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THE ROLE OF THE BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL
SETTLEMENTS IN SHAPING THE WORLD FINANCIAL
SYSTEM
CARL FELSENFELD* AND GENCI BILALI**
The Bank for International Settlements ("BIS") was set up in Basel,
Switzerland in 1923 to handle remaining financial issues from World
War II largely having to do with German reparation payments. It was
the first of the semi-public international banks. Over the years its func-
tions have changed and, largely since the late 1970's, it has served as the
situs for the world's central banks and financial regulators to pool ideas
and deal with international financial issues. A group of committees, com-
posed largely of representatives of central bankers, now meets at BIS and
has been issuing memoranda and drafts of regulations on a number of
subjects affecting international banking. Among these are the regulation
of capital, the management of international conglomerates, and problems
resulting from electronic banking.
Problems in world banking have sensitized observers to the absence of
coordinated regulation and to the need for some form of unified control.
That there is a need for one international bank regulator is increasingly
acknowledged. BIS comes closer than any other organization to fulfilling
this function. The International Monetary Fund ("IMF") comes close
but is too politicized and has been too involved in attempting to meet a
continuing series of crises to do any long range thinking. Only BIS has
attracted the intellectual resources to analyze and resolve international
problems in a thoughtful and deliberate manner. Only BIS output is be-
ing adopted in the world's banking centers.
BIS has been proposed as a world senior financial regulator. This ar-
ticle acknowledges the rationale for such a decision but argues that now is
not the time for such an attempt. Banking is, of course, conducted locally
even though its reach is international. To anoint any body as a senior
regulator with the power to impose rules would require massive compro-
mises among national regulators to achieve one central set of rules. It
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would also involve an abdication of measures of sovereignty by the con-
stituent states. An effort of this kind would risk destroying the whole
concept. Rather than start such a bold stroke at such an inopportune
time, this Article argues that the international banking world would fare
far better assisting BIS to proceed down the current track. As it contin-
ues to mature, and as its edicts are increasingly accepted throughout the
world it will continue to approach its rightful place as the world's bank
regulator.
1. Introduction
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3. Start of International Bank Supervision Authority
3.1. BIS-Related Activities
3.1.1. The Committee on Banking Supervision ("CBS")
3.1.2. The Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates
("Joint Forum")
3.1.3. The Committee on the Global Financial System
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thorities
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1. INTRODUCTION
Negotiations to create BIS, the oldest of the large international
banks, began in Paris in 1929.1 It was perceived then as an institu-
tion very different from today's reconstituted BIS. In 1932, when
the institution was less than three years old, a book about BIS be-
gan:
In March 1929, almost to a day two hundred years after the
1 THE BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS AND THE BASLE MEETINGS 9
(Margaret Home et al., trans. 1980) [hereinafter BIS AND THE BASLE MEETINGS].
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death of John Law, and within a few hundred yards of the
scene of his activities, the scheme of a bold experiment,
worthy of the genius of that financier, was elaborated in
Paris by a body of distinguished experts. It was pregnant
with immense possibilities, but also with great dangers. It
was as ambitious and as perilous as was John Law's scheme
for a bank of issue in the less advanced conditions of eight-
eenth-century France.
The world was taken by surprise when it was announced
that the Committee of Experts on Reparations had decided
to propose the establishment of an International Bank. The
novelty and boldness of the idea appeared fascinating to
some people, bewildering to others.
The Bank for International Settlements is not designed as a
superior authority over central banks .... No legal or po-
litical power, but the recognition of the necessity to co-
operate and the development of a strong public feeling
against the disturbers of harmony are the main factors
which.. . [BIS depends on] for its existence. 2
In 2002, as a testament to its growth and development, it was writ-
ten: "The BIS is without a peer in what it has accomplished." 3
As further tribute to BIS's success, some seventy years after its
creation, the world financial system and BIS itself had sufficiently
evolved so that the bank with, "no legal or political power" 4 was
nominated, "to perform in the domain of world financial markets
what national regulators do in domestic markets."5 It is the goal of
this article to trace that evolution and show how BIS-and, as we
shall soon see, its affiliates in Basel,6 Switzerland -won that nomi-
nation.7 We will also recommend that efforts to appoint it/them
2 PAUL EINZIG, THE BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETFLEMENTS 1, 4-5 (3d ed. 1932).
3 JAMES C. BAKER, THE BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS: EVOLUTION AND
EVALUATION, at xii (2002).
4 Id. at 5.
5 JOHN EATWELL & LANCE TAYLOR, GLOBAL FINANCE AT RISK, at x (2000).
6 We intend to use the American style spelling of the city where BIS is lo-
cated, "Basel." Europeans and other countries commonly spell it as "Basle."
7 As we will soon see infra Section 3, it may be the Bank for International Set-
2004]
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
the supreme international regulator not be pursued. While we be-
lieve that there is a legitimate need for this office, we do not believe
that BIS or its affiliated organizations should be supported for this
role - at least not now.
BIS functioned as a significant part of the world's banking sys-
tems from its dubious creation in 1929 to its position as nominee
for the world's senior financial regulator in 2000. From the start,
modesty was not BIS's prime virtue. It perceived itself as a major
cog in the international financial system. In 1931 it assisted in the
control of an international monetary crisis that was marked by
massive withdrawals of capital from the worst hit countries. The
Great Depression of the 1930's saw BIS involved with such major
issues as the proper place for exchange controls and the function of
the gold standard in dealing with international dislocations. BIS
participated in the discussion of stabilization efforts at the 1933
London Monetary and Economic Conference and had contributed
to their partial inclusion in the Tripartite Agreement among the
United States, England, and France in 1936.8
The worsening of the political situation in Europe in the late
1930's prevented further initiatives: World War II temporarily
ended the role of BIS in international regulatory activities, al-
though it achieved a unique place in a world at war in both finan-
cial dealings and reporting. Upon the end of the war, concepts for
a new world financial order were largely concentrated in the Bret-
ton Woods Conference held in New Hampshire, July 1944. It was
generally assumed that international financial affairs would be
centered in the newly-created IMF, which was to be based in
Washington, D.C., far from BIS. The Bretton Woods final declara-
tion consequently contained a resolution that BIS be liquidated.9
The resolution was never carried out because BIS almost im-
mediately assumed a central role in the post-war international
payment systems. BIS was, and is, a bank and from its creation it
performed the functions of a bank. The principal reason for its
tlements ("BIS") and it may be the Committee on Banking Supervision established
at BIS that is in reality the candidate for this global role. See EATWELL & TAYLOR,
supra note 5, at x. (speaking of "the foundations of global financial surveillance
and regulation that have already been laid at the Bank for International Settle-
ments in Basle").
8 HENRY H. SCHLOSS, THE BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS: AN
EXPERIMENT IN CENTRAL BANK COOPERATION 6, 83 (1958).
9 See BAKER, supra note 3, at 7 (describing the attempts made to "abolish
BIS").
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creation was the German reparations issue and it assisted -in part
as a direct lender to Germany-in providing the funds for those
payments. It also acted as a depository bank, for countries that re-
ceived reparations and suddenly had surplus reserves and also as a
general depository entirely apart from reparations. Within a year
after its creation, BIS had just under 1,800 million gold francs in
deposits, of which 800 million were unconnected with reparation
payments. 10
BIS also served a regulatory/supervisory function by provid-
ing a forum for the world's central banks in their efforts to effectu-
ate, first, the goals of Bretton Woods, and later, in their bank man-
agement functions. BIS was not created to be a central bank, but a
bank for central banks.1 The dominant function of central banks
has always been fiscal control, oversight of the money supply.
Whether central banks should simultaneously act as a regulator of
the local banking system has been and continues to be a bone of
contention with different countries going in different directions. A
recent article surveys thirty countries and concludes that nine give
their central banks regulatory responsibilities and twenty-one do
not.1 2 Clearly, the United States has taken a strong pro-regulatory
position since its Federal Reserve System ("FRS," the U.S. central
bank) regulates a major share of the American financial system in-
cluding national banks and all bank holding companies. England
has gone the other way. The Central Bank of England performed
regulatory functions until 1977 when those responsibilities were
given to the newly formed Securities and Investment Board (now
the Financial Services Authority, "FSA"). Therefore, it was not un-
natural that BIS should drift into regulatory activities.
BIS's Bretton Woods' work after World War II led, in turn, to
the reconstruction of the European economy and ongoing attempts
to remove trade and foreign exchange barriers within Western
Europe. The most significant outcome of these developments was
10 See SCHLOSS, supra note 8, at 57, 77-78, 85 (discussing the purpose of BIS's
creation).
11 In 2000, BIS had forty-nine central bank members; at the June 2000 Annual
Meeting in Basel, ninety-nine central banks attended with governors from sev-
enty-six central banks. See Bank for Int'l Settlements, Profile (June 2000), at 9 (pro-
viding a general profile of BIS), available at http://www.bis.org/about/profil
2000.pdf; see also BAKER, supra note 3, at 240 (discussing the criticisms and praise of
BIS).
12 Heidi Mandanis Schooner, The Role of Central Banks in Bank Supervision in
The United States and The United Kingdom, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 411, 417-422, fig.1
(2003).
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the creation in 1950 of the eminently successful European Pay-
ments Union ("EPU"), with BIS as a core participant in its plan-
ning. The major objective of EPU was to eliminate payment barri-
ers within Europe and enable full transferability as an adjunct to
the creation of free trade. Within the operation of the new EPU,
surpluses and deficits among trading partners were largely netted
and settled in terms of net credits. This meant that, compared to
the earlier trading system, comparatively little had to be settled in
the international media of dollars and gold. Gradually, full dollar
settlement was made possible, and full convertibility became a re-
ality not only within Europe, but the United States as well. BIS
was the agency chosen as the central clearing house for this new
and complex system.
The 1960's and early 1970's were periods of serious turmoil in
the international financial markets. Among key events was the col-
lapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange system that could not
accommodate the needs of international trade. In its place there
developed a system known as "managed floating," which recog-
nized acceptable exchange rates but permitted their flexibility
within certain bands. Difficulties were compounded by the crea-
tion of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
("OPEC") and the resulting worldwide rise in oil prices accompa-
nied by new and unprecedented financial surpluses in the middle
eastern oil producing countries. These had to be recycled, a proc-
ess that required the cooperation of the IMF, the major interna-
tional banks, and BIS. It was only the existence and efficiency of a
suitable international market that made this possible and it was
through BIS that the world's central banks were able to communi-
cate.
Increasingly during its decades of growth, the banking activi-
ties of BIS meshed with its evolving function as international bank
regulator. It was initially perceived as a place where central banks
could conveniently meet and share their problems. As a bank,
however, it also actively participated in solving those problems.
For example, BIS was itself a borrower; it received money both in
the form of deposits and as direct loans from institutions with sur-
plus funds.13 When informed by central banks that a local bank
was overly liquid, BIS would arrange to borrow from that institu-
tion, i.e., "to siphon off liquidity viewed as excessive by the central
13 BIS received both deposits and loans from oil-producing countries who
benefited from rises in oil prices.
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bank concerned." 14 In its various contacts with the central banks,
BIS was never far from a role as bank regulator.
At the end of 1974, BIS participated in an act that turned out to
be its most consequential step in the direction of international bank
regulation: it cooperated with the central bank governors of the
Group of Ten countries (the "G-10" countries) and Switzerland to
set up what was originally called the Committee on Banking Regu-
lation and Supervisory Practices, and is now know as the Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision (the "CBS"). As will be discussed be-
low,15 the CBS is not formally a unit of BIS, although it functions
and is widely accepted as one. The creation of the CBS was the re-
sult of a continuing association of central banks on the interna-
tional stage and, more near-term, from a series of international
banking disturbances including: the fourfold increase in petroleum
prices; a wide fluctuation in interest rates that reached record highs
in mid-1974; an international depression that deepened in 1974; the
removal in January 1974 of U.S. controls on capital outflows; and
the Herstatt Bank failure that is still cited to illustrate systemic
bank risks. 16
BIS, the CBS, and various related committees, such as the Joint
Forum, that will be dealt with together in Section 3, form a kind of
amorphous international conglomerate of bank regulators. When
BIS and/or the other groups are mentioned as a potential world fi-
nancial authority, it is really this body that is being referenced. We
will at appropriate times single out the particular committee that is
at work on a particular project and, to some degree, accuracy is en-
hanced in this way. At the same time, we see the forest better if we
down peddle the trees and deal with the group as a whole. If a
world regulator is ultimately appointed, it will be distilled from
this entire group and we are in fact seeing things correctly when
we consider international bank regulation as the task of this group.
The group has evolved in a consistent manner.
At its formation in 1974, the CBS did not attempt to regulate in-
ternational banking. Rather, it attended to "broad supervisory
standards and guidelines." 17 Peter Cooke, Director of Supervision
14 BIS AND THE BASLE MEETINGS, supra note 1, at 35.
15 See infra text surrounding note 115 (discussing the role of BIS as "secre-
tariat" for other committees).
16 All of these events are mentioned in Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System, Developments in International Financial Markets, 61 FED. RES. BULL.
605, 605-15 (1975).
17 Bank for International Settlements, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervi-
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of the Bank of England, and in 1984 the chairman of the CBS, de-
scribed its role at that time as follows:
The committee does not undertake a formal supernational
supervisory role .... [1It formulates and recommends
broad supervisory principles and guidelines of best prac-
tices in the hope and expectation that individual authorities
will take steps to implement them through detailed ar-
rangements--statutory or otherwise--which are best suited
to their own national systems.18
A marked change occurred in 1988 when CBS issued the Basel
Accord on Capital Adequacy (the "Basel Capital Accord").' 9
[Tihe capital agreement marked a quantum jump for the
Committee's role as a joint decisionmaking body. Previ-
ously, the Committee's role had been largely a forum for
the exchange of information, and a place where supervisors
could learn from each other and develop codes of best prac-
tice.
... [T]he capital agreement went much further.... Al-
though not legally enforceable as a treaty, and although the
Committee is not a formally constituted international or-
ganization, nonetheless the agreement is considered to be
binding on the members and the agreement itself states that
the Committee will continually monitor its application.20
The CBS's stature as an international bank regulator was en-
hanced in 1991, three years after it issued the Basel Capital Accord,
by the appointment of Gerald Corrigan, President of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, as its chairman. The Financial Times
described Mr. Corrigan as, "the leading US spokesman on supervi-
sion issues" and confirmed that his appointment "will add consid-
sion, at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/aboutbcbs.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
18 Joseph J. Norton, Capital Adequacy Standards: A Legitimate Regulatory Con-
cern for Prudential Supervision of Banking Activities?, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1299, 1337
(1989).
19 See infra Section 3 (discussing the goal of the Basel Capital Accord and the
subsequent amendments to the document).
20 Peter C. Hayward, Prospects for International Cooperation by Bank Supervisors,
24 INT'L LAW. 787, 790-91 (1990).
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erable stature to [the CBS]."2 1 The selection not only added gener-
ally to the stature of the CBS but highlighted its role as a nascent
international bank regulator.22
The life of BIS and its related companies can be divided into
four phases:
1. From its creation to 1988, it undertook banking func-
tions and opined generally on the international banking
system.
2. Starting in 1988, it began to assume the role of an unof-
ficial international bank regulator. Although it had no
official international status, its members- central banks
of the major banking countries -were obligated by the
nature of their membership to abide by its edicts and
the rest of the world took them seriously.
3. Starting in the late 1990's, it began to consider itself the
equivalent of an international bank regulator. Every
subject of significance was within its jurisdiction and,
although its legal powers were no greater, it assumed
that it had a right to make rules for local banks to ob-
serve in the conduct of their businesses.
4. There is widespread anticipation that at sometime in the
future a treaty mechanism will give it the power to en-
force its rules internationally.
Section 2 of this article gives a larger picture of BIS and its place
in the international banking system. Section 3 describes the place
of BIS, largely through the CBS, in bank regulation, the operation
that led to the consideration of BIS/CBS as the international bank
regulator. In Section 4 it is shown that the role of bank regulator is
being assumed by BIS/ the CBS through the major banking systems
21 David Lascelles, NY Fed Chief to Head International Banking Watchdog, FIN.
TIMEs, July 9, 1991, at 18.
22 See generally CARTER H. GOLEMBE, The Basle Committee and the Regulation of
U.S. Banks, in THE GOLEMBE REPORTS 162 (1992) (discussing the Basle Committee's
emerging role as a regulatory body). Mr. Golembe writes:
We can only guess at who all of the players were and what motivated
them. My guess is that when that story is finally written it will turn out
that the U.S. regulators played a major role in boot-strapping the Basle
Committee to its present position of eminence, probably with a great
deal of assistance from the Bank of England. And among the U.S. agen-
cies, the Federal Reserve Board probably deserves the most credit or
blame, depending upon one's assessment of what has been accom-
plished.
Id. at 172-73.
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of the world adopting its proposals. Section 5 describes the inter-
national banking system and the needs for a senior regulator, and
Section 6 presents the arguments that make BIS/the CBS a logical
candidate for that position. Section 7 gives the authors' position
that BIS/the CBS should not now be formally nominated for the
senior regulator position. A summary of this article and its conclu-
sions are in Section 8.
2. PROFILE OF BIS
Today, BIS stands as the world's oldest international financial
institution, remaining as the principal center for maintaining stabil-
ity in the international central banking cooperation among central
banks.23
BIS was formally created on January 20, 1930, at the Hague
Conference ("Hague Convention of 1930") with the main purpose
of implementing Germany's reparation (settlement) payments to
victorious Allied nations.24 The newly established bank was to
take over the functions previously performed by the Agent General
for Reparations in Berlin, Germany, which included collection,
administration and distribution of the annuities payable as repara-
tions. This is also why the bank was named as a bank "for interna-
tional settlements." 25
The reparation payments were to be paid into BIS in German
currency and would serve as collateral for a hard-currency bond
issue to be provided by the French government. Nothing came of
the bond issue because the 1929 Great Depression in the United
States had such an impact on the world economy before BIS com-
menced its activity.
In addition to its role in Germany's reparation payments, BIS
was also created to act as a trustee for international loans issued to
finance reparations (often called "Young Plan" or "Dawes Plan"),
to promote central bank cooperation and to facilitate operations of
international financial activities. 26 Exactly how BIS founders were
23 For more information about BIS, see Bank for International Settlements,
About BIS, at http://www.bis.org/about/index.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2004).
24 Convention respecting the Bank for International Settlements, Jan. 20, 1930,
104 L.N.T.S. 441 [hereinafter Hague Convention of 1930], available at http://
www.bis.org/about/convention.htm#P21_2653 (last visited Oct. 4, 2004).
25 See BAKER, supra note 3, at 2 (detailing the formation of BIS after World War
II).
26 See id. at xi-xii (describing how BIS has formulated rules and proposals in
the area of international banking).
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to promote central bank cooperation was unclear at the time. Nev-
ertheless, the financial crises of the late 1920's and early 1930's may
have led central bankers to believe that a central financial institu-
tion was required to coordinate efforts of central bankers and fi-
nancial regulatory authorities in preventing future financial crises.
Basel, a city located in Switzerland, was chosen as the bank's
headquarters. 27 In addition, the bank had two representative of-
fices, one located in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
of the People's Republic of China,28 and the other in Mexico City, 29
which facilitate the bank's operational activities for Asia and the
Pacific, as well as for the Americas, respectively. 30 The bank was
initially funded by the central banks of its founding countries:
France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Japan,31 and the United King-
dom.
BIS was created as a commercial bank and adopted the legal
structure of a Swiss limited company with publicly held shares.
BIS is subject to neither Swiss banking nor corporate laws. The
bank's immunity from Swiss government interference and taxes in
both peace and war was guaranteed by the Hague Convention of
1930, which established BIS as an international organization gov-
erned by international law with the privileges and immunities nec-
essary for the performance of its role.32
27 Switzerland may have been chosen because of its tradition as a neutral
country.
28 See Host Country Agreement Between the Bank for International Settle-
ments and the Government of the People's Republic of China Relating to the Es-
tablishment and Status of a Representative Office of the Bank for International
Settlements in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Re-
public of China, May 11, 1998, BIS-P.R.C., BIS Basic Texts 2003, art. 1 (establishing
a BIS branch in Hong Kong), available at http://www.bis.org/about/
hostctryhk.pdf.
29 See Host Country Agreement Between the Bank for International Settle-
ments and the United Mexican States Relating to the Establishment and Status of a
Representative Office of the Bank for International Settlements in Mexico, Nov. 5,
2001, BIS-Mex., art. 2, BIS Basic Texts 2003 (establishing a BIS branch in Mexico),
available at http://www.bis.org/about/hostctrymx.htm.
30 The bank has not yet established any representative office for Africa or the
Middle East. Regardless of the bank's failure to establish its presence in these re-
gions, some central banks there have already started to implement the bank's di-
rectives.
31 See Hague Convention of 1930, supra note 24, n.2 ("Based on an announce-
ment made by the Swiss government on December 26, 1952, Japan renounced all
rights, titles and interests under the Convention.").
32 See id. art. 1 ("Switzerland undertakes to grant to the Bank for International
Settlements... the following Constituent Charter having force of law ... ").
955
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The international legal personality of BIS and the privileges
and immunities which it has enjoyed in Switzerland since its
founding were also "reconfirmed" in other documents such as the
Brussels Protocol of July 30, 193633 and the Headquarters Agree-
ment entered between BIS and the Swiss government on February
10, 1987. 34 It is apparent from these documents that BIS has a legal
status in Switzerland similar to that accorded to the many other in-
ternational organizations which have been established there since
1930.
BIS's first annual report disclosed its total assets as of March 31,
1931 to be 1,901,148,912.91 in Swiss gold francs.35 Today the gold
franc of BIS weights just over 0.29 grams, identical with the gold
parity of the Swiss franc at the time of BIS's founding in 1930. In
September 1936, by which time a number of leading countries had
left the gold standard, the gold parity of the Swiss franc was sus-
pended. BIS employs the gold franc solely for balance sheet pur-
poses in order to convert assets and liabilities expressed in U.S.
dollars ("USD") into gold francs at the fixed rate of USD208 per
ounce of fine gold (equivalent to 1 gold franc = USD1.94). All
other currencies are converted into gold francs based on their mar-
ket rates against the USD.36
When BIS's initial capital was raised, the subscribing institu-
tions were given the option of taking up the whole of their allo-
cated shares or arranging for those shares to be subscribed to by
the public. As a result, part of the Belgian and French issues and
the whole of the American issue are not held by the institutions to
which they were originally allocated. In all, some eighty-six per-
cent of BIS issued share capital is registered in the names of central
banks; the remaining fourteen percent is held by private share-
holders. While all shares carry equal rights with respect to the an-
nual dividend, private shareholders have no right to attend or vote
at the annual BIS General Meetings. All rights of voting and repre-
33 Protocol Regarding the Immunities of the Bank for International Settle-
ments, July 30, 1936, art. 1, 197 L.N.T.S. 31, 33-34, available at http://www.bis.org/
about/protoc.pdf.
34 See Agreement between the Swiss Federal Council and the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements to determine the Bank's legal status in Switzerland, Feb 10,
1987, BIS-Switz., art. 1, BIS Basic Texts 2003, (acknowledging the international le-
gal status of BIS), available at http://www.bis.org/about/headquart-en.pdf.
35 See BAKER, supra note 3, at 15 (summarizing the changes in the conversion
of assets held by BIS in gold francs from a variable to a fixed rate).
36 Id.
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sentation are reserved for the central bank of the country in which
the relevant national issue of shares was initially subscribed. 37
As of March 31, 2003, BIS balance sheet showed total assets of
92.8 billion gold francs, with capital and reserves of 5.5 billion gold
francs.38 These assets are held in gold, cash, treasury bills, time
deposits and advances in currencies, securities purchased under
resale agreements, government and other securities at term, land
or buildings and equipment, and other miscellaneous assets.39 In
terms of the market price of gold at that time, BIS total assets were
USD180 billion and its capital and reserves amounted to USD10.6
billion.40 Regardless of these numbers, the true value of the bank is
uncertain. There could be other assets, such as tracts of valuable
land around Basel, which do not appear on BIS's balance sheet.41
A majority of BIS shareholders and members are still the cen-
tral banks (comprising almost eighty-six percent of the bank's is-
sued shares capital) that originally purchased its shares, and the
remains of the original U.S. bank syndicate. Several central banks,
including those of France, Belgium and Denmark, along with the
U.S. syndicate of private banks, have sold substantial portions of
their holdings to the public. However, only central banks can
vote.42 The private shareholders do not have a right to attend, or to
vote at BIS General Meetings.
Although all its depositors are central banks, BIS has consis-
tently operated at a profit and therefore has not required a subsidy
or aid from any government. Moreover, since BIS provided a safe
and convenient depository for the gold holdings of the European
central banks, it swiftly became the bank used by central banks.
37 See generally Kristin K. Howell, Regional and International Cooperation and
Monetary Stability: The Roles of the International Monetary Fund and the Bank for In-
ternational Settlements, 39 RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE ECONOMICHE E COM-
MERCIALI, No. 10-11, at 83348 (1992) (describing the different roles of the IMF and
BIS in promoting international trade).
38 BANK OF INT'L SETTLEMENTS, Balance Sheet at 31 March 2003, in 2003 ANNUAL
REPORT 73, 181, 182-85 (2003), available at http://www.bis.org/banking/e-
balancesheet.pdf.
39 Id. at 182.
40 "The exchange rate used at that date was 1 gold franc = US $ 1.94 and the
price of gold used for these calculations was a fixed rate of US $208 per ounce of
fine gold." BAKER, supra note 3, at 15.
41 See BAKER, supra note 3, at ch. 1.
42 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Bank for International Settlements,
FEDPOINTS, at http://www.ny.frb.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed22.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 8, 2004).
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The 1930's had increasing number of financial panics in Europe,
and a worsening depression in the United States. As a result the
governors in charge of major central banks were concerned that the
international financial system would not survive the increased
economic pressures unless they closely coordinated their rescue ef-
forts: "[tihe obvious meeting spot for this desperately needed co-
ordination was BIS, where they regularly went.., to arrange gold
swap settlements." 43
BIS's central mission of reparations payments concluded some-
time around 1932.
During World War II, when nations battled, their central banks
maintained business activities. BIS was thus able to continue oper-
ating in Basel, though monthly meetings were temporarily sus-
pended. At the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, the U.S. gov-
ernment supported calling for the liquidation of BIS. This
resolution followed Czech accusations that BIS had laundered
money stolen by the Nazis during World War II. The notion, naYve
as it was, was that the new international financial institution, the
IMF, could replace BIS in its settlement and money-clearing func-
tions. Although the Bretton Woods Conference considered liqui-
dation of BIS, it did not make any decision on its fate.44
The IMF could not replace BIS because BIS was more than an
international clearing house. BIS was, "a supranational organiza-
tion for setting and implementing global monetary strategy." 45
These leadership positions simply could not be accomplished by a
democratic international agency similar to the United Nations
("UN"). The central bankers, not about to let their club be
snatched away from them, quietly let the U.S. resolution die. In-
stead of "going out of business," BIS gained more authority, par-
ticularly in arranging financial transactions to preserve the stability
of international financial markets.46




46 The BIS, besides ensuring its survival, also maintained its original name,
the Bank for International Settlements, although the mission of the German set-
tlement payments process had ended. Perhaps this was a tactical strategy de-
signed to give the international community an impression that the bank was stillfacilitating its settlement payments function, and therefore avoiding any protestfrom the international community, already sensitive to the bank's murky transac-
tions during the Nazi period.
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So, BIS re-emerged as the main clearing house for European
currencies and, behind the scenes, as the favored meeting place of
central bankers. When the USD came under attack in the 1960's,
massive swaps of money and gold were arranged at BIS to bolster
the USD. It was ironic that, as the then president of BIS observed,
"[tihe United States, which had wanted to kill BIS, suddenly finds
it indispensable." 47
"Since 1930, central bank cooperation at BIS has taken place
through regular meetings in Basel of central bank Governors and
experts from central banks and other [national financial regulatory]
agencies."48 In support, BIS develops its own research in financial
and monetary economics, and makes important contributions to
the collection, compilation, and dissemination of economic and fi-
nancial statistics. 49
When necessary, BIS has also provided or organized emer-
gency financing to support the international monetary system:
"[diuring the 1931-33 financial crisis, BIS organised support credits
for both the Austrian and German central banks. In the 1960's, BIS
arranged special support credits for the Italian lira (1964) and the
French franc (1968), and two so-called Group Arrangements (1966
and 1968) to support [the British] sterling."50
Following World War II until the early 1970's, BIS monetary
policy focused on implementing and defending the Bretton Woods
system. The focus shifted over following two decades to managing
cross-border capital flow transactions. This shift followed the oil
crisis and then the international debt crisis of that time. More re-
cently, BIS provided finance to the stabilization programs the IMF
led for the default loans of Mexico in 1982 and Brazil in 1998, and
in the Asian crisis in 1997, and more.51
All the above crises, as well as the issue of financial stability in
the wake of economic integration and globalization, have received
considerable attention in the international banking community.
This has brought the issue of regulatory supervision of interna-
tionally active banks to the attention of BIS, which resulted in the
47 See Epstein, supra note 43, at 44 (describing how BIS controls the monetary
activities of the free world).
48 Bank for International Settlements, BIS History (une 2003) [hereinafter BIS
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Basel Capital Accord 52 and its revision in 2004, Basel 1.53
Apart from fostering monetary policy cooperation, BIS has al-
ways performed "traditional" banking functions for the central
bank community (for example, gold and foreign exchange transac-
tions), as well as serving trustee and agency functions. BIS was the
agent for the EPU between 1950 and 1958, providing assistance in
restoring the convertibility of European currencies after World
War II. Similarly, BIS acted as the agent for various European ex-
change rate arrangements, including the European Monetary Sys-
tem between 1979 and 1994, which preceded the move to a single
currency, the euro.54
Even though an isolationist U.S. Congress officially refused to
allow the U.S. Federal Reserve Board (the "FRB") to participate in
BIS or to accept shares in it (which were instead held in trust by the
First National City Bank), the chairman of the FRB quietly and fre-
quently attended important meetings at BIS's headquarters 55 Evi-
dently, world monetary policy was too important for the chairman
to leave to national politicians.
The fact that the first president appointed to BIS (1930-1935)
was an American banker, Gates W. McGarrah (formerly of Chase
National Bank & the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank), shows that by
1930, the United States was a financial force on the international
scene.56
In the 1940-1946 period, the BIS Board of Directors (the
52 See Basel Comm. On Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capi-
tal Measurements and Capital Standards (July 1988) [hereinafter Basel Capital Accord]
(presenting, "the outcome of the [BIS] Committee's work.., to secure interna-
tional convergence of supervisory regulations governing the capital adequacy of
international banks"), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04A.pdf (last
visited Sept. 16, 2004).
53 See Basel Comm. On Banking Supervision, Basel II: International Convergence
of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework (June 2004) [here-
inafter Basel II] (setting "out the details of the agreed Framework for measuring
capital adequacy and the minimum standard to be achieved" as agreed by the na-
tional supervisory authorities represented on the Committee), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl07.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2004).
54 BIS History, supra note 48.
55 The Federal Reserve Board ("FRB") has become a leading member of BIS,
before and after its formal representation in BIS Board of Directors in 1994. Either
then Chairman Paul Volcker or Governor Henry Wallich attended almost every
"Basel weekend" meeting.
56 See ANTHONY SAMPSON, THE MONEY LENDERS: BANKERS AND A WORLD IN
TURMOIL 45 (1981) (detailing the history of banking with emphasis on post-World
War II international banking development).
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"Board") elected another American banker, Thomas H. McKittrick,
as president of BIS, and at its General Meetings it has consistently
appointed a New York bank to exercise the voting rights carried by
the shares of the American issue. In addition, close personal con-
tact is regularly maintained between BIS principal officials and the
FRB officers. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York is the BIS cor-
respondent to the U.S. market.5 7
No American official served as a director or alternate director
of BIS until 1994.58 Then, at its General Meeting on July 12, 1994,
the Board took note of, and welcomed, the intention of the FRB to
occupy the two seats on the Board, which the FRB had been enti-
tled to since 1930. An Extraordinary General Meeting of BIS was
convened on September 13, 1994 to approve a minor change in the
bank's statutes, taking account of the evolution of the FRB. Subse-
quently, on September 13, 1994, Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the
FRB, became an ex-officio member of the Board. The Board also
appointed William J. McDonough, then President of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, as a member of the Board for a period
of three years beginning September 13, 1994.59
The fact that the FRB formally joined BIS went almost unno-
ticed in the U.S. banking and financial community, with the excep-
tion of a few dozen U.S. banking experts. There were no U.S. Con-
gressional hearings, nor was there a public statement by the U.S.
President or Secretary of State. Not until 1995, almost a year later,
did the New York Times report that the FRB had "joined" BIS, which
was, interestingly enough, characterized as an "obscure global
bank [that] move[d] into the light."60
Since its inception, the relationships between BIS and European
central bankers have gradually developed to the extent that some-
times the bank is regarded as a "European" bank. Until 1994, BIS
did function as the principal organization for cooperation among
57 See generally Charles J. Siegman, The Bank for International Settlements and the
Federal Reserve, 80 FED. RES. BULL. 900 (1994) (describing the Federal Reserve's rela-
tionship with BIS).
58 See BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, 65TH ANNUAL REPORT 205-06 (65th ed.
1995) (listing changes in the Board of Directors (the "Board") and Management in
the fiscal year ending March 31, 1995).
59 See Reginald H. Howe, The BIS and Greenspan: Freezing-Out the U.S. Consti-
tution (Oct. 27, 2000) (discussing BIS's planned freeze-out of private shareholders),
available at http:www.golensextant.com/BIS.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2004).
60 See Keith Bradsher, Obscure Global Bank Moves Into the Light, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 5, 1995, Business, at 1 (reporting on the emergency of BIS into the public's
consciousness).
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Europe's major central banks, of which several were and continue
to remain friendly toward gold. But, with the signing of the Treaty
establishing a European Union in 1992,61 and the creation of the
European Monetary Institute ("EMI") in 1994, a predecessor or-
ganization to the European Central Bank, BIS has faced the pros-
pect of playing a rapidly reducing role in European monetary af-
fairs. 62
Observers feared that the creation of a unified European finan-
cial institution would jeopardize the future role of BIS. However,
BIS was quick to assure bankers otherwise. For example, in 1994,
when Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy resigned from his post as Gen-
eral Manager of BIS in order to become head of the EMI, his re-
placement, Andrew Crockett, said that he, "did not foresee the
EMI... impinging on the work of the Basel-based BIS, which is
widely regarded as the central bankers' central bank ... "63 Mr.
Crockett further added that, "the EMI would enable BIS to refocus
on global issues and develop its role as a forum for collaboration
between central banks in the monetary and regulatory fields."64
It may have been a coincidence, perhaps a well-coordinated
step, that at the same time BIS's role in European monetary affairs
was diminishing because European central bankers were focusing
on the creation of a European Central Bank, the FRB decided to
join BIS. The FRB may have felt that it was the right time to fill the
vacuum.
Since its inception, BIS established a remarkable pattern of se-
crecy. Central bankers sought complete anonymity in their activi-
ties. They comprised BIS membership and met monthly to discuss
matters of relevance to economic and banking policy. The success
of the organization depended on the secrecy of its meetings and
the trust created among central bankers through their discussions
at their frequent meetings.
Central bankers paid particular attention in finding a discreet
location for the head-offices of BIS. Upon careful review of various
61 Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 191) 1, 31 I.L.M. 253 (treaty
establishing a European Union).
62 See generally Economic and Monetary Union ("EMU") (describing the three
stages to the Economic and Monetary Union), available at http://
www.ecb.int/ecb/history/emu/html/index.en.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2004).
63 See Colin Narbrough, France Demands Action to Stabilise Currencies, THE
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locations, the central bankers chose an abandoned building (for-
merly a hotel named "Grand Hotel et Savoy Hotel Univers"), 65 as
well as premises above the adjacent candy store (known as Frey's
Chocolate Shop).66 The central bankers decided not to put a sign
on the premises in order to disguise the activity of BIS inside such
premises. Even central bankers and guests visiting BIS were led
through the entrance to Frey's shop, which was conveniently lo-
cated near the railroad station of Basel. If the walls within BIS's
premises could talk, they would reveal discussions and decisions
made by the central bankers on issues of devaluation or defending
of currencies, fixing the price of gold, regulation of off-shore bank-
ing, raising or lowering interest rates, etc. The central bankers also
purposely left the public-at-large unaware of BIS's role and activi-
ties in shaping of international banking and financial system.67
With time, central bankers saw a need to relax their sense of
closeness and anonymity in conducting the business of BIS. The
first sign of openness was seen in May 1997, when the central
bankers decided to relocate BIS. The new headquarters was lo-
cated in an eighteen story circular skyscraper in center of Basel.
This building, which is called the Tower of Basel, has become a
well-known historic landmark in Basel, attracting numerous visi-
tors and tourists from all over the world. However, some central
bankers grew uncomfortable and concerned with the increase of
tourism to BIS's premises. Some of the central bankers openly ex-
pressed their feelings. For example, Dr. Fritz Leutwiler, former
president of BIS, said "[tihat [attention] was the last thing we
wanted." In expressing his discontent with moving to the "Basel
Tower," Dr. Leutwiler added that, "[i]f it had been up to me, it
never would have been built [here]." 68
Inside the walls of Basel Tower, BIS's central bank members
and staff are surrounded by deluxe accommodations and efficient
65 The building, which was formerly the Grand Hotel et Savoy Hotel Univers at
Centralbahnstrasse 7, Basel, and a series of adjacent buildings taken over either
wholly or partially, was where the Bank had its seat from 1930 until 1977.
66 Epstein, supra note 43. The BIS purchased a new office building con-
structed at Centralbahnplatz 2, Basel, and moved in 1977. Additionally, the Bank
built a sports center in Kreuzackerweg, Bottmingen, (Canton of Baselland) which
was inaugurated in 1972.
67 See BIS AND THE BASLE MEETINGS, supra note 1, at 59 (describing how the ex-
change of views among central-bank economists "tend to be extremely frank" be-
cause of the confidential nature of these meetings).
68 Epstein, supra note 43, at 45.
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services. Those who work in the Basel Tower live in their own"world" with central heating, air-conditioning, and fire-
extinguishing systems; its own nuclear bomb shelter; indoor health
care and dental services; etc. An impressive part of BIS's archives,
where books, materials and database are preserved in a great order
and privacy. Even today BIS's archive is heavily secured, allowing
only limited access to outsiders.
The Basel Tower has a functional lay out. For example, the cen-
tral bankers have access to a restaurant on the top floor of the
tower that provides a great view while they enjoy a quality dining
experience. Underneath the restaurant, the central bankers' offices
and pertinent services (conference room, secretarial working sta-
tions, etc.), are located on three separate floors of the Basel Tower.
The offices of the staff (traders, gold traders, etc.) who carry out fi-
nancial transactions and other services on behalf of BIS, are located
on the lower floors of the Basel Tower. The electronic database
system of BIS is connected directly to the central banks that are BIS
members. Through this system, the staff of BIS provides central
banks with access to updated financial data related to international
monetary situations and related information. Describing the type
of work environment inside the Basel Tower, the former BIS gen-
eral manager, Gunther Schleiminger said, "[BIS] tries to provide a
complete clubhouse for central bankers.., a home away from
home." 69
BIS earned an unenviable reputation for its readiness to serve
the Nazi regime. In 1938, when Hitler marched into Prague, BIS
nearly collapsed in its rush to surrender the gold that the Czecho-
slovakian government had left with the bank for safekeeping.70
Two other examples of BIS's bias can be noted.
First, BIS arranged the transfer of USD378 million of what was
in effect, gold looted from the coffers of invaded Austria, Czecho-
slovakia, Holland and Belgium into the account of the German
Reichbank.
Second, in 1942, plans for the projected U.S. invasion of Algeria
were leaked to the governor of the French National Bank, who
immediately contacted his German colleague in BIS (SS Gruppen-
69 Id.
7o See William Clarke, Nazi Gold: The Role of the Central Banks - Mhere Does the
Blame Lie?, 8 CENTRAL BANKING (Summer 1997) (discussing the accusations against
the behavior of Swiss banks after World War II), available at
http://www.bigeye.com/nazigold.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2004).
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fuehrer Baron Kurt von Schroder of the Stein Bank of Cologne),
and transferred nine billion gold francs - via BIS - to Algiers. The
Germans and their French correspondents made a profit of some
USD175 million in this U.S. dollar exchange scam.71
BIS has always tried to keep a low profile with respect to its ac-
tivity during the Nazi regime. As the former general manager of
BIS, Andrew Crockett said on the subject, "[ilt is fair to say [the
bank's] original focus has been to establish facts rather than to try
to guess the motivations and opinions' of the wartime manage-
ment."72
In the face of its accomplishments, BIS continues to stand in the
shadow of its past controversial role in laundering Nazi gold in the
late 1930's and early 1940's. However, while it has been asserted
that BIS entered into unlawful transactions in gold during the Nazi
period, at least one commentator has said that, "there is very little
historical documentation presented to support the argument." 73 It
remains the duty of historians to uncover the historical truth of this
dark period in the activity of the bank.
Central banks regularly transfer deposits to BIS. By commin-
gling part of their reserves in what amounts to large blocks of mu-
tual funds of short-term investments, the central banks create a
convenient screen behind which they can conceal their own depos-
its and withdrawals in financial centers around the world. For ex-
ample, if BIS places funds in France, central banks do not have to
answer to their respective governments for investing in France.
Central banks are perceived to pay high fees to use such transac-
tional services from BIS. It becomes apparent that, regardless of its
name, BIS is far more than - or perhaps different from - a bank.
71 See CHARLES HIGHAM, TRADING WITH THE ENEMY: AN ExPost OF THE NAZI-
AMERICAN MONEY PLOT 1933-1949, 10-11 (1983) (arguing the existence of a mone-
tary plot between the financial establishment in the United States and the Nazi
regime).
72 See Alan Cowell, Global Central Bank Says It Held Gold Looted by Nazis, N.Y.
TIMES, May 13, 1997, at A8 (reporting that BIS gold transactions with the Nazis in-
cluded looted gold).
73 One of the major factors limiting the historical documentation has been
that BIS did not open its archives until the 1990's. Under BIS open archive rules,
all records relating to the Bank's business and operational activities which are
over thirty years old are available for consultation, with the exception of a very
limited number of records that remain private or confidential even after thirty
years have elapsed. A.M. Endres, The Bankfor International Settlements: Evolution
and Evaluation, EH.NET (July 2003) (reviewing James C. Baker's book on the
history of BIS from a generalized vantage point), at http://www.eh.net/
bookreviews/library/0645.shtml (last visited Sept. 1, 2004).
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From the outside, BIS seems to be a small, technical organiza-
tion. Just eighty-six of its 298 employees are ranked as professional
staff. But BIS is not a monolithic institution. Artfully concealed
within the shell of an international bank, like a series of Chinese
boxes one inside another, are the real groups and services the cen-
tral bankers need- and pay to support.74
BIS emerged over time as a major international organization
charged with the task of increasing the efficiency of regulatory and
supervisory activities for improvement of the international bank-
ing system. BIS ultimately claimed a major place in world financial
affairs. It became part of the international cooperative effort post-
1945, ensuring the stability of the international financial system.
During the 1960's, BIS started to analyze international financial
markets, including the new euro currency markets, and developed
new databases on international capital and currency stocks and
flows. During the 1970's, BIS started to study potential risk in de-
veloping economies. It was among the first financial institutions to
warn of the possibility of a sovereign debt crisis in loan default
matters. The independence of central banks from their respective
governments, a goal sought by most central banks reflects the im-
age of BIS, which has a most ambiguous background from the
other international financial institutions.
BIS confirms the belief of most of its members that central
banks should act independently of their home governments. The
bank holds extensive discussions with central bankers, encourag-
ing them to remain as independent in their activities as possible.
This independence is visible in the Bundesbank (Central Bank of
Germany), whose president, "is not required to consult with gov-
ernment officials or answer the questions of [the German] Parlia-
ment-even about such critical issues as raising interest rates." 75
The Bundesbank President has even refused, "to fly to Basel in a
government plane, preferring instead to drive in his Mercedes lim-
ousine." 76
In order to safeguard BIS's independence, a director of BIS
cannot be an official of a government or a member of a legislative
body, unless he is the governor of the central bank. It is precisely
this provision which gives BIS its characteristic as a central bank-
ers' club, and its resistance against the intrusion of government of-
74 Epstein, supra note 43, at 46.
75 Id. at 47.
76 Id.
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ficials.77 For example, when Dr. Leutwiler became president of BIS
in 1982, he insisted that no government official be allowed to visit
during a "Basel weekend." He recalled that in 1968, U.S. Treasury
Undersecretary, Fred Deming had been in Basel and stopped in at
the bank. "When word got around that an American Treasury of-
ficial was at BIS," Leutwiler said, "bullion traders, speculating that
the U.S. was about to sell its gold, began a panic in the market."78
Further, BIS shares a strong preference for pragmatism and
flexibility over any economic ideology. Rather than resorting to
rhetoric and invoking principles, BIS searches for any remedy that
will relieve a potential financial crisis. For example, in the external
debt rescheduling of Brazil in 1993, Peru in 1997, and Cote d'Ivoire
in 1998, BIS stepped up its efforts, acting as an agent for these debt
reschedulings. In the late 1980's, when Brazil defaulted on its loan
payments, BIS loaned monies, guaranteed by the central bank
members. In this case, the bank quietly decided to extend the
deadline instead of collecting the money from guarantors. As one
former high official of BIS summed it up, BIS is, "constantly en-
gaged in a balancing act-without a safety net."79
Fundamentally, "the most important belief of [the BIS] inner
club is its conviction that when the bell tolls for any central bank, it
tolls for them all."8 0 For instance, in the Mexican default crisis of
1982, the issue for BIS was not the welfare of Mexico but rather, the
stability of the entire banking system and its central banks. Mexico
had been constantly borrowing overnight funds from the interbank
market in New York to pay the interest on its USD80 billion exter-
nal debt. Each time, Mexico had to borrow more money to repay
the interest on the previous transactions, and within a few months,
it had borrowed nearly one quarter of all the "Fed Funds" (a
banker's term for loans between banks). The FRB found this an
emergency situation requiring its intervention and asked BIS to
take a leading role in the escalating situation. BIS realized that
Mexico's entire financial system was a time bomb, and in less than
forty-eight hours, BIS responded to the Mexican central bank's
desperate need to get out of the interbank market by arranging a
77 See STATUTES OF THE BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, Jan. 20, 1930
(amended Mar. 10, 2003) [hereinafter THE BIS STATUTES] (establishing the BIS),
available at http://www.bis.org/about/statutes-en.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2004).
78 Epstein, supra note 43, at 47.
79 Id. at 48 (quoting Dr. Leutwiler).
80 Id. at 47.
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temporary bridging loan of USD1.85 billion. While in the press,
money for this loan appeared to have come from BIS, almost all the
funds came from the central bank members, including the FRB,
Bundesbank, Swiss National Bank, Bank of England, Bank of Italy,
and Bank of Japan. BIS undertook virtually no risk in this rescue
operation but rather coordinated assistance among central banks.81
The central banks' efforts, led by the FRB, rescued one of their
own, the Mexican central bank, and avoided the potential spread
of the financial crises.82
However, the bailout of Mexico was only a temporary victory
for BIS. Other countries, including Argentina, Chile, Venezuela,
Brazil, the Philippines, and Russia have faced similar default situa-
tions and BIS has repeated its role as a crises manager.83
Financial interventions from BIS have created considerable
concern among critics who do not share BIS's philosophy. Some of
these critics prefer that the FRB, instead of BIS, worry about finan-
cial crises such as Brazil and the rest of Latin America. Others
have argued that the bank does not have the experience or facilities
to become a sort of IMF, extinguishing financial crises around the
world.84
On one hand, the central bank members publicly pay lip ser-
vice to the ideal of maintaining the character of BIS, and not turn-
ing it into a lender of last resort for the world. On the other hand,
they are in constant discussions among each others for finding
ways to minimize or prevent occurrence of financial crises in weak
markets. In the end, this approach makes sense because in cases of
financial crises BIS uses the capital invested by central bank mem-
bers. The quicker central bankers extinguish the "fires" created
from financial crisis in the world, the safer their monies are with
BIS. Presently, central banker members seem determined to con-
s Id.
82 See Mark Matthews & Carl M. Cannon, Clinton Bypasses Congress, Moves to
Rescue the Peso, BALT. SUN, Feb. 1, 1995, at 1A (discussing President Clinton's ef-
forts to alleviate the financial crisis in Mexico).
83 Robert E. Norton, Argentina Hails Latin Cooperation, AM. BANKER, Apr. 3,
1984, at 2; see also Guillermo Ortiz, Recent Emerging Market Crisis - What have
we learned?, Speech at the Per Jacobsson Lecture (Jul. 7, 2002), available at
http://www.bis.org/events/agm2002/sp020707.pdf (discussing the aftermath of
the financial crisis in Mexico) (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
84 See Catherine L. Mann, Market Mechanisms to Reduce the Need for IMF Bail-
outs, INST. FOR INT'L ECON. (1999) (evaluating the role of the IMF as the, "interna-
tional lender of last resort"), at http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb99-4.htm
(last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
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tinue maintaining their double standard (for the public and among
themselves) when it comes to protecting the safety net of their in-
vestment with BIS.85 Through financial crises, and its success and
failures, BIS has cultivated a low profile as the banker from which
the international banking system can scheme its way out of the re-
strictions placed on the insolvent banks during financial crises.
The governance of BIS is determined by its statutes.86 These
governing statutes restrict BIS to granting only short-term loans
(typically less than thirty days). Moreover, all loans must be gov-
ernment-guaranteed, or backed with gold deposited at BIS.
The main duties of BIS87 include:
* To purchase, sell, open accounts and maintain custody
in gold, on its own behalf and/or the central banks' be-
half;
* To loan to or borrow from the central banks;
* To enter into short-term obligation transactions, such as
bills of exchange, promissory notes, or checks, on its
own behalf and/or the central banks' behalf;
* To purchase or sell negotiable securities;
* To discount and re-discount bills from its own portfolio
or the central banks' portfolios;
* To create and maintain bank accounts with the central
banks;
* To accept deposits from the central banks and other
parties;88
* To act as agent or correspondent of the central banks;
and,
* To act as trustee or agent in international settlement
transactions.8 9
85 See generally Epstein, supra note 43, at 47-48 (describing the "inner club" of
powerful central bankers and their business principles and practices).
86 See The BIS Statutes, supra note 77, art. 24 (listing prohibited activities of
BIS).
87 Id. at arts. 21 and 22.
88 Other deposits may pertain to trustee agreements for international settle-
ments, as well as other deposits within BIS's scope of activity.
89 From 1986 through 1999, BIS served as an agent for the private clearing
and settlement system of the European Currency Unit at the creation of the EMU.
Since the early 1980's, acting as "agent" of the World Bank, BIS has arranged
bridge loans for member states and emerging market countries. As a result, these
loans sped countries' access to IMF or World Bank credits. Of recent note, at the
end of 1998, BIS arranged a $13.28 billion dollars credit facility for Brazil as part of
a financial support program.
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However, BIS, unlike a central bank, is prohibited from print-
ing currency; loaning or opening accounts to governments; acquir-
ing a significant interest in any business transaction; or engaging in
real estate transactions. 90
BIS's purchase and sale transactions on behalf of central banks
are kept highly confidential. Presently, approximately 130 central
banks and international financial institutions use BIS's opera-
tions.91 As of March 2002, the total currency deposits kept with BIS
reached USD154 billion, which represents almost 7.6% of world
foreign exchange reserves. Upon request from a central bank, BIS
provides them with the available funds that are part of the reserve
assets of the central bank with BIS. Therefore, an important role in
the activity of BIS its level of asset liquidity. BIS acts very
shrewdly and carefully in investing its funds. Large portions of
these funds are put principally as direct investments in large inter-
national banks and financial institutions. The remaining funds are
used to purchase short-term government securities, buying and
selling gold, entering into foreign exchange transactions, etc.
BIS is actively looking to develop its investment services, re-
sponding particularly to the concern of central banks to increase
the return on their foreign assets. Therefore, to assist central banks
with longer-term reserve management, BIS offers investment in-
struments of up to five years.92
BIS also offers a variety of asset management services for cen-
tral banks, including enhancement of individual customer services,
knowledge exchange, dedicated portfolio mandates, an open-end
fund structure, and allowing blocks of customers to invest in
common pools of assets.93 BIS makes short-term loans to central
banks in the form of secured credits against gold, other collateral
or currency deposits held with BIS. BIS also provides loans on an
unsecured basis, for example in the form of a standby credit which
90 See The BIS Statutes, supra note 77, art. 24 (listing prohibited activities of
BIS).
91 See REFORMING BANK CAPITAL REGULATION, U.S. SHADOW FINANCIAL
REGULATORY COMMITTEE MEETING (2000) (describing the history of BIS).
92 See generally Siegman, supra note 57, at 900-06 (surveying BIS and its func-
tions); Bank for International Settlements, Profile of BIS - Bank for Central Banks
(2002) (describing BIS's role in relationship to central banks), available at
http://www.bis.org/about/profcbank.htm#pgtop (last visited Sept. 16, 2004).
93 See Profile of BIS - Bank for Central Banks, supra note 92 (offering asset
management services for central bankers); see also Kristin K. Howell, The Role of the
Bank for International Settlements in Central Bank Cooperation, 22 J. EUR. ECON. HIST.
367-80 (1993) (addressing the success of BIS in central bank cooperation).
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a central bank can draw on at short notice. In recent decades, BIS
has provided financial support to central banks with the backing,
by way of guarantees, of a group of leading central banks. "Multi-
lateral assistance of this kind has usually prefinanced disburse-
ments of credits granted by international institutions such the IMF
or the World Bank."94
An important part of BIS's financial activities is its risk control
functions consisting of Internal Audit, Credit Risk Control, and
Treasury Risk Control. "Market and credit risk are measured and
managed under an integrated economic capital framework em-
ploying state of the art methodology. [In particular] asset quality is
rigorously and constantly monitored."95
But how does BIS put everything together in order to, "pro-
mote the cooperation of central banks and to provide additional fa-
cilities for international financial operations and to act as a trustee
or agent for international settlements?" 96 It is BIS's organizational
structure and management that makes it efficient and disciplined.
The three most important decisionmaking bodies within BIS are:
the General Meeting 97 of member central banks; the Board;98 and
the Management.99
In 2003, BIS had fifty "shareholders" (central banks or financial
monetary authorities 00) as members,101 exercising the rights of rep-
94 Profile of BIS - Bank for Central Banks, supra note 92.
95 Id.
96 See The BIS Statutes, supra note 77, art. 3 (stating the objectives of BIS).
97 See id. ch. V (containing provisions regarding the General Meetings such as
each country voting in proportion to the number of shares it owns in BIS).
98 See id. ch. IV (containing provisions regarding the Board).
99 See id. (containing provisions regarding management of BIS).
100 A financial monetary authority from a member country may be a nominee
to participate in the General Meeting with voting rights. If such a nomination is
not offered by the central bank, the central bank and the Board may approve the
appointment of a financial institution of widely recognized standing. If there is
no central bank, then the Board has the power to appoint a financial authority in
that member country. See id. art. 14 (delineating voting rights at the General
Meeting).
101 Members are the central banks or monetary authorities of Argentina, Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China,
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Latvia, Lithuania, the Republic of Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia,
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, the United States, and the European Central Bank.
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resentation and voting at General Meetings 102 in proportion to the
number of BIS shares issued to their respective countries. The
General Meeting is held annually, usually on the second Monday
of June. 103 At the General Meeting, the shareholders approve the
Annual Report, including the annual financial statements of BIS
(the Balance Sheet, and the Profit and Loss Account); approve
changes in the remuneration, fees, and allowances of the Board
members; elect Auditors; and discharge the Board from any re-
sponsibilities. 10 4 The General Meeting may also be called in ex-
traordinary sessions where the shareholders have the right to
amend the statutes, change the capital of the bank, as well as call to
liquidate BIS.105
The Board is composed of the governors of the central banks of
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
The current statutes allow the governors (appointed members) of
the central banks of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the United
Kingdom, and the United States to appoint another individual of
the same country to the Board. These are known as ex-officio
members.106 The statutes also provide for the election to the Board
of no more than nine governors of other member central banks
than the appointed member countries.10 7 The governors of the cen-
tral banks of Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Swit-
zerland are currently elected members of the Board, which totals
seventeen members. The Board elects a Chairman from among its
members and appoints the President of BIS. Since 1948 the two of-
fices have been vested in one person. The Board's main role is to
represent BIS in its dealings with third parties and to enter into
undertakings on its behalf. 108
102 See The BIS Statutes, supra note 77, ch. V (articulating the structure and
functions of the General Meeting).
103 See id. art. 45 (describing in further detail the guidelines for a General
Meeting).
104 See id. art. 46 (listing the powers of the General Meeting).
105 See id. art. 47 (stating when extraordinary General Meetings may be
called).
106 See id. art. 27(1) (noting that the directors representing the six ex officio
members may appoint an alternate, "to attend and exercise the powers of a Director at
meetings of the Board if the Governor himself is unable to be present." [emphasis
added]).
107 Id. art. 27(3).
108 See id. arts. 36, 37 (defining the Board's interaction with third parties).
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The Management consists of: the President,10 9 who can also be
the Chairman or a member of the Board; General Manager or a
Deputy General Manager;" 0 heads of a department; or other officer
or staff."' In 2003, the staff of BIS, including temporary staff,
numbered over five hundred employees from over forty coun-
tries." 2 The President implements policies approved by the Board
as well as supervises administration of the bank's activities." 3 The
General Manager, as the head of BIS's operating staff, reports and
coordinates its daily activities, and reports this information directly
to the President.114
BIS acts as secretariat for committees which include the Mar-
kets Committee,115 the Committee on the Global Financial Sys-
tems," 6 the CBS, 117 and the Committee on Payment and Settlement
Systems. 1 8 These committees participate in the Financial Stability
Forum, which BIS created in April 1999 to promote international
financial stability through information exchange and international
cooperation in financial supervision and surveillance. 119 In addi-
tion to the Financial Stability Forum, BIS has created the so-called
Financial Stability Institute, which provides a venue for interna-
tional discussions among high level officials in the banking and fi-
nancial sectors in order to promote better and more independent
banking, capital markets, and insurance supervision.120 As to in-
109 See id. art. 38 (explaining the election of the President by the Board).
110 See id. art. 40 (giving the Board the power to appoint a General Manager
and a Deputy Manager).
111 See id. arts. 40, 41 (giving the Board the power to appoint Heads of De-
partments and other officers, and giving the General Manager the power to ap-
point staff).
112 See Bank for International Settlements, Organization and Governance (pro-
viding basic information about BIS governance), at http://www.bis.org/about/
orggov.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2004).
113 See The BIS Statutes, supra note 77, art. 38 (outlining the powers and duties
of the President).
114 See id. art. 40 (outlining the powers and duties of the General Manager).
115 The Markets Committee was established in 1962.
116 The Committee on the Global Financial System was established in 1971.
117 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision ("CBS") was established in
1974.
118 The Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems was established in
1990.
119 To learn more about the Financial Stability Forum from its official website,
see The Financial Stability Forum, at http://www.fsforum.org/home/home.html
(last visited Sept. 14, 2004).
120 To learn more about the Financial Stability Institute ("FSI") from BIS offi-
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surance supervision, BIS organizes the secretariats of the Interna-
tional Association of Insurance Supervisors and the International
Association of Deposit Insurers, who do not have any direct rela-
tionships with BIS or its member central banks. Respectively, these
insurance agencies focus on the business of insurance and deposit
insurance for financial institutions.
With some exceptions, BIS officials are not members of the
Markets Committee, the Committee on the Global Financial Sys-
tems, the CBS, or the Committee on Payment and Settlement Sys-
tems. Membership in these committees normally consists of na-
tional technical experts in the fields of banking and finance.
However, BIS helps to organize meetings of such committees and
performs secretarial functions for them.121
BIS is a paramount institution in the preparation of research
and analysis of monetary and financial issues. Its Monetary and
Economic Department maintains a macroeconomic database acces-
sible by member central banks and international financial institu-
tions.122 Specialists, experts and research analysts of various eco-
nomic and financial fields who work for the Monetary and
Economic Department author publications and articles of interest
to central banks. Mainly, these publications and articles appear in
the BIS Working Papers, financial related journals, symposiums,
seminars organized by central banks, etc. Macroeconomic data
and research provided by the staff of the Monetary and Economic
Department with respect to global monetary statistics is presented
in the BIS Annual Report and Quarterly Review. The department's
publications remain models for central banks and major financial
institutions.123
During its more than seventy year history, BIS has adapted to
major changes in the financial industry and central banking prac-
tices. This ability to adapt is primarily due to its limited, nearly
homogeneous membership. An example of this ability is demon-
strated in BIS's quick response to the challenge of meeting regula-
cial website, see Bank of International Settlement, Financial Stability Institute, athttp://www.bis.org/fsi/ (last visited Sept 3, 2004).
121 See infra Section 3 for a discussion of these committees.
122 See Bank for International Settlements, Functions and Organization (June
2004) (discussing the responsibilities and functions performed by the Monetaryand Economic Department), at http://www.bis.org/about/functions.htm (last
visited October 8, 2004).
123 See Profile of BIS- Bank for Central Banks, supra note 93 (describing the ac-
tivities of the Monetary and Economic Department).
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tory deficiencies at the international level. Furthermore, it has per-
suaded even many of the less developed countries, to implement
BIS standards to maintain and improve the soundness and safety
in their banking systems.124
In order for BIS to continue as a significant player in the inter-
national banking arena, it must continuously adapt its activities.
Changes in business practices among banks, as well as changes in
the technology that accomplishes those practices, pressure BIS to
change. Changes might be beneficial not only to the inner struc-
ture, but also to BIS's relationships with customers, including the
central banks, particularly in undeveloped countries. The escalat-
ing globalization of the economy is forcing banking to become in-
creasingly international. Central banking cannot run nationally,
while commercial banking is going international. The role of BIS in
riding with this evolution is indispensable.
BIS currently consists of a wide array of committees that report
to various bodies, with different memberships and different spon-
sors. This structure often creates confusion about the allocation of
responsibilities and the particular missions of each committee or
group within BIS. It also contributes to the lack of transparency in
BIS's role. BIS's success as a meeting ground for central bankers
has been facilitated by its small, homogeneous, and cohesive mem-
bership. For that reason, membership expansion through other
means, such as the Financial Stability Forum, might be a disruptive
development for BIS, and should be undertaken cautiously. There
is a risk that inclusion may be at the expense of efficiency. 125 In the
words of the Meltzer Commission Report, "any expansion of
membership in BIS or its committees or groups [should] be under-
taken gradually and deliberately to avoid disruption of the infor-
mation exchange that central bankers find valuable." 126
While it is quite difficult to make specific recommendations on
how to restructure BIS, it is clear that some streandining of the or-
124 See Stephany Griffith-Jones, Developing Countries and the New Financial
Architecture (Nov. 30, 2000) (unpublished paper) (remarking on recent reforms in
the international financial community), available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/
socecon/ffd/2001/1130idsreport.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
125 See Michele Fratianni & John Pattison, The Bank for International Settle-
ments: An Assessment of Its Role in International Monetary and Financial Policy Coor-
dination, 12 OPEN ECON. REV. 197, 212 (2001) (reviewing BIS's history and praising
its performance).
126 Int'l Financial Inst. Advisory Comm'n, Commission Report 99, Mar. 2000
[hereinafter Meltzer Report] (Commission chaired by Allan H. Meltzer), available at
http://www.house.gov/ jec/imnf/meltzer.pdf.
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
ganizational structure is necessary.
Through its ever increasing role, BIS has helped create interna-
tional financial order. BIS continues to remain a relevant financial
institution. It has expanded from a regionally oriented agency to a
financial institution with global outreach. While it has not been
particularly successful in acting with other international organiza-
tions to solve regional economic and currency crises, BIS has been
a focal point for cooperative efforts among central banks that sup-
plement the actions of IMF and the World Bank.
BIS's reputation as a pre-eminent economic forecaster and dis-
seminator of financial data, is based on its efforts to reduce Y2K
problems, cope with technical innovations in international bank-
ing, securities and insurance activities, encouraging transparency
in financial transactions across national borders, dealing with in-
ternational money laundering, and much more. Yet, it is not clear
why most of these achievements could not be brought within the
functions of private, international commercial banks. Most regula-
tions on banking, securities and insurance activities have been
harmonized within the EMU and, even earlier, within the United
States, without the need for organizations such as BIS. However,
BIS is increasingly found to be a "closed club for central bankers...
without clear lines of accountability to national governments."'127
How far BIS will go is anybody's guess. Regardless of what
policies it chooses, BIS's impact is felt not only by central bankers
and their governments, but also by those who do not closely follow
the developments. As one journalist remarked:
Behind closed doors one now hears open discussions of the
printing of money.
That sure as hell scares me. I visualize the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements in Basel, opposite the railroad station, a
heavy iron grille across the door. Inside, they are drinking
cups of coffee that cost $3 in American currency. The Swiss
inflation rate has been so low that the dollar has ballooned, as
tourists know. It's not Swiss money they're talking about
printing. A trillion dollars in dollars.128
Since its inception, BIS has established itself as an avant-garde
institution improving and strengthening relationships among cen-
127 Endres, supra note 73.
128 Adam Smith, Maybe I Am Easily Scared: Energy and Superinflation, 1978
ATLANTIC MoNTHLY, Dec. 1978, at 35,36.
976 [Vol. 25:3
2004] BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS 977
tral banks, national financial regulatory agencies, and international
financial institutions for the coordination and improvement of
their activities. Obviously, this remains a difficult and ongoing
task which BIS appears to be handling successfully, so far. In the
end, as domestic financial markets become more global, the success
of BIS lies not only in its ability to issue financial guidelines, but
also in the willingness of international and national financial banks
and institutions to implement them.129
3. START OF INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY
3.1. BIS-Related Activities
BIS's work on the regulation of international banking has been
accomplished through a series of committees both within and
without. On its website, BIS states that it facilitates, "cooperation
among central banks... [and] assists central banks and other fi-
nancial authorities in their efforts to promote greater monetary and
financial stability." 130 The committees which concern us here are
not formally affiliated with BIS or with each other.131 Of the com-
mittees, three are so-called permanent committees. They are the
CBS, the Committee on Payment, and Settlement Systems and the
Committee on the Global Financial System. The committees and
their work are detailed below.
3.1.1. The CBS
The oldest and most active of the committees, the CBS, is the
most likely of the existing BIS bodies to metamorphose into a su-
preme international bank regulator, or as it is sometimes called, a
World Financial Authority ("WFA"). Created in 1974 by the cen-
129 See Matthew Bishop, The Regulator Who Isn't There, ECONOMIST, May 16,
2002 (noting regulators have to "rely on the private sector to assist them in their
regulatory task"), available at http://www.economist.com/surveys/display
story.cfm?story-id=1119911 (last visited Oct. 14, 2002).
130 Bank for International Settlements, Functions and Organisation (June 2004),
at http://www. bis.org/about/functions.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2004).
131 The committees, however, meet at BIS, are identified by the international
banks with BIS and are described in the BIS website as if they are BIS subsidiaries
or affiliates. See BAKER, supra note 3, at 73 (referring to the CBS and its original
name of the Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices); see
also EATWELL, supra note 5, at x, (noting that as part of BIS, "the foundations of
global financial surveillance and regulation that have already been laid at the
Bank for International Settlements in Basel").
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tral bank governors of the so-called G-10 it was principally a reac-
tion to the systemic risk that resulted from the international pay-
ment failure of the Herstatt Bank. 132 The Herstatt failure contrib-
uted to a period of instability in international banking markets133 in
the early 1970's and a general recognition that bank regulators in
different countries had many of the same problems. 34 As a result,
the CBS was aimed at the strengthening of collaboration among na-
tional authorities in their supervision of international banking.'35
The CBS has about thirty technical working groups and task forces
which meet regularly. Its members now come from Belgium, Can-
ada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United
States.136
As BIS notes, the CBS lacks formal authority:
[The CBS] does not possess any formal supranational su-
132 The Herstatt Bank, based in Cologne, Germany received a funds transfer
of U.S. dollars in purchase of deutsche marks. Before BIS could wire back the cur-
rency, it was closed by the German authorities. Thus, it received, but could not
disburse funds. The send failure had international repercussions and took years
to remedy. This type of problem is still called "Herstatt risk." See EATWELL, supra
note 5, at 200 (defining the "Herstatt risk"). The Herstatt failure was closely fol-
lowed by the closing of the British-Israel Bank of London, "for insolvency prob-
lems. The closure of the Herstatt and British-Israel Bank of London starkly re-
vealed the vulnerability of the international banking system." Lawrence L.C. Lee,
The Basle Accords as Soft Law: Strengthening International Banking Supervision, 39 VA.
J. INT'L L. 2, 16 (1998).
133 Adding to the Herstatt and British-Israel failures were severe problems in
the United States, at the Franklin National Bank, and the National Bank of San
Diego. Lee, supra note 132.
134 While Herstatt was the key event in the creation of the CBS, other world
events followed that contributed to the legitimacy and solidity of the CBS. Princi-
pal among these events were: (1) the collapse of the fixed international exchange
system established by the Bretton Woods agreement in 1945-causing much more
speculative investment and a general movement of funds in the currency markets,
and (2) "the oil shocks of 1973-74 and 1978-79" that resulted in enormous cashholdings by the Middle-Eastern oil states and the need for international banks to
absorb and invest these funds. ETHAN B. KAPSTEIN, GOVERNING THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY: INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND THE STATE 30, 58 (1994) (stating explicitly
that the CBS was created in response to the two events described above).
135 C.J. Thompson, The Basle Concordat: International Collaboration in Banking
Supervision, in 1 CURRENT LEGAL ISSUEs AFFECTING CENTRAL BANKS 331, 333 (Robert
C. Effrose ed., 1992).
136 Bank for International Settlement, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion, at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/aboutbcbs.htm (describing the structure of the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) (last visited Sept. 3, 2004).
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pervisory authority, and its conclusions do not, and were
never intended to, have legal force. Rather, it formulates
broad supervisory standards and guidelines and recom-
mends statements of best practice in the expectation that
individual authorities will take steps to implement them
through detailed arrangements - statutory or otherwise -
which are best suited to their own national systems. In this
way, the Committee encourages convergence towards
common approaches and common standards without at-
tempting detailed harmonisation of member countries' su-
pervisory techniques.137
From its inception, as a natural result of its membership, the
CBS began inexorably to assume the role of an international finan-
cial services regulator. This does not appear in its publications nor,
as far as one can tell, even in its deliberations. The CBS has regu-
larly reported to the central bank Governors of the G-10 countries,
and sought the endorsement of the G-10 for its major initiatives.
The CBS has also attracted representatives from institutions, which
are not central banks and through them the decisions made carry
the commitment of many national authorities outside the central
banking fraternity. The CBS has worked to extend its influence by
stimulating contacts and cooperation between its members and the
banking supervisory authorities of other countries. In many cases,
non-G-10 have seen fit to publicly associate themselves with the
CBS's initiatives. Contacts have been further strengthened by an
International Conference of Banking Supervisors which takes place
every two years, most recently in Basel.
The CBS has operated consistently with two basic principles.
First, no international banking establishment should escape regula-
tion. Second, supervision should be adequate. To accomplish these
goals, the CBS has issued a number of documents.138
First to consider is the Basel Concordat. Almost immediately
upon its creation, the CBS issued a blockbuster report 139 that in its
137 Id.
138 Much of the material in the following paragraphs is taken from a research
paper by the Authors. Carl Felsenfeld & Genci Bilali, The Role of the Bank for In-
ternational Settlements In Shaping the World Financial System (Jan. 2004) (unpub-
lished paper, on file with Fordham University School of Law).
139 The Basel Concordat began in 1974, the year of BIS's creation, and was re-
leased in 1975. It was supplemented in 1990 and 1992.
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revised form is the backbone of international bank regulation. The
Basel Concordat, "sets out certain principles, which the Conmmittee
believes should govern the supervision of banks' foreign estab-
lishments by parent and host authorities." 140 Known as "consoli-
dated bank supervision," and clarified over the years, the princi-
ples have come to dictate that the home state, the state where the
bank was chartered, would be principally responsible for the fi-
nancial well-being of the institution. The host state, the state where
an international bank did business, would have principal responsi-
bility for the banks' powers and functions. The host state was not
to accept a bank unless it is subject to acceptable home state super-
vision. The two states were encouraged to be in regular contact
with each other.'4'
Second, is the Basel Capital Accord. This document, currently
receiving the most attention from banks and regulators, is the set of
guidelines officially titled, International Convergence of Capital Meas-
urement and Capital Standards.
The Basel Capital Accord was originally released in July 1988142
and represented the CBS's effort to secure international conver-
gence of supervisory regulations governing the capital adequacy of
international banks. Following the Mexican financial crisis of the
1980's, the U.S. regulators' efforts to force national and state banks
to hold more capital, led to immediate industry resistance on com-
petition grounds, and strengthened efforts within the Basel com-
mittee to issue the accord.143 The Basel Capital Accord reflects the
effort of the CBS to ensure a maximum degree of consistency be-
tween the framework agreed upon in Basel and the separate rules
of the constituent countries. At the same time, the accord pays due
140 See Basel Comm. Report on Banking Supervision, Principles for the Supervi-
sion of Banks' Foreign Establishments (1983), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/bcbsc3l2.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2004).
141 Application of the Basel Concordat has been enhanced by the issue on July
6, 1992 of a CBS report that requires all supervisory authorities enforcing the Con-
cordat to follow its dictates. Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Minimum
Standards for the Supervision of International Banking Groups and their Cross-Border
Establishments (1992) [hereinafter Banking Supervision Standards], available at
http://www.bis.org/ publ/bcbsc3l4.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2004).
142 See Basel Capital Accord, supra note 52 (reporting on the work of the CBS
over a period of several years).
143 William R. White, International Agreements In the Area of Banking and Fi-
nance: Accomplishments and Outstanding Issues, BANK FOR INT'L SETrLEMENTS, at 23
(discussing major accomplishments of the international financial market), available
at http://www.bis.org/publ/work38.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
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regard to particular features of the existing supervisory and ac-
counting systems in individual member countries. "It [the CBS]
believes that this objective has been achieved."144 The accord sets a
minimum capital standard at eight percent, a figure that is still
generally in effect.145
The Basel Capital Accord has been modified twice and one ma-
jor modification is now on the drawing board.
The 1996 Amendment 46 principally dealt with the ways banks
should adjust their capital based upon market risk-the risk aris-
ing from broad factors as contrasted with risk of loss from specific
loans and investments. Of particular importance was the addition
to the accord of qualitative standards for banks basing their capital
requirements on the results of internal models, a relatively new
approach to the measurement of capital proposed to the banking
community in 1995. Tentatively accepted in the 1996 Amendment
was use of a bank's own internal model as an evaluation of specific
risk. The CBS expressed its desire that this approach be developed
and improved by the banking system.147
The 1998 Amendment is the second modification.148 In a
document titled, Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Mar-
ket Risks, the CBS resolved certain speculations contained in the
1996 Amendment. Its principal goal in the 1998 Amendment was
to confirm that a bank could use its own internal model to estimate
both market risk and specific risk. Although the 1998 Amendment
does not specifically state this, it is clear that a bank's internally
created model is the device of the future in the establishment of
bank capital. Use of the model was conditioned upon a bank's es-
tablishing supervisory approval of the model from both home and
144 Banking Supervision Standards, supra note 141, at 981.
145 Banking regulations in the United States, depending upon the particular
definition of capital, set minimum percentages at three percent, four percent andthe generally accepted eight percent. Treas. Reg. § 3.6, app. A (as amended in
2004).
146 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Overview of the Amendment to the
Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks (1996) [hereinafter Overview of the Amend-
ment], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs23.pdf (last visited Oct. 14,
2004).
147 See id. at 2 (noting that the main feature of the April 1995 proposal was the
bank's use of in-house models to evaluate risk).
148 Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks (1996, updated
1998), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc222.pdf (last visited Oct. 14,
2004).
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host countries. 149 Approval is based upon four principles: (1) a
bank's risk management system must be conceptually sound and
implemented with integrity; (2) a bank has a sufficient number of
trained staff; (3) the model must have a record of reasonable accu-
racy; and (4) a bank conducts stress tests of its model.
The 1998 Amendment elaborates at some length on these un-
derlying principles. For example, to demonstrate reasonable accu-
racy, the model must be shown to reflect both the bank's activities
and the geographic areas in which the activities are conducted.
Stress testing is defined to mean the identification of "events or in-
fluences that could greatly impact banks." 150 It is made clear that
no particular type of model is required for use in the estimation of
capital. The 1998 Amendment also authorizes banks to base spe-
cific, as well as market capital, upon modeled estimates if the mod-
els meet a set of qualified and quantitative estimates.1 51
The Basel II, is a proposed modification under consideration.
In 2001, the CBS issued a proposed amendment to the Basel Capital
Accord that has been extensively studied, revised and was reissued
in May 2003. The CBS anticipated that it would issue a final rule
based upon the amendment by the end of 2003; that due date has
been deferred. Plans are for U.S. regulators to consider and proba-
bly revise the CBS product and issue a rule designed to become ef-
fective in local banking communities in 2006 or 2007.152 Whether
any of these "final" dates will materialize is, at best, question-
able.153
The proposed amendment essentially leaves intact the capital
guidelines in place under the original accord, including the 8%
capital floor. It introduces, however, an alternative method of
computation, through five years of discussion, that has left much
of the banking community bewildered. It is not the place of this
149 See id. at 38 (noting that the application of the scenario's analysis by a bank
will be subject to supervising consent).
150 Id. at 47.
151 See id. at 51 (outlining specific treatment of risk).
152 See Barbara A. Rehmy, Fed's Ferguson: Why it's Okay for U.S. to Ease Basel
Load, AM. BANKER, Apr. 10, 2003, at 1 (stating that the U.S. FRB anticipates that re-
visions to Basel II will take effect in 2006 or 2007).
153 Hearings are being held in both the House and the Senate about Basel II
and key lawmakers are telling bank regulators that they are skeptical about the
proposed accord. The House Financial Services Committee is to consider a bill
that would create a new regulatory committee under the Treasury Department to
coordinate the U.S. position on Basel II. Rob Garver, Final? Not Quite, as Hill Fi-
nally Gets Started on Basel II Debate, AM. BANKER, June 23, 2003, at 1.
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article either to detail Basel II or to evaluate it. It is based upon fur-
ther use of the banks' internal risk ratings systems as the definer of
their required capital. As the most recent of the CBS prescriptions
to the banking community, it reflects the CBS's perception of itself
as the international regulatory leader.
The world's banks and bank regulators' major objection to
Basel II is its complexity, not its substance. Comprising some five
hundred pages, the proposal is filled with highly technical lan-
guage and arcane mathematical formulations. The U.S. Comptrol-
ler of the Currency, regulator of national banks, has testified to
Congress:
This (the level of detail and specificity in the proposal) has
led to a proposal of immense complexity - greater complex-
ity, in my view, than is reasonably needed to implement
sensible capital regulation. I believe we have to avoid the
tendency to develop encyclopedic standards for banks,
which minimize the role of judgment or discretion by banks
applying the new rules or supervisors overseeing them....
If we determine through our rulemaking process that
changes in the Basel proposal are necessary, we will press
the Basel Committee to make changes.'l 4
Third to consider are the Core Principles. In 1995, the CBS is-
sued the Core Principles of Effective Banking Supervision, which came
to be known as the "Core Principles." 5 5 Basically comprising
twenty-five key areas of banking supervision, these principles
were designed to present the essential ingredients of a regulatory
banking structure that will stimulate confidence in the interna-
tional banking market. The principles cover the significant "pre-
conditions for effective banking supervision, licensing of banking
institutions, capital standards and other prudential guidelines for
risk management and internal control, methods of ongoing bank-
ing supervision, information requirements, formal powers of su-
154 The New Basel Accord: Sound Regulation or Crashing Complexity?: Hearings
Before the House Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 12, 14 (2003) (statement of Hon.
John D. Hawke, Jr.) (emphasis added).
155 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Core Principles for Effective Banking
Supervision (Sept. 1997) [hereinafter Core Principles], available at http://
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs30a.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
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pervisors and cross-border banking." 15 6
The CBS, "intended the Core Principles to be applied in all
countries ... "157 It issued them in its conviction that they repre-
sent the essential ingredients to make an international bank regula-
tory system work. Writing about its own work in 1999, the CBS
said, "[tihe Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision have
become the most important global standard for prudential regula-
tion and supervision." 158 They represent another example of the
CBS granting to itself the authority to prescribe regulations for the
international banking system.
In October 2001, the CBS issued a paper titled Customer Due
Diligence for Banks. This represents the CBS's views on the gener-
ally acknowledged duty of banks to both know their customers,
and generally know the source of the assets that their customers
bring.' 59 The CBS anticipates that the "principles [of the paper]
will be incorporated into the Committee's Core Principles for Effec-
tive Banking Supervision in due course."160
Fourth, are the three papers of September 1998.161 In Septem-
ber 1998, the CBS issued three papers dealing with bank regula-
tion:
1. The Bank Transparency Paper. This paper advocates
the use of greater contributions from market discipline
and resulting public disclosure to complement the ef-
forts already being made by the supervisory sector in
controlling banks.162
156 Christine M. Cumming, Financial Services Regulation, 33 Bus. ECON. 20, No.
4, 23 (1998).
157 Id.
158 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Core Principles Methodology (Oct.
1999), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs61.pdf (last visited Oct. 14,
2004).
159 The International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-
Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 296 (2001) in Title III of the massive
United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA Patriot Act) of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (2001), is ,at bottom, a detailed application of the know-your-
customer principle applicable to terrorist activities. The USA Patriot Act was en-
acted as a result of the attack of September 11, 2001.
160 Bank Regulation/Thrift Regulation, 22 BANKING & FIN. SERV. POL'Y REP. 14,
No. 8 (2003).
161 The three papers are discussed in, Connie M Friesen et al, The 1998 Basle
Committee Supervisory Initiatives and their Potential Consequences on International
Banking Activities, 14 J. Int'l Banking L. 55 (Feb. 1999).
162 See id. at 56 (remarking on trends in banking disclosure).
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2. The Internal Control Paper. This paper emphasizes the
use of banks' internal control procedures and meas-
urement of the effectiveness of those procedures in af-
fecting bank performance.163
3. The Operational Risk Paper. The last paper is based
upon the CBS's survey of the operational risk manage-
ment techniques in use in banks. It relates those tech-
niques to communication breakdowns and resulting fi-
nancial losses in those institutions.164
Fifth to consider is the paper titled, Banks' Interaction with
Highly Leveraged Institutions. In January 1999, influenced by the
near collapse of Long Term Capital Management, the CBS issued a
report dealing with the relationship of banks and highly leveraged
institutions. The thirty-two page document stressed aspects of
bank regulation together with greater public disclosure and an im-
provement of bank internal practices. It noted: "[b]anks generally
did not appear to possess effective policies and guidelines for
managing exposures to some... [highly-leveraged institutions] in
a manner consistent with their overall credit standards." 165 The re-
port is written in the form of a set of directions to bank supervi-
sors. It reads, "supervisors should ensure that the proper incen-
tives, procedures and standards are in place" and should,"consider these issues carefully." 166
Sixth, Sound Practices for the Management and Supervision of Op-
erational Risk (hereinafter Sound Practices Paper) was issued in Feb-
ruary 2003 by the CBS Risk Management Group. 167 This paper ex-
pands a prior paper published in 1998, titled, A Framework for
Internal Control Systems in Banking Organizations.168 The Sound Prac-
163 See id. at 57 (discussing trends in risk control).
164 See id. (noting operation risk management techniques).
165 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Sound Practices for Banks Interactions
with Highly Leveraged Institutions (Jan. 1999), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/bcbs46.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
166 Id.
167 Chaired by Roger Cole of the Federal Reserve Board and consisting of
thirty-one individuals from central banks, major international banks, regulatory
groups and the CBS itself. Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Sound Practices
for the Management and Supervision of Operational Risks (Feb. 2003) [hereinafter
Sound Practices], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs96.pdf (last visited
Oct. 14, 2004).
168 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Framework for Internal Control Sys-
tems in Banking Organisations (Sept. 1998), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/bcbs40.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
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tices Paper describes the growth of several ingredients that make
the update appropriate. Among these are greater use of highly
automated technologies, large scale acquisitions and mergers that
test the viability of newly integrated systems, and the emergence of
banks as large-volume service providers, including participation in
settlement and clearing systems. Basically, this paper provides a
framework for the effective management and supervision of opera-
tional risk.169
The CBS has drawn on its work in the management of other
significant banking assets, "such as credit risk, interest rate risk
and liquidity risk, and the [c]ommittee] believes that similar rigour
should be applied to the management of operational risk."170 The
paper identifies a five pronged approach to the control of opera-
tional risk: "developing an appropriate risk management environ-
ment; risk management: identification, assessment, monitoring and
control/mitigation; the role of supervisors; and the role of disclo-
sure." 171
The Sound Practices Paper assumes the role of a financial regula-
tor and assigns to banks a series of elements that should be univer-
sally undertaken in the control of operational risk. These include:
the appropriate roles of the board of directors and senior manage-
ment; the use of risk identification, assessment, monitoring, control
and mitigation procedures; implementation of clearly designated
supervisory roles; and the role of public disclosure in the control of
risk.172 The sweep of these proposals assumes the CBS's function
as an international regulator without portfolio.
Seventh, Risk Management Principles for Electronic Banking was
published in June 2003 by the Electronic Banking Group of the
CBS.173 It has two main areas of focus. The first builds on a similar
paper published in May 2001, also titled, Risk Management Princi-
ples for Electronic Banking.174 The earlier paper presented fourteen
169 The definition of operational risk, coming from the CBS studies of bank
capital, is "the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes,
people and systems or from external events." Sound Practices, supra note 167, at 2.
170 Id. at 4.
171 Id.
172 See id. at 4-5 (setting out principles to be used by banks and supervisory
authorities when evaluating risk management policies and practices).
173 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervisions, Risk Management Principles for Elec-
tronic Banking (July 2003) [hereinafter Risk Management Principles 2003], available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs98.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
174 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervisions, Risk Management Principles for Elec-
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risk management principles, "to help banking institutions expand
their existing risk oversight policies and processes to cover their e-
banking activities." 175 The 2003 paper stresses the banks' need to
integrate cross border electronic banking risks into the banks'
overall risk management framework. The second objective is to
identify more clearly the home country and host country responsi-
bilities for electronic activity, and to focus attention on the need for
effective home country supervision of cross-border electronic activ-
ity, as well as international cooperation between banking supervi-
sors.176
3.1.2. The Joint Forum
In early 1996, the CBS joined forces with two other interna-
tional financial committees -the International Organization of Se-
curities Commissions ("IOSCO") and the International Association
of Insurance Supervisors ("IOIS") -to create the Joint Forum.
Strictly speaking the Joint Forum is not a committee, although it
essentially serves a committee function within its area.77 The Joint
Forum's mandate was brought up to date in 1999, but its focus re-
mains on international conglomerates. As the activities of con-
glomerates both expand and refine, the area of activity is generally
referred to, not as banking, or securities, or insurance, but rather,
as financial services. The major founding organizations were no
longer in these fields separately, but were organized around a con-
tronic Banking (May 2001) [hereinafter Risk Management Principles 2001], available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs82.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
175 Id.
176 See Risk Management Principles 2003, supra note 173.
177 The Joint Forum of Financial Conglomerates was successor to an essen-
tially identical prior group titled the Tripartite Group and composed of the same
three types of regulatory agencies. The Tripartite Group issued a report on con-
glomerate regulation in 1995. See The Tripartite Group of Banks, Securities and
Insurance Regulations, The Supervision of Financial Conglomerates (July 1995), avail-
able at http://www.iosco.org/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD47.pdf (last visited Oct. 14,
2004). The United States Comptroller of the Currency issued a statement on the
report on July 24, 1995, and briefly described its approach to international con-
glomerate regulation. Basically, it recommended continued regulation by the
three types of regulatory agencies; each in its own area and a high degree of ac-
cess to general information by all of them, as well as coordination among them.
Statement by Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency, Comptroller
Ludwig Welcomes International Report on the Supervision of Financial Conglom-
erates (July 24, 1995), at http://www.ocs.treas.gov/ftp/release/95-75.txt (last vis-
ited Sept. 16, 2004). The Tripartite Group, as well as the successor Joint Forum,
saw itself as an advisor to regulators.
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geries of financial activities which drew upon the various areas of
traditional banking, securities activities and insurance.
In 1996, and even before, the financial services movement rep-
resented the direction of the major international financial organiza-
tions. However, it gained major impetus from the United States
with the enactment on November 12, 1999, of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act,178 a statute that brought banking, securities operations,
and insurance closer to one another.179 At first the attention of the
Joint Forum was upon the larger international conglomerates;
more recently it is increasingly interested in smaller firms too.
The Joint Forum issued its first major report, titled, The Supervi-
sion of Financial Conglomerates, in February 1999.180 The Joint Forum
identified itself in the report as representing the CBS, IOSCO, IAIS,
thirteen countries181 and the European Union ("EU") Commission
in an observer capacity.182 The Joint Forum addressed interna-
tional conglomerates from the vantage point of a regulator and
prepared a number of papers in this capacity.183 Dealing as it does
with different financial businesses, the Joint Forum stresses what it
terms the "cross-sectoral issues" related to the business on which it
concentrates. The papers were released by the three parent regula-
tor bodies in 1998 and have stimulated a new, more broadly based
kind of regulation.
3.1.3. The CGFS
One of the three permanent committees, the CGFSl84 was estab-
178 113 Stat. 1338 (2000).
179 Banks had always been involved in both securities activities and insur-
ance. Even after the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, there were technical divisions
among the three fields, but the new statute made convergence much more avail-
able.
180 Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates, Supervision of Financial Conglom-
erates (Feb. 1999) [hereinafter Supervision of Financial Conglomerates], available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs47.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
181 Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States.
182 Supervision of Financial Conglomerates, supra note 180, at 1.
183 The papers were titled: Capital Adequacy Principles; Supplement to the
Capital Adequacy Principles Paper; Fit and Proper Principles; Framework for Su-
pervisory Information Sharing; Principles for Supervisory Information Sharing;
and Supervisory Questionnaire. Id. at 2.
184 See Bank for International Settlements, Committee on the Global Financing
System ("CGFS") (providing general information on the CGBS), at http://
www.bis.org/cgfs (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
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lished in 1971 as successor to the Euro-Currency Standing Commit-
tee. The committee has three major tasks, all dealing-as the
committee's name indicates -with the global financial system: sys-
tematic short-term monitoring of global financial system condi-
tions; longer-term analysis of the functioning of financial markets;
and the articulation of policy recommendations aimed at improv-
ing market functioning and promoting stability.1 85 The CGFS web-
site lists twenty-one published CGFS reports through March
2003.186 The focus of the CGFS is the functioning of the global
market, and its publications and reports are focused more on that
market, as is the work of the CBS, than upon the operations and
solvency of the financial institutions which it reviews. From this
vantage point, however, it also acts as a central bank forum and
submits reports and recommendations to central banks designed to
enhance their responsibilities for monetary and financial stability.
A recent report that illustrates the niche occupied by the CGFS
is the January 2003 paper titled, Credit Risk Transfers.187 While de-
vices such as financial guarantees and credit insurance are long-
standing features of the international marketplace, the last few
years have seen a considerable expansion of the range of credit risk
reduction transactions and the circumstances when they are used.
At the same time, new credit risk transfer instruments are rela-
tively few compared to the underlying risk-related instruments
that create the credit risk itself. This paper identifies and analyzes
the implications to the financial market of the growth of financial
institutions in new risk reduction instruments.
3.1.4. The CPSS
This committee, also a permanent committee, was formally es-
tablished in 1990 to continue work on both domestic and cross-
border payment, and clearing systems undertaken since 1980 by a
series of different groups and committees organized by the G-10
countries. These relatively short-lived groups had examined such
issues as the development of electronic funds transfer systems and
the question of cooperation versus competition in payment sys-
tems. The result of an early study by a so-called group of com-
185 Id.
186 Bank for International Settlements, CGFS Publications, at http://www.bis.
org/cgfspubl.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2004).
187 Comm. on the Global Financial Systems, Credit Risk Transfer (Jan. 2003),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs20.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
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puter experts in 1985 was the first of a series that has become
known as "Red Books."
3.1.5. The Committee on Interbank Netting Schemes
Through the years, BIS, the CBS and the other loose affiliates
created still other committees that studied and reported upon bank
and related financial activities. For example, the Committee on In-
terbank Netting Schemes was created by the G-10 central banks in
1990. The committee issued a report, actually published and re-
leased by BIS, that contained a set of minimum standards for the
operation of bilateral and multilateral netting systems and set an
agreed approach for the joint oversight of such systems. Commit-
tee reports in the years since then advise central banks on such top-
ics as the development of electronic payment issues, retail pay-
ments - largely devoted to consumer payments - the nature of
payments in various selected countries and securities settlements.
In connection with their work in the securities field, the committee
has done several reports with the OSLO, and covered both domes-
tic and international settlements. The committee has also reported
on clearing arrangements for derivative products. All together,
there are over fifty reports issued by this committee on payment
and settlement topics. 188
This committee reflects the position of bank regulators in the
continuing belief that confidence in the banking system cannot
survive without public confidence in the currency and the ability
to sustain economic development. In the many ways illustrated
above, the committee, as a virtual public regulator, seeks to en-
hance that goal.
3.2. Other Entities
Entities outside BIS and its immediate colleagues have moved
in various ways to approach the international regulation of bank-
ing and bank-related activities. We can name a few.
1. In the imposition of conditionality standards as part of
its offers of financial assistance, the IMF has positioned
itself as a quasi-regulator of international banking ac-
188 A description of the Committee and a list of its publications may be found
on the BIS website. Bank for International Settlements, Report of the Committee on
Interbank Netting Schemes of the central banks of the Group of Ten countries (Lamfa-
lussy Report), CPSS Publication No. 4 (Nov. 1990), at http://www.bis.org/
publ/cpss04.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
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tivities. It has been mentioned as a possible senior in-
ternational bank regulator. 189
2. IOSCO has actually joined with BIS in the regulation of
financial conglomerates. 190
3. The Ad Hoc Group on Securities Markets was set up by
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment in the late 1980's.'91
Moving farther afield from banking, international groups with
uncertain authority work in such international fields as climate
control, energy, water, fisheries, the environment and, of course,
nuclear energy.192
4. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BIS AND NATIONAL FINANCIAL
AUTHORITIES
The BIS issues supervisory guidance to central and local banks,
and other financial institutions on various banking matters, includ-
ing core banking and such related problems as banknote counter-
feiting,193 international payment systems establishment of a uni-
form foreign exchange, derivatives systems, and financial risks in
commercial lending. Ultimately BIS must be measured by the ef-
fect it has upon the financial institutions actually in the market
place. This is an evolving relationship, but BIS can be accurately
seen as becoming closer to local banks.
The BIS's recommendations do not have any legal force (so-
called "soft law") with national financial authorities and banks
around the world. However, local authorities and banks cannot
189 See ANNE L.M. SALDA, 4 THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 45 (Interna-
tional Organization Series 1992) (summarizing William McChesney Martin, To-
ward a world central bank? Lecture and Commentaries, Lecture before the Per
Jacobsson Foundation and BIS (1970)) (considering the possibility of the IMF in-
corporating all aspects of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and BIS)).
190 See discussion supra Section 3.1.2 (describing the formation of the joint fo-
rum).
191 Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, International Standards for Consolidated Supervision
of Financial Conglomerates: Controlling Systemic Risk, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 137, 139
(1993).
192 See infra text accompanying note 359 (stating that the CBS represents the
major central banks).
193 See Press Release, The Chairman of the Governors of the Group of Ten
(May 10, 2000) ("In response to the threat of increasing use of personal computers
and digital imaging tools, the Governors [of the G-10 central banks] authorized
work by a group of central banks (SSG 2) to develop a system to deter PC-based
counterfeiting."), available at http://www.bis.org/press/p000510b.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 14, 2004).
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simply ignore BIS's recommendations. In such cases, they know
they risk being regarded by major international banks and their fi-
nancial authorities, including BIS itself, as "unattractive" business
partners. And they know that in this global economy, they cannot
afford to develop activities in isolation. Therefore, in addition to
the central bank members, recommendations and suggested guide-
lines issued from BIS are also constantly adopted by central banks
that are not members of BIS.194
All of BIS's activities aim at promotion of an international fi-
nancial stability-which was, in its originally limited scope, the
main purpose of BIS's creation. International financial stability is
of even more interest to the financial authorities today than in
1929.195 As for banks, financial stability starts with stable profits
194 See Andrew Crockett, International Standard Setting in Financial Supervi-
sion, Lecture Before the Cass Business School, City University, (Feb. 5, 2003) (dis-
cussing the importance and the difficulty in achieving financial stability as op-posed to monetary stability), available at http://www.bis.org/speeches/
sp030205.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
195 Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Should Financial Stability Be an Explicit Central
Bank Objective?, Remarks Before an International Monetary Fund Conference onChallenges to Central Banking from Globalized Financial Markets (Sept. 17, 2002)(presenting a paper on how the Federal Reserve is focusing on financial stabilityobjectives through the fostering of price stability and sustainable output growth),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/SPEECHES/2002/
20021016/default.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
Financial stability, is an explicit central bank objective among other countries,
and is adapted in central banks' charters.
For example, in 1977, the statement, "[t]he Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System and the Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain long rungrowth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy'slong run potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals ofmaximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates" was
added to the law governing the Federal Reserve. 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2002).
The Bank of Canada charter states its purpose is to, "regulate credit and cur-rency in the best interests of the economic life of the nation, to control and protect
the external value of the national monetary unit and to mitigate by its influence
fluctuations in the general level of production, trade, prices and employment, sofar as may be possible within the scope of monetary action, and generally to pro-
mote the economic and financial welfare of Canada." Bank of Canada Act, R.S.C.,
ch. B-2, § 1 (1985) (Can.).
The Bank of England charter states, "objectives of the Bank of England shall
be - (a) to maintain price stability, and (b) subject to that, to support the economic
policy of Her Majesty's Government, including its goals for economic growth and
employment." Bank of England Act, 1998, c. 4, § 11 (Eng.).
The Bank of Japan charter, notes, "[c]urrency and monetary control shall beaimed at, through the pursuit of price stability, contributing to the sound devel-
opment of the national economy." The Bank of Japan Law, art. 2 (2001) (prelimi-nary translation by the Bank of Japan), available at http://www.boj.or.jp/en/
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and fewer risk-taking activities. Financial stability for all financial
authorities means a developed economy, a low unemployment
percentage, and appropriate interest rates in lending. BIS has un-
dertaken these goals as its mission, and has assumed a constantly
increasing influence over the day-to-day affairs of local banks and
other financial institutions.
After the economic crisis of the 1970's, most industrialized
countries became concerned with their banks taking increased
risks. Low capital levels and off balance sheet activities made it
highly difficult for banks to be monitored by national financial au-
thorities. This first led in 1986 to a joint undertaking between the
United States and the United Kingdom, aimed at achieving a
common risk-weighted capital measuring system. In December
1987, the joint undertaking was followed with the creation of the
Basel Capital Accord. In 1989, the EU adopted its own capital
guidelines based on the Basel structure. The Basel Capital Accord
was thereafter adopted by many non-EU countries. Adoption of
the accord was perceived as enhancing a country's international
reputation and enabling it to operate throughout the developed fi-
nancial world (such as the United States), which increasingly re-
quired conformity with BIS standards as a condition to carry out
activities in their respective markets. 196 Today, there are over 120
countries, which have adopted 97 the revised Basel Capital Ac-
about/basic/law/bojlawl.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
The European Central Bank resolution states that,"[tihe primary objective of
the European System of Central Banks shall be to maintain price stability. With-
out prejudice to the objective of price stability, it shall support general economic
policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the Un-
ion's objectives." Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, June 20,
2003, art. 1-29, para. 2, at http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/
cv00850.enO3.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
196 See Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan R. Macey, A Public Choice Model of In-
ternational Economic Cooperation and The Decline of The Nation State, 18 CARDOZO L.
REv. 925 (1996) (applying the theory that changes in the world, including techno-
logical changes and changes to market process, create strong incentives for coun-
tries to create international agreements and institutions like the Basel Accords); see
also Hal S. Scott, The Competitive Implications of the Basle Capital Accord, 39 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 885, 888 (1995) (indicating that BIS Committee includes "the G-10 countries
(Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, United
Kingdom, and United States) plus Switzerland and Luxembourg," and an exten-
sion of the Accord in 1989 brought in Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and
Spain).
197 See William J. McDonough, Global Finance Reform: A Regulator's Per-
spective, Remarks Made Before the Foreign Policy Association (Nov. 17, 1999),
available at http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/speeches/1999/ mcd991117.html
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cord.198
The revised accord is a statement of the CBS as agreed to by all
its members. It provides details of the agreed framework for
measuring capital adequacy and minimum reserve standards to be
carried out, which the national supervisory authorities represented
on the committee intend to implement in their respective coun-
tries. 199 Implementation of BIS's rules continues to be a top priority
for national financial authorities of the individual countries, which
do not underestimate the wide-ranging legal, infrastructural and
educational changes resulting from such implementation. Na-
tional financial authorities do not hesitate to establish ambitious
programs with clear time frames for the rules implementation.
International financial institutions, particularly the IMF and the
World Bank, should have an important role in monitoring the im-
plementation of BIS's rules. Those in support of this argument say
that these international financial institutions already send teams of
experts to almost all countries across the world whose implementa-
tion of BIS rules are connected to monetary policies and lending
practice reforms orchestrated by the IMF and the World Bank. In
this "cohabitation," BIS is increasingly earning a role of primary
responsibility for creating a sound and safe environment for bank-
ing activities. This role, in turn, is dependent on the national fi-
nancial policies sponsored by the World Bank and the IMF.200
The major international banks and even those of lesser scope
are eagerly adapting the Basel Capital Accord in their lending busi-
nesses. The BIS's role is particularly felt in assisting emerging
financial markets. The world's less sophisticated banks are adopt-
ing the BIS capital approach, as they embrace capital requirements
(last visited Oct. 14, 2004). The Basel II Accord is adopted by countries under bi-
lateral "Memoranda of Understanding" between respective countries and BIS.
198 See Patricia Jackson, International Financial Regulation and Stability,
Speech at the Finance and Regulation Seminar Series at the Judge Institute of
Management (Mar. 8, 2002) (stating that over one hundred countries have
adopted Basel II), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches/
speech177.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
199 Basel Capital Accord, supra note 52, at 980 (detailing the agreed framework
for measuring capital adequacy and the implementation of this framework in each
respective country).
200 See Tom de Swaan, Address at the 14th Annual Meeting of the Latin
American and Caribbean Banking Supervisory Organizations (Sept. 1, 1997) (dis-
cussing, "the background, advantages and implementation of the core principles
for effective banking supervision"), available at http://www.bis.org/review/
r970912a.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
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in the lending system.201
National financial authorities still have the dominant role in
developing and utilizing prudent regulations and requirements to
control risks, including those covering capital adequacy, 202 loan
loss reserves, 2 3 asset concentrations, 2 4 liquidity, risk manage-
ment205 and internal controls.20 6 These requirements may be of a
qualitative and/or quantitative nature, and their purpose is to limit
banks' imprudent risk-taking. These requirements guide but are
not a substitute for management decisions. Rather, they establish
minimum calculated standards that ensure banks conduct their ac-
tivities in a suitable manner. The evolving nature of banking re-
quires national supervisory authorities to constantly assess sound
201 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Overview Paper for the Impact Study
(Oct. 2002) (focusing on a comprehensive field test of BIS' proposals for revising
the Basel Capital Accord), at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/qis/qis3ovrv.pdf (last
visited Oct. 14, 2004).
202 Bank regulators must issue minimum capital requirements for banks that
reflect the risks that the banks undertake, and define the components of capital,
considering its ability to absorb losses. For internationally active banks, these re-
quirements must not be less than those established in the Basel Capital Accord.
See Core Principles, supra note 155, at 5 (detailing Principle 6, which implements
greater use of assessments of risk provided by bank's internal systems as meas-
urements for capital calculations), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbsl07.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
203 See id. (detailing Principle 8, "Banking supervisors must be satisfied that
banks establish and adhere to adequate policies, practices and procedures for
evaluating... loan loss reserves.").
204 See id. (detailing Principle 9, "Bank regulators must be satisfied that banks
have management information systems that enables management to identify con-
centrations within the portfolio and supervisors must place prudential limits to
restrict bank exposures to single borrowers or groups of related borrowers.").
205 See id. (detailing Principle 7, "An essential part of any supervisory system
is the evaluation of a bank's policies, practices and procedures related to the
granting of loans and making of investments and the ongoing management of the
loan and investment portfolios.").
206 See id. at 6 (detailing Principle 14, "Banking supervisors must determine
that banks have in place internal controls that are adequate for the nature and
scale of their business. These should include clear arrangements for delegating
authority and responsibility; separation of the functions that involve committing
the bank, paying away its funds, and accounting for its assets and liabilities; rec-
onciliation of these processes; safeguarding its assets; and appropriate independ-
ent internal and external audit and compliance functions to test adherence to
these controls as well as applicable laws and regulations."); see also id. (detailing
Principle 15, "Bank supervisors must determine that banks have adequate poli-
cies, practices and procedures in place, including strict "know-your-customer"
rules, that promote high ethical and professional standards in the financial sector
and prevent the bank being used, intentionally or unintentially, by criminal ele-
ments.").
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requirements, evaluate the continued applicability of existing re-
quirements and also assess the need for new requirements. 207
Implementation of the Basel Capital Accord requires a substan-
tial commitment of resources by banks and their national financial
supervisory authorities, and raises practical implications. 208 Im-
plementation of the Basel Capital Accord by a bank is not a simple
process. It depends on various factors, including the bank's size,
structure, and the nature and complexity of activities. Clear strate-
gies by the banks' management, a strong operational risk culture
and internal control culture, clearly assigned responsibilities and
segregation of duties, effective internal reporting and contingency
planning, are all crucial elements of an effective operational risk
management framework for banks of any size and scope. 20 9
There are certain specific areas to which banks direct their ef-
forts in implementation of the accord. The areas mainly include
design of an internal rating system, supervision of the rating sys-
tem, data requirements and validation, and corporate govern-
ance.210
Banks' internal rating system policies and degrees of risk
should differentiate between each other. Credit risk rating systems
are more useful to the extent they distinguish differing degrees of
borrower risk. Thus, banks normally expand the number of ratings
categories in which they keep their risk exposures. Nevertheless, it
is not enough for banks to establish more ratings categories. The
most difficult part for banks is to determine fairly and clearly the
criteria for ratings categories, providing more meaningful assess-
ments to both individual credit exposures and overall risk profiles.
Transparency of the ratings criteria is of critical importance in or-
207 See generally id. at 5-7 (laying out core principles of baking supervision
from the theory that financial instability not only threatens the stability but also
the stability of international markets).
208 Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Basel II: A Realist's Perspective, Remarks Made at
the Risk Management Association's Conference on Capital Management (Apr. 9,
2003) (addressing concerns that the approach of the United States to Basel II is too
limited in scope), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
speeches/2003/20030409/default.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
209 See Core Principles, supra note 155, at 4 (listing key elements of newly pro-
posed minimum capital requirements).
210 See William L. Rutledge, Implementing the New Basel Accord, Remarks
Before the British Bankers Association Basle 2/CAD 3 Half-Day Conference (Mar.
13, 2003) (addressing various challenges to implementing Basel II and describing
preparations underway for implementation), available at http://www.newyorkfed.
org/newsevents/speeches/2003/rut31303.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
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der to ensure that ratings are assigned in a rigorous and reliable
way.211 Without a system of checks and balances, or control bal-
ance, any ratings system becomes useless. For any good ratings
system control structure, the necessary structural elements are in-
dependence from the ratings process, 212 internal review of such rat-
ings, 213 and overall transparency. 214 They all contribute in consoli-
dation of controls over ratings mechanism, which should be
complemented by the collection of accurate data upon which the
ratings are based.
Obviously, a credit system is only as satisfactory as the data
upon which it is based. From a broad risk management point of
view, access to a bank's data history and external data enables such
a bank to evaluate the performance of its internal rating and risk
valuation systems in a consistent and significant way.2 5 As a re-
sult, banks are creating data "warehouses," 216 enabling them, over
time, to collect, store and draw upon loss statistics in an effective
fashion. Designs, controls, or data that are added to a risk rating
system should be evaluated based upon a strict corporate govern-
ance structure. Here, the active role of the banks' management
body is crucial to the successful implementation of the accord.
Banks will apply the accord productively only with full knowledge
of the operational mechanisms, including the banks' internal rat-
ings systems and the measure of risk derived from ratings.217
211 Letter from Ed Duncan, Risk Management, International Swaps and De-
rivatives Association, Inc., to Nicholas Le Pan, Accord Implementation Group,
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Dec. 20, 2002) (addressing views on is-
sues discussed in the Technical Guidance accompanying a Quantitative Impact
Study), at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/qis/resp3isda.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
212 Those in charge of assigning ratings and approving loans should be inde-
pendent of the marketing department and revenue producers.
213 This includes having a subsequent review of ratings by an independent
review group, which reviews ratings for accuracy, timeliness and consistency.
Both the ratings system and individual ratings should be subject to review by the
internal audit department.
214 Ratings criteria are intended to be objective. A bank has policies and pro-
cedures in place, which clearly document the rationale for each ratings category.
The more transparent the process is, the easier it is to audit ratings.
215 See William J. McDonough, Risk Management, Supervision and the New
Basel Accord, Remarks at the Bond Market Association: 2003 Legal and Compli-
ance Conference (Feb 4, 2003) (discussing improvements to banks' risk manage-
ment processes and business imperative), available at http://www.bis.org/
review/r030207a.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
216 See Rutledge, supra note 210 (addressing various challenges ahead in im-
plementing Basel II).
217 See William J. McDonough, Implementing the New Basel Accord, Re-
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It is revealing that, according to a 2001 survey from the CBS, on
the annual reports of fifty-four internationally active banks, which
included questions related to quantitative and qualitative disclo-
sures in various pertinent categories (i.e., capital structure, capital
adequacy, market risk internal modeling, internal and external rat-
ings, credit risk modeling, securitization activities, asset quality,
credit derivatives and other credit enhancements, other deriva-
tives, geographic and business lines diversification, accounting and
presentation policies, and other risks),218 a majority of these banks
were expanding their disclosure of lending information. 219 The
main disclosures from the banks consisted of accounting policies,
risks and capital structure. Credit risk modeling, credit deriva-
tives, and other credit enhancements were the least widespread of
the disclosures.
From 1999 to 2001, banks sought to increase the disclosure of
information on securitization activities, internal and external rat-
ings, credit derivatives, credit enhancements, operational and legal
risks, liquidity risk, and interest rate risk in the banking books.220
The most common individual disclosure items concerned the struc-
ture of capital, accounting and presentation policies, market risk
internal modeling, and the risk-based capital ratio calculated in ac-
cordance with the Basel Capital Accord parameters. In examining
the banks' reporting, the CBS encouraged them to expand the
transparency of their use of lending credit risk mitigation methods,
asset securitization, and internal ratings, given that disclosure in
these areas will support use of these methods under the accord.
The CBS also encourages those banks that do not disclose their
information to act according to the existing CBS disclosure guide-
lines issued in order to improve disclosure procedures. 221 And
marks Before the Global Association of Risk Professionals (Feb. 11, 2003) (discuss-
ing the need for clarity and transparency in risk rating systems as they apply to
the 1988 Accord), available at http://www.bis.org/review/r030217a.pdf (last vis-
ited Oct. 14, 2004).
218 This publication of the results of the 2001 disclosure survey is part of the
sustained effort by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to promote
transparency and effective market discipline in the banking and capital markets.
219 Overall, in 2001, banks disclosed sixty-three percent of the items included
in the survey, up from fifty-nine percent in 2000 and fifty-seven percent in 1999.
220 See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Public Disclosures by Banks: Re-
sults of the 2001 Disclosure Survey (May 2003) at 14 (describing the results of inter-
nal and external ratings of banks), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbs97.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
221 See generally Michele Fratianni & John Pattison, International Financial Ar-
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when this committee raises the red flag, banks take notice.
The CBS is paying particular attention to the rapid, and often
difficult to supervise, expansion of e-banking activities worldwide.
The committee expects the risks of e-banking to be acknowledged
and managed by banking institutions in a prudent manner, ac-
counting for the fundamental characteristics and challenges that e-
banking services offer, including the unprecedented speed of
change related to technological and customer service innovation,
the universal nature of open electronic networks, and the integra-
tion of e-banking applications in computer systems. "[Tihese char-
acteristics [have] increase[ed] and modified some of the traditional
risks associated with banking activities, particularly strategic, op-
erational, legal, and reputational risks, thereby influencing the
overall risk profile of banking." 222
While existing risk management principles remain applicable
to e-banking activities, such principles must be tailored, adapted,
and expanded to address new challenges created by e-banking. It
is incumbent upon bank management and boards of directors to
ensure that their institutions have reviewed and modified existing
risk management policies and processes to cover e-banking activi-
ties. Integration of e-banking applications demands an integrated
risk management approach for all banking activities.223
Banks in developed economies have significantly increased
their risk based capital ratios, particularly with the introduction of
the Basel Capital Accord in 1988. A survey from BIS found that the
industry average capital ratio rose from 9.3% in 1988 to 11.2% in
1996. Those banks which were close to (or under) the accord's
minimum capital adequacy ratio of eight percent in 1988, showed a
much higher overall increase than those which had historically
high capital ratios.224 Although the data is not completely compa-
chitecture and International Financial Standards, 57 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 183 (2002) (proposing a portal solution to international financial standards
with the United States and the United Kingdom as examples).
222 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Risk Management Principals for Elec-
tronic Banking (May 2001), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs82.pdf (last
visited Oct. 14, 2004).
223 See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Management and Supervision of
Cross-border Electronic Banking Activities (July 2003) ("[s]tressing the need for banks
to integrate cross-border e-banking risks into the banks overall risk management
framework."), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs99.pdf (last visited Oct.
14, 2004).
224 See PATRICIA JACKSON ET AL., CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS AND BANK BEHAVIOUR:
THE IMPACT OF THE BASLE ACCORD (Basle Comm. on Banking Supervision, Working
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rable across countries, it is clear that the introduction of the Basel
capital adequacy ratios was followed by a significant increase in
the average capital ratios in most industrialized countries. Bank
regulators regularly set ratios higher than the accord's minimum,
bank by bank.225 From 1988 through 1996, seventy-three percent of
banks in the most industrialized countries increased both capital
and risk-weighted assets while three percent of banks decreased
capital (and also increased risk-weighted assets). The BIS study
concluded that in total ninety-two percent of banks increased their
capital levels while seventy-six percent raised their risk-weighted
assets.22 6
These statistics show clear differences between the capital and
lending decisions of banks and the effects of those decisions in dif-
ferent countries.227 Studies indicate that banks with relatively low
capital ratios have subsequently tended to improve these ratios- in
the process outperforming the better capitalized banks.228 How-
ever, in the United States the combination of increased capital lev-
els and reduced risk-weighted assets by banks, may have contrib-
uted to the sharp decrease in economic growth experienced from
1988 to 1991. Some critics say that the introduction of minimum
regulatory capital requirements harms the competitiveness of the
banking industry. They argue that if capital standards dictate that
a bank maintain an equity position in excess of what the bank
would hold independently or in response to market pressure, then
these standards constitute an artificial constraint on the bank's op-
erations.
Paper No. 1, Apr. 1999) (noting studies which show that post-Accord, weakly
capitalized banks rebuilt their capital ratios), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/bcbs.wpl.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
m See George Sheldon, Capital Adequacy Rules and the Risk-Seeking Behavior of
Banks: A Firm-Level Analysis, SwIss J. OF ECON. & STATISTICS 709 (1996) (discussing
how Bank Regulators utilize the Basel Capital adequacy ratios).
226 See S. Pilcer & M. D. Dierdorff, Understanding Structured Liquidity Facilities
in Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Programs, ASSET-BACKED COM. PAPER MARKET REV.
(First Quarter 1997) (discussing the implications of credit risk shifting), available at
http://www.securitization.net/pdf/abcp3.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
227 See John Boyd & Mark Gertler, U.S. Commercial Banking: Trends, Cycles and
Policy, in NBER MACROECONOMICS ANNUAL (1993) (proposing key policy options
and examining trends in U.S. commercial banking).
m See generally Adrian Blundell-Wignall et al., Monetary Policy in the Wake
of Financial Liberalization (Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., Working Paper
No. 77, April 1990) (examining evidence concerning the impact of financial liberal
trends, and innovation on monetary policy), at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
16/40/2002723.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
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Evidence supports the view that the Basel Capital Accord,
which was implemented in the United States in the beginning of
1990, played a role in the U.S. "credit crunch" when the portfolios
of U.S. banks shifted from commercial lending into government se-
curities. For example, shortly after the passing of the accord, the
share of total bank credit invested in commercial and industrial
loans in the United States fell from 22.5 percent in 1989 to below
sixteen percent in 1994. Yet, the share of total bank credit invested
in U.S. government securities rose from fifteen percent to twenty-
five percent over the same period of time.229 The development of
risk management policies by BIS and the consideration of those
policies by local bank regulatory authorities has a salutary effect in
several ways: bank regulators are evaluating the relationship be-
tween capital and bank activity,230 and bank regulators and bank
management are more deeply evaluating the effects of bank activ-
ity on general economic activity.231
The work on bank capital and risk measurement being con-
ducted in Basel does not ignore that many, perhaps most, banks
are safe, sound and well managed. The CBS found similarities and
differences in the structure, methodology and application of inter-
nal rating systems among banks.232 According to a BIS study,233
almost thirty banks and financial institutions in the most devel-
oped countries had well-developed internal rating systems.
Although there is no unique standard for the design and opera-
229 See Craig Furfine, Evidence on the Response of US Banks to Changes in
Capital Requirements (Bank for Int'l Settlement, Working Paper No. 88, June
2000) (presenting a structural model of a banking firm in order to test how banks
typically adjust loan portfolios over a given period of time), at http://www.bis.
org/publ/work88.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
230 See generally Ronald E. Shrieves & Drew Dahl, The Relationship Between Risk
and Capital in Commercial Banks, 16 J. BANKING AND FIN. 439 (1992) (supporting
regulation for banks with low capital levels).
231 See, e.g., William J. McDonough, Speech before the Monetary Authority of
Singapore (Mar. 24, 2001) (discussing the broad economic effects of bank policies),
at http://www.bis.org/review/r000328a.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
232 See Press Release, Bank for International Settlements, A New Capital Ade-
quacy Framework, Supplementary Documents (Jan. 18, 2000) (quoting Pierre-Yves
Thoraval, Chairman of the Working Group that produced the paper that is the
subject of the press release), at http://www.bis.org/press/p000118.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 14, 2004).
233 See id. In spring 1999, BIS Committee's Models Task Force received a
mandate from the Committee to embark on a study of banks' internal rating sys-
tems and processes, and to evaluate the options for relating internal ratings to a
regulatory scheme.
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tion of an internal rating system, the CBS concluded that banks are
establishing similar strategies, including, among others: using the
same types of risk factors when assigning an internal rating, ac-
companied by different supervision approaches in doing so; as-
signment of these ratings based on an assessment of the borrower;
use of information gleaned from ratings for management report-
ing, pricing, limit setting; and ways of collection and analysis of in-
ternal data to quantify risks.234
Since the birth of the Basel Capital Accord, the CBS has pro-
duced numerous policy statements dealing with sound risk man-
agement practices for banks related to derivative activities and
most recently involving the management of interest rate risk.235
One of the most recent notable accomplishments of the committee
was the creation of new capital standards for market risk in trading
activities, reflecting a new approach for building international
banking standards. Banks and other financial institutions apply
the new capital standards to their existing risk management prac-
tices, resulting in increased efficiency. 236
234 There is much for local bank regulators to do in applying the Basel Capital
Accord standards. In determining whether a bank may rely on its market risk
model for capital purposes, national financial supervisory authorities need to
evaluate the technical fundamentals of the model, as well as to establish risk con-
trol and management procedures for implementation of such a model. Particular
attention should be paid to (1) whether the model is based on reasonable risk as-
sumptions; (2) whether a bank is appropriately using back-testing procedures; (3)
performance of the model under normal and stressed market conditions; and (4)
the overall use of models, including the model evaluation process and the new
product approval process. See William J. McDonough, Completing the Journey to
the New Basel Accord, Remarks before the Twelfth International Conference of
Banking Supervisors (Sept. 18, 2002) (commenting on the promotion of risk man-
agement via the regulation of capital), at http://www.bis.org/review/
r020920b.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004). Other important tasks for the bank regu-
lators are (1) to audit how banks are managing operational risk management and
control structures from a corporate governance point of view, (2) to analyze
banks' assessments of their economic capital requirements for operational risk,
and (3) to examine how this capital is allocated to business lines to strengthen ef-
forts for improving internal controls. The regulators' ultimate goal is to ensure
that the internal processes in place are in fact working and are effective in mitigat-
ing the relevant risks of banks' activities. See Rutledge, supra note 210.
235 See Masaru Hayami, Financial system stability and future agenda -need
to strengthen the capital base, Speech at the Fiftieth Anniversary Symposium of
the Institute for Financial Affairs (July 14, 2000) (discussing the incorporation of"market and operational risks" and the improvement of credit risk measures in
the reformed Capitol Accord), available at http://www.bis.org/review/
r000718a.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
236 See Robert T Parry, Monetary policy in a new environment -the US ex-
perience, Speech at the Joint Bundesbank/BIS conference on "Recent develop-
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Promoting sound risk management in banks is a goal which
bank regulators need to pursue aggressively when they consider
implementing new banking policies and regulations. This should
be compatible with underlying economics and market demands in
their respective countries to the extent of building on "best" or
sound banking practices in designing rules and regulations, lead-
ing toward a common end. Identifying those practices and decid-
ing how to apply them as supervisory or regulatory standards will
also strengthen relations among national financial authorities,
proving invaluable in times of market stress.
Among banks and related financial institutions, there are sig-
nificant differences in operations, structures, and historical devel-
opment. No single or specific technique is the best for every insti-
tution in its risk measurement, modeling processes or, of course,
regulatory capital standards. The current proposals to the Basel
Capital Accord encourage banks to adapt their own risk measure-
ment and management processes to their needs, determining the
proper incentives and techniques for managing their affairs. How-
ever, it is also necessary for bank regulators to limit the level of
flexibility embodied in the accord's recommendations. 237 Bank
regulators must develop flexible, market-compatible regulations
and also cautiously rely on market discipline and on banks' inter-
nal incentives. The modem approach also demands that the public
be provided information on the risk exposures of banks and their
procedures to manage those risks.238 Public disclosure of informa-
tion on financial institutions varies throughout the world; not in-
frequently, such disclosure practices are minimal at best. In add-
ments in financial systems and the challenges for economic policy" (Sept. 28-29,
2000) (noting that technological developments have improved efficiency), available
at http://www.bis.org/review/r001005c.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
237 See Laurence H. Meyer, Capital Standards and Community Banks, Re-
marks at the Ohio Bankers' Day Conference (Mar. 15, 2001) (questioning whether
it would be wise for U.S. regulators to adopt the flexible approach in the accord),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gocv/boarddocs/speeches/2001/200103
15/default.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
238 See Laurence H. Meyer, The New Basel Capital Proposal, Remarks at the
Annual Washington Conference of the Institute of International Bankers (Mar. 5,
2001) (discussing the benefits of the disclosure requirements in the U.S. market
and advocating for more disclosure to decrease risk), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2001/20010305/default.htm (last
visited Oct. 14, 2004). The extent to which public perception is a vital cog in con-
trolling banks is a major issue in the Congressional and regulatory review of the
deposit insurance system. Many believe that deposit insurance should be reduced
in order to increase the public's supervisory function.
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ing transparency to the providing of market information, bank
regulators may attract an increased number of investors interested
in banks and other financial institutions, leading to the growth of
local capital markets.
Additionally, the role of banks in increasing disclosure may
lead to expansion into other financial and non-financial sectors. Of
course, the more information shared and disclosed by banks about
their condition and future prospects, the less uncertainty will be
felt by investors.239
Bank regulators should exercise caution when implementing
the CBS's recommendations. Often regulators create new or differ-
ent techniques, based on the committee's recommendations, which
might impair their oversight efforts or which do not relax them be-
yond prudent limits. In globalized markets, weak or ineffective
supervision in countries of any economic size might have far reach-
ing consequences. These are precisely the concerns of the CBS,
which systematically tries to identify the respective roles and re-
sponsibilities of home and host bank regulatory authorities. It re-
mains the imperative duty of bank regulators to coordinate with
sister regulatory authorities in other countries in order to adminis-
ter agreed-upon standards of financial institution safety and
soundness.240
Implementation of the CBS's recommendations often has be-
come too costly and burdensome for banks. Sometimes, these rec-
ommendations put a crimp in a particular banking activity. How-
ever, such barriers are overcome by banks, whose fundamental
objective is to create a risk-based capital system and to promote
better risk management, which leads to a safer banking system.
Banks, principally large banks with exposure to international ac-
tivities, are extensively participating in discussions for the produc-
tion of a better risk prevention systems addressed to both the
239 See Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Community and Regional Banks -Increasing
Complexity and Risk-Management Needs, Remarks at the 106th Annual Conven-
tion of the North Carolina Bankers Association (May 21, 2002) (discussing the im-
portance of risk management procedures and oversight in community and re-
gional banks), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/
2002/200205212/default.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
240 See Alan Greenspan, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Capital
Markets, Securities, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the Committee on
Banking and Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 19,
1997) (stating the importance of risk management procedure and oversight in
community and regional banks), available at http://www.federal reserve.gov/
boarddocs/testimony/ 1997/ 19970319.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
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needs of private and public financial institutions. The CBS and na-
tional bank authorities take banks' comments and suggestions se-
riously, and respond to them accordingly. 241 The relationship be-
tween bank regulators and banks is ongoing and operates best
when it includes the industry's understanding that the regulator's
wider objective is to develop a safer and sounder banking system
by strengthening risk management in banking institutions.242
The United States adopts the Basel proposals under the statu-
tory authority of the International Lending Supervision Act.243 On
an interagency basis, the FRB, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation are all
represented on the CBS. The Federal Reserve is also represented
on the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems. The Fed-
eral Reserve and the other bank regulatory agencies have increas-
ingly recognized the significant role of the Basel Capital Accord,
particularly its introduction of risk-based capital requirement rec-
ommendations.244 U.S. bank regulators work systematically with
banks in order to supervise their implementation of the Basel Capi-
tal Accord's minimum capital requirements.245 Shortly after the in-
troduction of the accord, a new trend occurred in U.S. commercial
bank portfolios consistent with the new economic incentives given
241 See Edward W. Kelley, Jr., Remarks at the Seminar on Banking Soundness
and Monetary Policy in a World of Global Capital Markets Sponsored by the
International Monetary Fund (Jan. 29, 1997) (recognizing the significance of the
liquidity transformation function of banks and its interaction with national
economies), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/
1997/19970129.htm (last visited October 14, 2004).
242 See Alice M. Rivlin, Remarks at The Brookings Institution National Issues
Forum (Dec. 19, 1996) (addressing how bank regulators should supervise bank
risk-taking), at http:/ /www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/199 6/1 9 96 1
219.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
243 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3901-12 (2000) (declaring the congressional policy fortify-
ing the economic health of the nation through strengthening of bank regulatory
frameworks).
244 Under the 1998 Agreement, banks should hold a higher percentage of eq-
uity capital for loan than for government security. Considering that loans are pre-
sumably more risky than securities, these new capital regulations seem to im-
prove the link between bank risk and bank capital. Considering also the common
view that equity capital is more costly than alternative funding sources, these re-
quirements made lending more expansive than purchasing securities, which in
turn provided an incentive for banks to shift their portfolios away from loans and
into securities.
245 See 12 U.S.C. § 3907(a)(1) (2000) ("Each appropriate Federal banking
agency shall cause banking institutions to achieve and maintain adequate capital
by establishing minimum levels of capital for such banking institutions....").
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to bank managers. Banks 246 started to reduce their investments in
commercial lending and began instead to invest in government se-
curities. By way of example, the total share of bank credit invested
in commercial loans dropped from 22.5 percent to sixteen percent
during the period 1989 to 1994, while credit invested in U.S. gov-
ernment securities increased from fifteen percent to twenty-five
percent.247
In the United States, some long time critics believe that BIS's
proposed rules are too complex and unnecessary to be imple-
mented by U.S. banks and their regulators. 248 One of those critics
was John D. Hawke, Jr., head of the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, who said, "U.S. banks -led by credit card lenders -
were united in opposition to a provision requiring them to hold
capital for expected losses on problem loans," arguing that banks
today set aside reserves or charge high prices for products like
credits cards in order to cover their expected losses.249 The CBS ac-
ceded to Comptroller Hawke's objection and reduced its capital
design to where capital would have to be held only against unex-
pected, and not expected, losses.250 Concern was also expressed
concerning a decision by U.S. bank regulators that the Basel rules
would apply only to some ten leading banks that account for about
ninety-nine percent of the foreign exposure in the U.S. banking sys-
tem.251
In general, the U.S. regulatory agencies see BIS as an entity that
helps in developing compatible regulations to maintain a healthy
international banking system which meets the growing needs of
the U.S. economy. The effect of BIS's work is to enable U.S. institu-
tions to compete safely on a nondiscriminatory basis.252 If there
246 Banks that are bound by the capital requirements are commercial and sav-
ings banks, credit unions, foreign bank branches and agencies, and Edge Act cor-
porations.
247 See FURFINE, supra note 229, at 1-2.
248 The CBS has dropped its wish that U.S. regulators adopt the Basel Accord
II rules by the end of 2003.
249 Gary Silverman, U.S. Regulator Voices Basel Concerns, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 13,
2003, at 8.
250 See Barbara Rehn, Basel Rewrite -Suddenly, Simple is In, AM. BANKER, Oct.
21, 2003, at 1 (listening to the concerns of industry, the CBS "is shifting back to
a... less prescriptive approach").
251 See generally id. at 3 (discussing difficulties in rewriting international capi-
tal requirements).
252 See William J. McDonough, Bank Supervision and Credit Standards under
Basle I -perspectives for SMEs, Remarks at the GUrzenich Kbln (Apr. 25, 2002)
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were regulatory competition between BIS and the U.S. bank regu-
lators, the U.S. Congress at some point might oppose the work in
Basel. It is also, however, conceivable that such regulatory compe-
tition could demonstrate advantages from accommodating differ-
ent risk reduction recommendations and permitting financial insti-
tutions to have alternative ways to protect their business. 253
Surveys over the years have tended to show that despite a natural
inclination in banks to keep their internal information confidential,
demands by law and by regulatory authorities to disclose their af-
fairs to the public have had relatively good effects. Pressures from
Basel and from local regulators continue in this direction, including
such proposals as that the banks' so-called "call reports," be made
available to the public.254
The Federal Reserve and other U.S. bank supervisory agencies
believe that the CBS approach on internal credit risk ratings of
banks will be a major step for bank supervision and regulation and
will also have major implications for banks, not only in the United
States, but also around the world. It seems to be a step in the right
direction, keeping pace with market practices and addressing de-
velopments that undermine current standards.255 In sum, the Fed-
eral Reserve and other U.S. bank supervisory agencies are commit-
ted to the efforts of the CBS and the direction they are taking.256
(addressing needs of small and midsize businesses vis 6 vis banking regulations).
253 See Susan S. Bies, Corporate Governance and Risk Management, Speech at
the Annual International Symposium on Derivatives and Risk Management,
Fordham University School of Law (Oct. 8, 2002) (discussing the role of risk
management in strengthening corporate governance from the viewpoint of
management, boards, and internal control functions), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002/20021008/default.htm (last
visited Oct. 14, 2004).
254 See William J. McDonough, The Foundation of Financial Stability, Speech
before the 50th Anniversary Symposium of the Bank of Korea, (Jul. 8, 2000) (not-
ing financial sector reform in relation to the rehabilitation of Asian financial sys-
tems), available at http://www.bis.org/review/r000713b.pdf (last visited Oct. 21,
2004).
255 See Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Financial Market Lessons for Bankers and
Bank Supervisors, Remarks before the Bond Market Association, New York (Oct.
28, 1999) (stating the effects business practice and financial innovation have upon
the supervision and regulation of banks), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SPEECHES/1999/19991028.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 21, 2004).
256 See also Alan Greenspan, The Condition of the Financial Markets, Testi-
mony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
(Sept. 20, 2001) (discussing the U.S. economy's resilience to disruption as a result
of deregulated financial markets and advances in information technology), avail-
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Standards set by the CBS are finding their way into the bank ex-
amination process. 257 Large U.S. banks have already commenced
implementation of the Basel II rules. The Federal Reserve is work-
ing in combination with banks to provide improved training tech-
niques. Encouraged by the CBS, local banks and regulators are in-
creasingly setting their sights on global as well as domestic issues.
Worldwide consolidated supervision is becoming an accepted part
of banking. 258
The Federal Reserve is actively involved in the ten meetings
each year among G-10 central bank governors, under the auspices
of BIS, where they exchange information on global economic is-
sues, including the risk profiles of internationally active financial
conglomerates and holding companies. 259  Alan Greenspan,
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, in his testimony to the
Congressional Sub-Committee on Financial Institutions and Con-
sumer Credit, said "[r]isks managed on a consolidated basis cannot
be reviewed on an individual legal entity basis by different super-
visors." 260 The BIS and its constituent committees are increasingly
able at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/2001/20010920/
default.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
257 See Susan M. Phillips, International Competition: Should We Harmonize
Our National Regulatory Systems?, Remarks at the IMF Seminar on Banking
Soundness and Monetary Policy in a World of Global Capital Markets, (Jan. 28,1997) (discussing efforts of the United States in concert with other countries to de-velop more consistent supervisory and regulatory systems), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/SPEECHES/1997/19970128.htm
(last visited Oct. 14, 2004), see also Laurence H. Meyer, Basel II: Moving from Con-
cept Toward Implementation, Remarks at the Bank Administration Institute's
Conference on Treasury, Investment, ALM, and Risk Management (Oct. 15, 2001)(discussing the Basel proposal for developing processes for improving internalrating based systems and the impact such processes might have on the U.S. bank-ing system), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/
SPEECHES/2001/20011015/default.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
258 See Susan M. Phillips, The Changing Financial Landscape and Umbrella
Supervision, Speech at The Exchequer Club (June 18, 1997) (discussing the needfor industry-wide supervisory roles as a response to the changing nature of finan-
cial services in the twenty-first century), available at http://
www.federalreserve.govBOARDDOCS/SPEECHES/1997/19970618.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 14, 2004).
259 See Laurence H. Meyer, Globalization and U.S. Monetary Policy, Speech
before the Institute for Global Management and Research, School of Business and
Public Management, The George Washington University (Oct. 14, 1997) (discuss-
ing the effects of globalization on the U.S. economy), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/SPEECHES/1997/199710143.htm (last
visited Oct. 14, 2004).
260 See Howard Davies, Market and Regulatory Structures in a Global Envi-
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emphasizing that for a bank operating in a large financial group, it
is necessary to look not only at the soundness of the bank itself but
also at the group as a whole.
In the EU, Basel recommendations serve as the basis to issue
EU banking directives, which are legally binding in all EU member
countries. 261 Among the most relevant EU directives with respect
to compliance with BIS's recommendation are: the EU Directive on
Investment Services (hereinafter "Investment Services Direc-
tive");262 the EU Directive on Capital Adequacy (hereinafter Capital
Adequacy Directive);263 the EU Directive on Solvency Ratio (here-
inafter Solvency Ratio Directive);264 the EU Directive on Own
Funds (hereinafter Own Funds Directive); 265 and the EU Directive
on Deposit Guarantee Scheme (hereinafter Deposit Guarantee
Scheme Directive).266
The Investment Services Directive provides the European"passport" to investment firms to offer investment services cross-
border or by branches in other European member countries with-
out the need to undergo additional authorization requirements in
these countries.
The Capital Adequacy Directive lays down the initial capital
requirements for investment firms. The directive also establishes
the amount of capital which must be set aside by both banks and
ron-ment, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta's Financial Markets Con-
ference (Feb. 22, 1997) (discussing UK regulatory structures and proposals for
change), available at http://www.bis.org/review/r970305e.pdf (last visited Oct.
14, 2004).
261 See JACKSON, supra note 224 (reviewing the empirical evidence on the im-
pact of the Basel Capital Accord).
262 Council Directive 93/22, 1993 O.J. (L 191) 27 [hereinafter Investment Ser-
vices Directive] (establishing an approach to secure mutual recognition of au-
thorization and supervision systems throughout investment service providers in
the EU).
263 Council Directive 93/6, 1993 O.J. (L 141) 1 [hereinafter Capital Adequacy
Directive] (establishing guidelines, though not common standards, for initial capi-
tal amounts of EU investment firms).
264 Council Directive 89/647, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 14 [hereinafter Solvency Ratio
Directive] (detailing a common solvency standard in the form of a minimum ratio
to reinforce the capital of credit institutions in the EU).
265 Council Directive 89/299, 1989 O.J. (L 124) 16 [hereinafter Own Funds Di-
rective] (setting basic standards for the EU with respect to the own funds of credit
institutions).
266 Council Directive 94/19, 1994 O.J. (L 135) 5 [hereinafter Deposit Guaran-
tee Directive] (providing for a system for the single authorization of each credit
institution by means of a single guarantee scheme).
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investment firms to cover their market risk exposure.267 Unlike the
Basel Capital Accord rules, the Capital Adequacy Directive is in-
tended to apply not only to institutions with international opera-
tions, but also those that are purely domestic. Currently, Basel
rules and the Capital Adequacy Directive are under revision.
There is a good likelihood that the final drafts of the Basel and EU
capital rules will be substantially and significantly more consistent
than they are currently.268
The Solvency Ratio Directive was the vehicle by which the EU
implemented the Basel Capital Accord into an EU law.
The Own Funds Directive determines the composition and the
basic standards for the funds of credit institutions and specifies the
qualifying criteria for certain own funds items, although EU mem-
ber countries are free to apply more stringent provisions if they
wish.
Under the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive, the home
country deposit protection scheme of a bank also covers deposits
of the bank's branches in other EU jurisdictions.
Under the First Banking Directive of 1978, banks within the EU
had the authority to implement the recommendations proposed by
BIS and other international banking institutions. 269 By way of ex-
ample, institutions subject to reserve requirements in various
European member countries are:
* Austria, all domestic credit institutions;
" France, all credit institutions except the Caisse Francaise de
Developpement;
" Germany, with few exceptions, all institutions doing the
business of banking;
* Italy, all credit institutions except very small ones; and,
* the United Kingdom, all authorized banks except very small
ones.270
267 See Jackson, supra note 198, at 20 (discussing the reasons behind interna-
tional agreements on financial regulation).
268 See David Clementi, Speech at an [sic] Financial Services Authority
Conference (Dec. 2, 1999) (describing the Bank of England's efforts to work with
the FSA on the Basel Committee proposals), available at http://www.bankof
england.co.uk/ speeches/speech63.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2004).
269 See Council Directive 77/780/EEC (Dec. 12, 1977) (discussing the implica-
tions of the First Banking Directive of 1978), available at http://europa.eu.int/
smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=E (last visited Oct. 21, 2004).
270 See CLAUDIO E.V. BORIo, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MONETARY POLICY IN
INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES: A SURVEY (BIS Econ. Papers No. 47, 1997) (reviewing mone-
tary policy implementation procedures to demonstrate similarities and differences
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Many EU member states implemented general banking risk re-
serves before BIS commenced work to introduce the concept of
loan-loss reserves in capital, including disclosure requirements. 271
Within the EU, the supervisory authority on banking and secu-
rities is shared among the national financial supervisory authori-
ties, European Central Bank272 and other international institutions,
such as BIS. This overlapping power, among supervisory institu-
tions, potentially represents a conflict of interest.273
The Bank of England and its successor, FSA, have a close rela-
tionship with BIS's various committees and institutions. The Bank
of England and the FSA always believed that effective supervision
of financial groups must involve consolidated supervision. The
cases of English bank failures, e.g., Barings and Daiwa, have high-
lighted the difficulty that the U.K. financial authorities face in su-
pervising bank operations which are far from their head offices.
Along with strengthening their international regulatory coopera-
tion, the U.K. financial institutions have been devoting consider-
able thought to the development of internal credit ratings based on
an approach to setting capital, utilizing the experience BIS has built
up in the course of its work on credit risk modeling.274
In reference to the Basel capital minimum, many of the largest
international bank operations in the United Kingdom are in
branches rather than in independent subsidiaries. This probably
remaining among EU countries), available at http://www.bis.org/pubi/
econ47.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
271 See BASLE COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, AMENDMENT TO THE BASLE
CAPITAL ACCORD (1998) (reducing the risk weight for claims on regulated securi-
ties firms), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs09.pdf (last visited Oct. 14,
2004).
272 The CBS resides at the ECB. This body consists of senior representatives
of the central banks and regulatory authorities of all EU countries and is thus well
suited to covering the various aspects of supervision. In the event of an impend-
ing systemic crisis with potential contagion effects, the CBS could also play an
important role in crisis management bringing together the countries involved.
273 See Edgar Meister, How Should Regulatory and Supervisory
Responsibilities Be Shared among the National Functional Regulators?, Lecture at
the Multinational Banking Seminar (June 9, 2001) (discussing the potential for
conflict of interest between member countries of the EU in the arena of the
converging European financial market), available at http://www.bis.
org/review/r10613d.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
274 See David Clementi, Speech at a Financial Services Authority Conference
(Dec. 2, 1999) (discussing the development of internal credit ratings at the Bank of
England in accordance with the Basel Committee's proposals), available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches/speech63.htm (last visited Oct. 14,
2004).
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relates to the fact that the U.K. financial authorities have generally
required more capital for operations of an independent bank than
the Basel minimum capital requirement. 275 A branch of a bank in
the United Kingdom can operate on the Basel minimum.
The greatest positive impacts of implementation of BIS's rules
are undoubtedly felt in the Japanese financial sector, which has
been made more open and competitive. 276 BIS has responded posi-
tively to the Japanese Central Bank's implementation of its recom-
mendations. Japan still has a number of issues to tackle in order to
strengthen its financial stability.277 Most important is the need to
strengthen Japanese banks' capital base as it applies to credit, mar-
ket, and operational activities. 278 Risk-based capital of Japanese
banks, which are internationally active, was 11.8 percent at the end
of March 2000, out of which Tier 1 capital was 6.6 percent.279
In accordance with BIS's recommendations, Japanese banks are
working toward the redemption of high-cost capital and an in-
crease in internal reserves through higher profits in order to
achieve reduction of capital cost and an increase of return on eq-
uity.280 Japanese banks281 are increasingly facing more complex
and sophisticated types of risks. In order to satisfactorily manage
such risks, as well as to face severe competition ahead, the Central
Bank of Japan has realized that risks and related capital charges
must be measured with greater sophistication. A related problem
for Japanese regulators is to deal with intensified competition trig-
gered by the entry of foreign capital and non-financial firms into
the banking industry.
275 See Jackson, supra note 198, at 2-3 (setting out the "Three Pillars," includ-
ing Pillar 1, minimum capital requirements).
276 See WILLIAM R. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IN THE AREA OF
BANKING AND FINANCE: ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND OUTSTANDING ISSUES (BIS, Mone-
tary and Econ. Dept., Working Paper No. 38, Oct. 1996) (discussing the relaxation
of restrictions on domestic financial markets and international capital flows
through international agreements in banking and finance).
277 Id.
278 Id.
279 According to the U.S. standard, if we calculate the Tier 1 capital of interna-
tionally active Japanese banks, it would decline from 6.6% to the 4% level.
280 The New Capital Accord incorporates market and operational risks which
are not taken into account in the current Capital Accord. See Basel II, supra note
53. It also measures credit risk more precisely and imposes capital charges more
appropriately. Id.
281 In Japan, banks bound by the Accord's capital requirements are city
banks, regional banks, regional banks II, trust banks, long-term credit banks,
branches of foreign banks, shinkin banks and Norinchukin Bank.
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Even the China Banking Regulatory Commission (China's na-
tional financial regulatory authority) is planning to draft regula-
tory rules and operational guidelines in line with the requirements
of the Basel Capital Accord. A high ranking official of the commis-
sion daringly said, "we [Chinese bank regulators] have long been
studying ways to improve the existing capital supervision sys-
tem."282 Since Chinese financial markets still remain essentially
closed to foreign capital investors, the extent of the implementation
of BIS's recommendations to Chinese bank regulators is unclear.
South Korean bank regulators have already put into place the
risk-adjusted capital standards recommended by BIS. These re-
quirements came into force at the end of 1995, and now all South
Korean banks are required to maintain an equity capital position
equivalent to at least eight percent. Since the late 1990's involve-
ment of international lending agencies in the restructuring of the
South Korean financial sector, the influence of BIS's recommenda-
tions has become increasingly noticeable. The BIS recommenda-
tions are used as an important policy tool in restructuring the trou-
bled South Korean financial industry. The South Korean financial
authorities apply disciplinary measures to commercial banks, in-
cluding the revocation of merchant banking licenses, freezing
management payrolls, prevention of dividends and even liquida-
tion contingent upon rehabilitation plans meeting BIS's standards.
South Korean commercial banks have become so sensitive to BIS's
standards that they initiated a recall of outstanding loans which re-
sulted in a sudden chain of bankruptcies among the affected
firms.283
The BIS is the principal forum for developing international su-
pervisory standards for banks in both industrialized and the less
developed countries throughout the world. The BIS relies on mar-
ket conditions to discipline banks and protect consumers. In the
end, national bank regulators have little choice but to implement
the recommendations in part or in whole as "global standard"
282 See Banks Embrace New Basel Accord, CHINA DAILY, June 2, 2003 (expressing
hope that the Basel Accord proposals, focusing on improved risk management,
will lead to progress in the risk management of Chinese banks), available at
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2003/Jun/65988.htm (last visited Oct. 14,
2004).
283 See Hwa-Jin Kim, Living With the IMF: A New Approach to Corporate Govern-
ance and Regulation of Financial Institutions in Korea, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 61 (1999)
(discussing the development of Korean corporate governance and addressing les-
sons Korea gleaned from comparative corporate governance studies).
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rules. Implementation of BIS's recommendation should not be
seen as a legal burden, but rather as a necessary requirement to re-
duce risks and failures in the business of banking. National finan-
cial authorities should be especially attentive in developing coun-
tries, which need to increase their cooperation in implementing the
standards provided by BIS.284 As financial markets become more
and more integrated, bank regulators around the world will be see-
ing more of each other than they have in the past. Banks operating
imprudently and without proper supervision are the ones most
likely to mis-measure their risks, mis-price their products, and dis-
rupt the markets. Detecting and deterring such institutions does
not necessarily require having uniform regulatory or supervisory
systems rather than a certain level of cooperation and coordination
and a material level of consistency. Even in countries that have no
internationally active domestic banks, authorities need to ensure
that the banks operating in their markets are sound and subject to
adequate supervision, whether by home or host authorities.
In its deliberations and in the materials that it sends out, BIS
and the CBS influence local regulators as well as the banks subject
to their supervision. Bank regulators must understand the full im-
plications of their practices for the financial safety of depository in-
stitutions.285 Flexibility in implementing CBS recommendations
may well be more important for bank regulators in developing
countries than in industrialized countries with large, developed fi-
nancial systems. The economies of developing countries are often
too weak to adapt BIS or the CBS recommendations strictly. How-
ever, different situations would normally require different solu-
tions. Accommodating differences does not reduce the need for
minimum regulatory or supervisory standards in compliance with
sound banking and safety net principles. At the end of the day, it
would be up to bank regulators and, as required, to legislators to
pass regulations and laws consistent with internationally recog-
nized standards, but always accommodating the local "culture" of
284 See Jonathan Ward, The New Basel Accord and Developing Countries:
Problems and Alternatives (2002) (unpublished working paper) (detailing the is-
sues and possible remedies developing countries may face in implementing Basel
II).
285 See Andrew Crockett, Speech at the Annual General Meeting of the Bank
for International Settlements (Jul. 8, 2002) (detailing BIS responses to the needs of
its clients with respect to yield, flexibility, and security), available at
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp020708.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
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doing business and economic needs.28 6
So far, BIS's recommendations are serving supervisors and the
industry reasonably well as one of the primary tools for maintain-
ing a sound and safe banking system. The nature and complexity
of risk, as undertaken by banks and other financial institutions, is
making the blunt traditional measures of capital adequacy less
meaningful. Considering the likelihood of the continued moderni-
zation of technology, financial authorities are trying to develop
ways to improve their control and supervisory role towards banks,
while reinforcing incentives for sound risk management of banks
activities. The BIS's recommendations help national financial au-
thorities achieve these multiple objectives. 28 7
Implementation of BIS's recommendations alone is insufficient
to ensure international financial stability. Nor are these standards
an end in themselves, or some kind of magic "cure-all." Instead,
they should be viewed as a means of promoting sound financial
systems and, in turn, to sustaining economic growth. One expects
that implementation of BIS's recommendations will, at the least,
reduce the likelihood of future international crises of significant
proportions.288 The BIS will continue to monitor the activities of
banks and other financial institutions closely.
5. NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL BANK GUIDELINES
The concept of an open market, available to entry and to com-
petition and also subject to failure, is the accepted economic phi-
losophy of today's international economy. 289 Regulation has not,
286 See Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., G-10 Study of Financial Sector Consolidation,
Speech at the Task Force on Financial Sector Consolidation Press Briefing (Jan. 25,
2001) (discussing the effects of consolidation of the G-10 financial sector and the
need for associated policy development), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2001/20010125/default.htm (last
visited Oct. 14, 2004); see also Overview of the Amendment, supra note 146, at 2
(summarizing amendments to the new Accord, most significantly that banks will
have more flexibility in specifying parameters for internal models).
287 The New Basel Capital Accord is based on three pillars: (1) minimum
capital requirements that are more sensitive to risk, (2) a supervisory review proc-
ess, and (3) market discipline. Ward, supra note 284, at 26-32.
288 See International Banking and Financial Market Developments, BIS Q. REV.,
Mar. 2001 (detailing international market developments and international finance
highlights of the fourth quarter of 2000).
289 The failure of the World Trade Organization meeting in Cancun, Mexico
on September 14, 2003 was, ironically, the result of some of the world's wealthiest
states, including the United States, refusing to subject their agricultural businesses
to the international free market. See Elizabeth Becker, Poorer Countries Pull Out of
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however, abdicated its function; the dominant economic problem
of our time may be where and how much to regulate both nation-
ally and internationally. This question lies at the heart of the proc-
ess of state-building in such new governments as Afghanistan and
Iraq as well as in re-creations as in Russia. Should there be a Secu-
rities Exchange Commission ("SEC") equivalent? Should there be
an Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") equivalent? Follow-
ing major international bank failures over the twentieth century, it
is generally agreed that it is consistent with the theory of a free
market that organizations, particularly banks, be regulated. De-
grees of regulation vary with the type of function involved. What-
ever benefits apply, for example, to the unrestrained manufacture
and sale of sneakers do not necessarily apply to banks. Not only is
the general money supply inextricably bound with the solidity of
the banking system, but the financial reserves of the public sector
in terms of, for example, lender-of-last-resort exists in tandem with
a dependable banking system.
Banks are fundamentally always at risk. It is, in fact, the nature
of a bank to be at risk because its dominant business is the loan of
money to individuals, companies, and governments. A bank's as-
sets are measured by the likelihood that the obligations it holds
will be repaid. Its success is measured by the soundness of its fi-
nancial evaluations of others; by the degree that others honor their
debts. A bank's assets are not measured in tangible goods but
rather almost entirely in the degree to which other parties are true
to their obligations. A bank that totally manages to avoid risk is
probably not doing a banking business.290 However, a bank that
incurs undue risk in its evaluations of others is risking failure. Its
security is inherently reduced by the fact that the debts of the bank
to others are mostly short term - deposits - while its assets are
generally payable over considerably longer periods of time. All
banks stand on banana peels. The history of banking has made
this evident. A prime function of a bank regulator is to measure
Talks Over World Trade, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 15, 2003, at Al (discussing the collapse of
world trade negotiations, which were meant to benefit developing nations, upon
the failure of wealthier nations to offer compromises on agriculture and other ar-
eas at issue).
290 During the savings and loan crisis of the late 1970's, some S&L's reduced
their lending activities because of suspect business conditions. They were roundly
criticized by their regulators for this unbank-like conduct despite what proved to
be a sound business philosophy.
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and control risk.291 A banking system needs this regulator to func-
tion and survive.
Today, all major banks are engaged in international financing
activities. Every major bank is an international bank; yet, each
bank has a strong domestic orientation. Each bank is a single busi-
ness entity responsible to senior executives and usually to stock-
holders with a base in one home country. Contrastingly, bank
regulators who affect these banks are dispersed through the coun-
tries in which the bank does its business. Each country has its own
system of regulators; each system is organizationally separate from
the others. The banks and its regulators do not match each other.
There is no centralized control over the international operations of
banks.
As we saw in the late 1990's, banking failure is serious; it is of-
ten virtually the equivalent of economic failure. This is because
bank failure is often "systemic" in nature and can infect first a
country, then a region of the world, and then spread to other re-
gions. While it is generally agreed that coordinated banking regu-
lation is in principle a good thing, the nature and quality of that
regulation raises difficult and controversial issues. The meeting of
the G-10 central banks and related bank regulators at Basel is re-
garded beneficently. The soft law that has emanated from those
meetings has been well received and one expects more to come,
particularly in the field of capital regulation.292
Although there has not been anything compulsory about the
positions taken by the CBS, it has come tantalizingly close to re-
quiring member central banks to abide by its positions in their
home countries and to give formal effect to those decisions. The
formal document adopted by the CBS in July 1988 as a standard for
measuring international bank capital 293 provides in the first para-
graph:
291 In the United States, a bank must achieve what the legal system calls"safety and soundness." To measure this, regulators monitor banks under what is
called the CAMELS standard. The letters are an acronym derived from Capital,
Assets, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to risk.
292 Lee, supra note 132, at 6 ("[A]lithough the Basle members are not legally
bound, the Basle Accords' methodology now applies to virtually all financial insti-
tutions worldwide.").
293 Basel Capital Accord, supra note 52 (including sections on the constituents of
capital, the risk weighing system, the target standard ratio, and transitional and
implementing arrangements).
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The present paper is now a statement of the Committee
agreed by all its members. It sets out the details of the
agreed Framework for measuring capital adequacy and the
minimum standard to be achieved which the national su-
pervisory authorities represented on the Committee intend
to implement in their respective countries.294
A commentator at the time wrote: "[tlhe July 1988 Report
clearly envisions some form of subsequent adaptation by national
authorities." 295 In 1988, with the Basel Capital Accord, the CBS
took a clear step in the direction of international bank regulation.
We are groping for the next step. Indeed, should there be a next
step? Should we be planning now to turn soft law into hard law
and create a real, functioning international body of bank regula-
tion?296
6. PROPOSALS THAT BIS BECOME THE WFA
Institutions, public and private, are created when those in
power feel they are necessary. This truism applies to all levels of
society, including the community of international financial institu-
tions. The number and magnitude of banking crises in the world
294 Id. This was a considerably more aggressive posture than that taken in the
prior draft of the paper dated December 1987 which stated:
[tihis paper sets out the conclusions of the Committee's discussions (re-
flecting as appropriate important minority views) in the form of a pro-
posal for a common framework of capital adequacy measurement and a
common minimum target capital standard to be achieved and main-
tained by banks operating internationally.
Basel Comm. on Banking Regulations & Supervisory Practices, Proposals for Inter-
national Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, 27 I.L.M. 524, 530
(1988).
295 Norton, supra note 18, at 1347. In the same article, Norton discusses "soft
law" and writes, "[in fact, one author (albeit with minimal supporting authority)
characterizes the Committee's actions as a form of 'international administrative
law.'" Id. at 1347 n.249. The administrative law idea, however, was picked up
some decades later when, in reviewing the CBS's process, another commentator
noted: "[tihis process is similar to the process of administrative rulemaking in the
United States." Heath P. Tarbert, Comment, Are International Capital Adequacy
Rules Adequate? The Basle Accord and Beyond, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1771, 1788 n.80
(2000).
296 It has been predicted that the widespread and basically uniform adoption
of soft law will evolve into the ultimate hard law status of the CBS. Lee, supra
note 132, at 40 ("Through the major industrial nations' acceptance of the Basle Ac-
cords as soft law, a framework for hard law may be created.").
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over the last decades are impressive. A crisis, when defined as a
situation in which the banking system's capital is exhausted as a
result of recorded losses, occurred sixty-seven times between 1980
and 1996.297 This figure has since grown substantially higher as a
result of the Asian, Mexican, Brazilian, Russian and other major fi-
nancial crises.
The Asian crisis of 1997 in particular initiated a worldwide re-
appraisal of international banks' activities. The reappraisal was
conducted by banking commentators, international financial insti-
tutions (including the IMF, the World Bank, and BIS), and most in-
dustrialized nations' economic policy forums (the Group of 7 ("G-
7"), G-10, etc.). This ongoing debate is commonly called "reform of
the international financial architecture." International financial
liberalization has been costly but with benefits. Costs could have
been substantially mitigated if a key lesson had been drawn from
domestic financial markets that liberal markets are only efficient if
they are efficiently regulated. The main task of financial regulation
is management of the risks; it must take its appropriate place in the
liberalization of financial markets. Without regulation, the risks
and the accompanying costs can become excessive.
During the late 1990's, a debate took place on what institutional
changes were needed to manage current international financial
systems. Among the most striking alternatives were to "leave it to
the markets," "create a super-regulator," or employ "step by step
initiatives to deal with particular issues."298 Advocates of "leaving
it to the markets" have argued that the international financial sys-
tem can run based on every market's needs; let the financial market
run its own course. "Creating a super-regulator" refers to the logic
applied by John Eatwell and Lance Taylor on the creation of a
WFA.299 The philosophy of this approach is that as financial insti-
tutions become more global, their regulators and supervisors
should also become global. The absence of a global regulator may
297 See GERARD CAPRIO, JR. & DANIELA KLINGEBIEL, BANK INSOLVENCIES: CROSS-
COUNTRY EXPERIENCE 13-20 (Fin. & Private Sector Dev. Div., World Bank, Policy
Research, Working Paper No. 1620, 1996) (discussing studies and data which
document the banking crises of recent years).
298 Philip Turner, Development and the International Financial Architecture,
Presentation at the Overseas Development Institute Meeting Series on Financing
for Development § 3 (Apr. 11, 2001) (searching for optimal responses to macro-
economic crises), available at http://www.odi.org.uk/speeches/schneider7a.html
(last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
299 EATWELL & TAYLOR, supra note 5, at 208-35.
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create problems in maintaining safety and soundness in interna-
tional financial markets.
In referring to the concept of "step-by-step initiatives to deal
with particular issues," it is argued that countries will adopt inter-
national standard initiatives when the market needs them. An ex-
ample is the international cooperation on bank supervision that oc-
curred under the guidance of the CBS. International rules on
capital adequacy originated in a joint proposal by the United States
and the U.K. bank regulatory agencies in 1987. Thereafter, this ap-
proach was extended to the G-10 countries. As a result of the fact
that the rules on capital adequacy gained credibility with markets
and were also implemented by financial authorities in the major
industrialized countries, other countries followed suit. These rules
became a global standard not because they were issued by the
CBS's initiative, but because an internationally accepted standard
was needed.
Among those who have argued for regulation of the interna-
tional financial market was former President Tietmeyer of the
Deutsche Bundesbank (German Central Bank),300 who persuaded
the G-7 to create a Financial Stability Forum that would bring to-
gether ministries of finance, central banks, and major supervisory
authorities, as well as international financial institutions. The mis-
sion of the Financial Stability Forum was to build on existing insti-
tutions, which would remain fully responsible for their mandated
tasks. It would also attempt to enhance synergies that could be
achieved from a better pooling of information and points of
view.301
Proposals on the future of international financial institutions
range from a significant enlargement of the powers of the IMF to
300 See Hans Tietmeyer, International Cooperation and Coordination in the
Area of Financial Market Supervision and Surveillance, Report to the Financial
Stability Forum 6-7 (Feb. 11, 1999) (emphasizing the role of BIS in the creation of
the Financial Stability Forum), available at http://www.fsforum.org/ publica-
tions/Tietmeyerreport.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004). Mr. Tietmeyer states:
[t]he Bank for International Settlements (BIS) provides analytical, statisti-
cal and secretariat support for various official groupings [such as the Fi-
nancial Stability Forum] working to strengthen the global financial sys-
tem .... Support for the Forum would be provided by a small secretariat
located at BIS in Basle. Members of the secretariat could be drawn from
BIS ....
Id. at 2, 7.
301 See id. at 4 ("[B]etter procedures are needed for systematically pooling and
efficiently using the information available....").
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the creation of a WFA to head up all initiatives aimed at financial
stability,302 with intermediary variants such as the merger of the
two Bretton Woods institutions and the organization of an interna-
tional lender-of-last-resort function by the IMF303 or BIS.3°4 Even
some world leaders, such as the British Prime Minister Tony Blair,
are calling for a new international financial architecture in the di-
rection of a "New Bretton Woods for the New Millennium." 305 In
the Unites States, the 1999 Economic Report of the President stated
that (a remarkable statement on behalf of President Bush) financial
liberalization and innovation have rendered national boundaries
irrelevant.306 If regulation was necessary within national bounda-
ries, then it is now (at least) equally necessary in the international
market.
All these proposals have two characteristics in common. First,
they focus on institutional reforms rather than on less ambitious
but more pragmatic and rapid initiatives. Second, they concentrate
power in one or a limited number of institutions rather than dis-
perse responsibilities.
Regardless of the lessons learned from the history of interna-
tional financial crises, they remain unpredictable. Realistically, re-
forms should be organized around a cautionary principle and
should contain market failures when they occur. The key role of
302 See JOHN EATWELL & LANCE TAYLOR, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND
THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC POLICY (Ctr. for Econ. Pol'y Analysis, CEPA, Working
Paper Series III No. 9, 1998) (proposing the establishment of the WFA), available at
http://www.newschool.edu/cepa/papers/archive/cepa309.pdf (last visited
Sept. 24, 2004).
303 See Charles W. Calo-niris, Blueprints for a New Global Financial Architecture,
in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBALIZATION (Leo-
nardo Auernheimer ed., 2000) (discussing how the IMF redesigned its lending
practices to solve the problems in global finance).
304 See Michele Fratianni & John Pattison, International Financial Architecture
and International Financial Standards, 579 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 183
(2002) (proposing promulgation of international financial standards as a "precon-
dition for acceding to the international lender of last resort (ILOL) facilities"),
available at http://ann.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/579/1/183 (last visited Oct. 14,
2004).
305 See Democratizing Global Finance: Civil Society Perspectives on People-Centered
Economics, NGLS ROUNDUP (UN Non-Gov't Liason Serv.), July 1999, at 5 (review-
ing a conference on macroeconomic policy), available at http://www.un-ngls.
org/ documents/pdf/roundup/38demfin.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
306 See President's Economic Report to Congress 5 (Feb. 1995) ("When nations
around the World descend into economic disruption. . . it hurts them and it hurts
us."), available at http://w-ww.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fyOO/pdf/1999-erp.pdf
(last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
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large international banks should be more carefully supervised
since the banks can transmit market discipline to their debtors.
Large banks with failing internal control systems would be subject
to corrective measures at an early stage. In this respect, the WFA
would have a key role in obtaining the necessary cooperation
among national supervisors.
With respect to international crisis management, there is a need
for an international lender-of-last-resort who could intervene in the
market if the risk of crises becomes endemic. It seems that a struc-
tured cooperation between central banks and a WFA should be
part of any plan.307
Eatwell and Taylor have proposed the establishment of an in-
ternational financial institution, called a WFA, which would per-
form the functions of a world financial market regulator similar to
those of national regulators in domestic markets.308 They further
suggest that a WFA should be built upon the foundations for
global financial surveillance and regulation, which are already
provided by BIS.309 They argue that we need a fundamental re-
structuring of international financial institutions and propose the
establishment of a WFA as an independent institution to perform
activities in the world financial markets, similar to what national
regulators do in the domestic financial markets.310 An effective
WFA should have the ability of any domestic regulator.
A WFA would develop analysis of markets and policies, fur-
ther enhancing the efficiency of international finance. 311 Resulting
307 See OLIVIER DAVANNE, INSTABILITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
SYSTEM para. 10 (Conseil d'Analyse Economique, Report No. 14, 1998) (stating thata cooperation between the main Central Banks of the world, within the Basel
Club, would be the most feasible solution"), available at http://www.archives.
premier-ministre.gouv.fr/jospin version2/gb/pm/cae/reportl4.htm (last visited
Oct. 14, 2004).
308 See John Eatwell, Macroeconomics and the Regulation of International
Financial Markets, (Apr. 5-6, 2002) (unpublished paper presented at Queens'
College, Cambridge) (analyzing "the relationship between micro-economic
actions and the behaviour of the macro-economy" in the context of the discussion
of international financial regulation), available at http://www.cerf.cam.ac.uk/
publications/files/ Eatwell%20-%205-6%20April%2002.pdf (last visited Oct. 14,
2004).
309 Id.
310 See Epstein, supra note 43, at 43 (noting "the unabashed purpose ... is to
coordinate and, if possible, to control all monetary activities in the industrialized
world").
311 See John Eatwell, The Coordination of Macro-economic Policy in the European
Community, in UNEMPLOYMENT IN EUROPE 209 (Jonathan Michie & John Grieve
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from breakdowns in national regulatory capacities, as liberaliza-
tion spreads worldwide, there is a need to monitor high and vari-
able real interest rates, volatility of asset prices, poor national eco-
nomic performances and the contagious spread of market
instabilities worldwide. These developments could create the pos-
sibility for massive upheavals even in the large and integrated fi-
nancial markets of the industrialized states. A WFA could be the
appropriate institution to monitor and coordinate these crises.312 A
WFA could also handle currency crises and speculative schemes of
exchange rates in developing and transition economies, which are
normally associated with rapid capital market liberalization and
the absence of appropriate regulatory procedures designed to deal
with the flow of capital.
Because of the prospect of major financial crisis in the future, a
WFA may well become politically feasible. If that happens, it
would be important to have given advance thought to how a WFA
would actually work. Taking preparatory and preventive meas-
ures makes it possible to minimize the spread of financial crisis in
other economies, as well as to lessen the impact of these crises in-
ternationally. 313 Other components of a WFA's functions would be
the control and accountability of the management of risk, macro-
economic policy, and industrial policy, all of which can stimulate
efficient operation of financial markets. This becomes particularly
clear in periods of relative deregulation when the authorities lose
control of credit and a speculative financial bubble first inflates and
then bursts. Examples are the Japanese financial market crisis
early in the 1990's and the U.S. savings and loan crisis around
1980.314
In the global economy, a WFA's central role would be to cure
inefficiencies in the financial marketplace that are outside the ju-
Smith eds., 1994) (arguing for the increased coordination between international
financial communities).
312 See JOHN EATWELL, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION: THE IMPACT
ON WORLD DEVELOPMENT 47 (Off. Dev. Stud., U.N. Dev. Programme, Discussion
Paper Series No. 12, 1997) (challenging financial liberalization trends to expand
macroeconomically), available at http://www.undp.org/ods/pdfs/interl-fin-
liberal.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
313 See John Eatwell, Unemployment: National Policies in a Global Economy, 21
INT'L J. MANPOWER 343 (2000) (stating the effects of deregulation globally in the
1970's on unemployment increases).
314 See THE GOLDEN AGE OF CAPITALISM: REINTERPRETING THE POSTWAR
EXPERIENCE V (Stephen A. Marglin & Juliet B. Schur eds., 1990) (compiling papers
which survey international examples of capitalistic rises and falls).
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risdiction of any one country but not outside the jurisdiction of the
society of nations.
There have been increasing attempts to forge cooperation
among financial regulators to accomplish this global task. As
global financial markets have achieved greater integration so coop-
eration among financial regulators has consolidated into regular
coordination. An international WFA would make these relation-
ships more effective.315 The growth of a world financial market has
created interrelationships we only begin to understand and risks
we can barely imagine. The benefits of a WFA, with all regulatory
and supervisory powers concentrated at the world level, are in-
creasingly perceived. 316
A WFA should be given the power to guide and dictate to na-
tional financial markets. Obviously, this can be achieved by bless-
ing BIS with enforcement and authoritative powers. But how these
powers can be entrusted to BIS remains a challenging task. A su-
preme global regulatory body should have the power to impose
mandatory sanctions for violation of its edicts and even to oversee
such global financial institutions as the IMF and the World Bank.
At present, there is no systematic evaluation of the activities of the
Bretton Woods institutions; yet their operations are regularly sub-
ject to severe criticism. BIS, albeit a source of less than binding
law, has begun this task and can serve as a step towards creation of
a WFA.
As the shape of a WFA evolves, it can be related to the opera-
tions of securities and futures markets, hedge funds, foreign cur-
rency traders, fund managers, and other institutions that use bor-
rowed money for speculative purposes, therefore avoiding or
reducing destabilizing leveraged activities and systemic bank
risk.317 Making international financial institutions accountable to a
WFA would introduce a "safety valve" consisting of evaluation
315 John Eatwell, Markets Must Be Regulated or They Will Fail to Prosper, TIMES,
Oct. 5, 1998, at 49.
316 See, e.g., Ajit Singh, Openness and the Market-Friendly Approach to Develop-
ment: Learning the Right Lessons from Development Experience, 22 WORLD DEV. 1811
(1994) (observing global issues with the World Bank and the world economy).
317 See Roy Culpeper, Systemic Reform at a Standstill: A Flock Of "Gs" In
Search Of Global Financial Stability (May 2000) (unpublished paper presented at
Critical Issues in Financial Reform Latin-American/Caribbean and Canadian Per-
spective) (focusing on how to achieve financial stability in the global capital mar-ket), available at http://www.nsi-ins.ca/ensi/pdf/flock-of Gseng.pdf (last vis-
ited Oct. 14, 2004).
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and accountability. 318
A WFA would quite naturally assist national bank regulators in
improving their regulatory and control functions with respect to
their national financial systems (by way of example, through the
imposition of capital and/or reserve requirements on all major
banks and financial institutions). A WFA should ensure that the
capital control programs implemented in one country are consis-
tent with such programs in other countries of the same region,
thereby preventing one country from attracting finance capital at
the expense of its neighbors. In many countries, a WFA might sim-
ply certify that domestic regulatory procedures are effective. In
others, a WFA would assist with regulatory reform.
A WFA would establish an institution where national financial
authorities could create and adapt international banking and fi-
nancial initiatives. Until such institution (or a forum) is formed, a
WFA may play the role of initiating the bringing together of na-
tional financial authorities in order to implement their initiatives
and transform them into domestic regulation. Despite supporting
issuance of international banking and financial initiatives, a WFA
must make sure that national financial authorities help and en-
courage each other in implementation of these initiatives. 319 Pres-
ently, the IMF seeks to shape its position as leader in solving inter-
national financial and economic troubled markets. In this aspect, a
WFA would significantly contribute by becoming a trusted and ef-
ficient international financial authority.
Recent decades of international financial liberalization have
removed almost all distinctions between national and international
capital markets. In the event of a rapid development of financial
markets, the same regulatory tasks required in national markets
will be needed internationally. BIS was the first institution to cre-
ate international financial regulation with the formation of the
Committee on Bank Supervision and Regulation in 1975. It formu-
318 See Economists Trace Russian/Asian Crises to Liberalization of Capital Markets,
IMF Policies, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Aug. 26, 1998 ("World Financial Authority ... would
provide a framework for international financial regulation and hold the IMF and
World Bank accountable for policy implementation."); see also Rosemary Right,
Blair May Have Swallowed A Seriously Bad Big Idea, TIMES, Sept. 29, 1998, at 33 (not-
ing that the WFA, as "an executive authority with surveillance capability," would
"ensure transparency and accountability at the IMF and the World Bank").
319 See S. Griffith-Jones & J. Kimmis, The BIS and its Role in International Finan-
cial Governance (1999) (noting the role of BIS in mediating national financial poli-
cies), available at http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/global/finance/pdfs/bis2.pdf (last
visited Oct. 14, 2004).
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lated the bank capital adequacy requirements in the 1980's, which
all members of BIS agreed to observe in addition to barring from
their markets foreign banks not adhering to the requirements.320
More countries have voluntarily agreed to BIS standards in order
to achieve market credibility.321
Existing international institutions are not up to the task of regu-
lating the global financial system. This is due to such factors as a
gap between effective regulation and "bail-outs," a vital precondi-
tion for the effective minimization of moral hazard, inadequate
surveillance powers, and a still incomplete definition of capital re-
quirements and best practice risk management techniques. The
IMF and the World Bank were set up to handle, respectively, the
balance of payments and economic/financial development prob-
lems worldwide. Due to the restricted focus of each, however, they
do not seem to be the right organizations to deal with today's in-
ternational financial markets. Increasing consideration is being
given to a WFA, and BIS seems to be the logical starting point.322
The concept of establishing a WFA is based mainly on two fac-
tors. First, banks and other financial institutions that carry out ac-
tivities across borders have developed the need to be supervised
and regulated under uniform international rules and regulations.
Second, increase of the free flow of investment worldwide and
creation of more open markets to foreign investors requires a safe
environment of domestic financial markets.
A WFA can contribute to the improvement of these factors re-
lated to the stability of international financial structure.323
Presently there is an ongoing collaboration among national fi-
320 See JOHN EATWELL & LANCE TAYLOR, THE PERFORMANCE OF LIBERALIZED
CAPITAL MARKETS (Ctr. for Econ. Pol'y Analysis, CEPA, Working Paper Series III
No. 8., 1998) (describing the evolution of capital market liberalization and its
effect on global economies), available at http://www.newschool.edu/cepa/
papers/archive/cepa0308.pdf; see also Corbin Cowley, International Monetary Fund
Reform, 2 HINCKLEY J. POL. 15, 22 (2000) (discussing the duties of the WFA).
321 See generally de Swaan, supra note 200 (discussing BIS core principles as
they would work to prevent further financial crisis).
322 See generally Democratizing Global Finance: Civil Society Perspectives on People
Centered Economics, supra note 305 (discussing the political and economic chal-
lenges and opportunities facing the international community).
323 See YILMAZ AKYOZ & ANDREW CORNFORD, CAPITAL FLOWS TO DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES AND THE REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 28 (U.N.
Conference on Trade & Dev. [hereinafter UNCTAD], Discussion Paper No. 143,
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/OSG/DP/143, 1999) (stating that "the increasingly global
character of financial markets and growing links between different categories of
financial business" have given rise to proposals for the WFA).
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nancial authorities at various levels, such as between/among
state(s), regions, etc. Nevertheless, there is still a lot of work to be
done in order to bring all national financial authorities rules under
a common legal and financial framework. In this regard, the role
of existing international financial institutions, such as the IMF, is
recognizable. Notwithstanding the fact that there is no clear evi-
dence to show that a WFA (or a new similar international institu-
tion) will play a better role in improvement of the global financial
stability, it seems that an institution like a WFA might positively
contribute to strengthening the international regulatory regime
currently in place.324
The creation of a new body with senior responsibility for set-
ting regulatory standards for all financial enterprises worldwide
would be an almost unreasonably ambitious approach. National
regulators would remain responsible for implementing its stan-
dards and the function of the new institution would be largely one
of surveillance, although it is expected to act as a brake on a coun-
try's capital influx. A less ambitious approach would be for a WFA
to serve simply as an umbrella organization under which existing
local or national bodies would operate.325 International financial
supervision, through a global WFA, would be necessary in either
case for the survival of an efficient liberal international system.
As the ultimate worldwide financial authority without ac-
countability, there is the danger that a WFA would be so singly fo-
cused to prevent financial crisis that it would set an excessive regu-
latory burden. This would create - but on a global scale - the
problems already faced by local regulators: overregulation, with
the consequence that the world community would pay the cost of
stymied competition; absence of innovation; and product stultifica-
324 The Financial Crisis and Its Impact on Growth and Development, Especially in
the Developing Countries: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess.,
Agenda Item 97(b), para. 12, U.N. Doc. A/54/471 (1999), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/policy/publications/a54471.htm (last visited Oct. 14,
2004).
325 The Financial Stability Forum, consisting of representatives from the fi-
nance ministries, central banks and senior regulatory authorities of the G-7 coun-
tries as well as from the IMF, the World Bank, the CBS, IOSCO, the International
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), BIS, the OECD, the Committee on
Payment and Settlement Systems, and the Committee on the Global Financial Sys-
tem (formerly the Euro-Currency Standing Committee), is arguably of this kind.
Objectives include pooling and sharing of information on vulnerability in the in-
ternational financial system among different bodies, monitoring of the implemen-
tation of internationally agreed regulatory and supervisory standards, and codes
of conduct.
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tion. This is, of course, a well-known existing problem both on the
national and international level. Regulatory agencies in the United
States are routinely criticized for abusing their powers. Interna-
tionally, the IMF is regularly accused by both consumer and indus-
try groups of demanding sacrifices that recipients of its largess
cannot deliver. It is accused of eliminating public financial benefits
and destroying the environment among many other perceived
derelictions.
There are various complex issues with respect to the role of a
WFA in an international financial system, which are still unan-
swered. Those issues concern the ability of a WFA to spot and
handle local (regional) financial crisis better than national financial
authorities, level of recognition of a WFA from governments, etc.
Politicians are skeptical in granting away their power. For exam-
ple, governments of the countries that are members of the EU have
fiercely resisted giving up their authority over national financial
supervision and regulation to the EU institutions. Even with the
creation of the European Central Bank, the EU faced resistance
from member states to give away their privileges of national bank-
ing supervision. 326
These are known problems without a known solution. To the
extent that a solution exists, it is in the construction of the enter-
prise -a system of checks and balances that gives a WFA sufficient
authority to do its job, but also enables its leaders to be challenged
if they abuse their positions.
Generally speaking, there are various proposals for world fi-
nancial reform, ranging from suggestions for pre-emptive crisis
mechanisms to recommendations for the reform of the IMF to sev-
eral proposals for establishment of a WFA. However, three main
proposals have been given serious attention.
The first proposal, which is the most discussed and given seri-
ous consideration among experts, is provided by Eatwell and Tay-
lor. The problem with this proposal is that the United States (in-
cluding the Federal Reserve and other federal and state banking
authorities) does not support it. Like other industrialized econo-
mies in the world, the United States is not ready to give up its
regulatory authorities to a WFA or similar international institution.
For better or worse, because the U.S. economy serves as the loco-
motive of international financial stability, it tends to impose on
326 Fratianni & Pattison, supra note 125, at 211.
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other nations U.S. laws and regulations in the financial industry. 327
Furthermore, the U.S. position is that the current financial architec-
ture is sound and there is no need for major financial reform.
Whatever reform is needed is seen simply as a question of improv-
ing the system's wiring.328
This "the wiring not the architecture" approach gives primacy
to "reforming" financial sectors along the lines of more transpar-
ency, tougher bankruptcy laws, prudential regulation using BIS
recommendations, and encouraging more foreign capital to recapi-
talize shattered banks as well as to "stabilize" the local financial
system by making foreign interests integral to it.329 As a conse-
quence, it would be advantageous for BIS, short of being a formal
and central regulator, to play a co-coordinating role in rapidly as-
sembling financial packages by G-10 central banks, combined
where feasible with private credit lines, for countries in currency
327 See Will Hutton, America's Global Hand, 11 AM. PROSPECT (1999) (noting the
American influence on world organizations), available at http://
www.prospect.org/print/V11/2/hutton-w.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
328 See, e.g., BARRY EICHENGREEN, TOWARD A NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
ARCHITECTURE: A PRACTICAL POST-ASIA AGENDA (1999) (proposing improvements
to the international monetary and financial system); MORRIS GOLDSTEIN, THE ASIAN
FINANCIAL CRISES: CAUSES, CURES, AND SYSTEMIC IMPLICATIONS (1998) (citing the dif-
ficulties in the Asian system); Stanley Fischer, On the Need for an International
Lender of Last Resort, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 85 (1999) (proposing improvements on the
current practices of the Central Bank); The Working Group on Int'l Fin. Crises, Re-
port of the Working Group on International Financial Crises (Oct. 1998) (identifying a"range of policies and institutional innovations that could help prevent interna-
tional crises and facilitate the orderly resolution of the crises that do occur"), avail-
able at http://www.bis.org/publ/othpOld.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004); The
Working Group on Strengthening Int'l Fin. Crises, Report of the Working Group on
Strengthening Financial Crises (Oct. 1998) (developing "concrete methods to
strengthen financial systems in industrial and emerging market economies"),
available a t http://www.bis.org/ publ/othp01c.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004); The
Working Group on Transparency and Accountability, Report of the Working Group
on Transparency and Accountability (Oct. 1998) (describing ways to improve trans-
parency and accountability), available at http:// www.bis.org/publ/othpOlb.pdf
(last visited Oct. 14, 2004); Summary of Reports on the International Financial Archi-
tecture (Oct. 1998) (summarizing the above mentioned reports), available at http://
www.bis.org/publ/othpOla.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004); Robert Rubin,
Strengthening the Architecture of the International Financial System, Speech at
The Brookings Institution (Apr. 14, 1998) (stating, "how we can strengthen the ar-
chitecture"), available at http://www.brook.edu/comm/transcripts/19980414.htm
(last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
329 See Anoma Srisukkasem, Delay in Adopting BIS Accord, NATION, Oct. 13,
2001 (describing Thailand's efforts to adopt BIS standard), available at
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/page.acrview/php3?clid=7&id=497528usrse
ss=1 (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
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crises not caused by policy mistakes and not requiring policy
changes. 330 There would be countries that BIS, operating in its pre-
sent mode (or perhaps the related CBS), deemed to be well man-
aged. If these countries had a run on their currency, and a crisis
started to unfold, a nonconditional financial package could be as-
sembled by BIS, drawing possibly on its own resources, but mainly
on those of the central banks of the most centralized countries and,
if feasible, on private lending.331
Other countries, after consultation with BIS might agree to a"shadow program" of conditionality, similar to the current de-
mands of the IMF. If local authorities fully implemented the pro-
gram, and a crisis still broke out, BIS would disburse financial aid
automatically. If a larger package was necessary, BIS could coor-
dinate additional financing from the central banks of the most cen-
tralized countries and private banks. There would still be coun-
tries that would not want to accept a "shadow program" with BIS
and would not improve their economic policies. If these countries
were hit by a currency crisis, they would have to go to BIS for con-
ditional lending as a first step. Such a procedure would provide
strong incentives for countries to have sound policies and decrease
the likelihood of crises. However, if crises occurred, then large
lending by facilities of BIS and/or lending by central banks and
commercial banks coordinated by BIS would take place quickly
and without additional conditionality.332
The purpose of redefining the role of international financial in-
stitutions and pertinent regulations is that, unfortunately, financial
markets are not thoroughly rational and risk-free in the interna-
tional financial system. The debate on the "architecture" of the in-
330 See S. Griffith-Jones, A New Financial Architecture For Reducing Risks
and Severity of Crises (1999) (paper prepared for CEPAL-Jacques Maritain
Foundation Conference in Santiago, Chile) (discussing ways in which BIS can
provide aid in response to a currency crises), available at http://www.ids.ac.uk/
ids/global/ Finance/pdfs/finarchl.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
331 See David Folkerts-Landau et al., Toward a Framework for Financial Stability,
WORLD ECON. FIN. SURVEYS, 4-6, 27-31 (1998) (discussing the ways in which the
IMF promotes financial stability), available at http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/wefs/toward (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
332 See generally Joseph Stiglitz, The Role of International Financial Institutions
in the Current Global Economy, Address to the Chicago Council on Foreign Rela-
tions (Feb. 27, 1998) (discussing ways in which institutions may work to prevent
crises and provide remedies when crises occur), available at http://
web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20024294-me
nuPK:34474-pagePK:34370-piPK:34424-theSitePK:4607,00.html (last visited Oct.
21, 2004).
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ternational financial system has generated various proposals to re-
define responsibilities among international institutions and some-
times to create new bodies. We believe that the niche now occu-
pied by BIS can, with continued fine-tuning, start to serve this
purpose. To retain the image, we can continue to use the present
architecture; we don't have to build a new building.
Nevertheless, proposals addressing the role of a WFA in finan-
cial crisis management have some logic. 333 Globalization of mar-
kets inevitably opens the debate about the usefulness of a global
regulator, such as a WFA, which would set standards, monitor
their implementation, supervise the functioning of international fi-
nancial markets, and take preventive action.
As financial markets become more global, the influence of in-
creasing numbers of countries with their own laws and practices
creates a more diverse system. This in turn raises the issue of har-
monization of standards and regulations and good communication
among supervisors. Regrouping responsibilities could generate
synergies and favor unity of vision and concept in the regulation
and surveillance fields, similar to the objectives assigned to na-
tional financial regulatory authorities.
Clearly, establishing an international consensus on such far
reaching reforms is extremely ambitious. National financial au-
thorities would have to give up a significant part of their current
responsibilities. It is unlikely that national financial authorities
would unanimously agree to such transfer of authority. Such a
change would have to be reached gradually and over the course of
time. Reaching agreement on fundamental adaptations at the in-
ternational level, where each participant remains sovereign, is fea-
sible- but not now.334
Another question pertaining to the concentration of powers is
whether the advantages of common international understandings
can be achieved in the context of large financial institutions and
333 See William R. White, New Strategies for Dealing with the Instability of Global
Financial Markets, in MGMT. OF GLOBAL FIN. MKT.S 44, 55-56 (Jan Joost Teurissen ed.,
2000) (providing a list of arguments supporting the creation of an "international
superregulator"), available at http://www.fondad.org/publications/management/
Fondad-Management-Partl.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
334 See STEVEN RADELET & JEFFREY SACHS, WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED, So FAR,
FROM THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS? 17 (Harvard Inst. For Int'l Dev., Discussion Pa-
per No. 37, 1999) (stating that the Asian financial crisis of the 1990's revealed the
need for an international institution to stop international finance panics in emerg-
ing markets).
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wealthy, self-absorbed states already accustomed to dealing with
complex issues on their own behalf. Big is not always beautiful
and efficient. Unwieldy procedures are a real risk and internal dif-
ficulties could be more damaging to the international community
than a continuing debate on competencies among independent fi-
nancial institutions. There is also a risk that large supranational fi-
nancial institutions, such as a WFA, could progressively lose touch
with the reality of markets.335
Often, it is perceived that a WFA could turn out to be a "me-
diocre regulator," able to deal only with common denominator
problems and proposing regulation that would not be adapted and
would prove insufficient in various economies and financial mar-
kets. This is a view already widely held about the World Bank and
the IMF. Concerns of this sort might force a WFA into a closely
regulated organizational structure. If members of a WFA indi-
vidually retain the responsibility of adjusting decisions to their
market needs, the new structure would not represent any particu-
lar advantage over the existing BIS.336
A WFA as an international lender-of-last-resort raises both
theoretical and political questions. A lender-of-last-resort injects
liquidity into the market or into individual financial institutions in
order to avoid a transitory funding problem with systemic implica-
tions. A WFA would require either standby funds for this purpose
or a means for raising them at short notice from its members or
elsewhere. Also required would be an available method for con-
verting funds into the particular currency required. 337
The international financial scene changes very rapidly under
the influence of innovations, the globalization process, and the
emergence of new actors. There is, therefore, a risk that at the end
335 See Hans Tietmeyer, Systemic Risk and Lender of Last Resort, Address be-
fore the Center for Financial Studies (June 11, 1999) (arguing against the formation
of an international "lender of last resort" if it is disconnected from market realities
through its offering of "generous or even unlimited credit lines"), available at
http://www.bis.org/review/r990621a.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
336 See Capital Mkt Liberalization Task Force of the Initiative for Pol'y Dia-
logue, Other Freedoms: A Report on the September 2002 Task Force Meeting, 22 (Sept.
19, 2002) (" [Tihere is no perfect ... solution to the problems associated with [capi-
tal market liberalization] when individual countries are acting in isolation .... "),
available at http://wwO.gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/pub/OTHERFREEDOMS2.pdf
(last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
337 See Forrest Capie, Can There Be an International Lender-of-Last-Resort?, 1
INT'L FIN. 311-25 (1998) (asserting that "there can be no international lender-of-last-
resort" because there is no international currency).
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of a long financial institutional reform, the result would not fit the
realities of the moment. Small and progressive reforms are better
suited to our changing environment than an ambitious transforma-
tion like the creation of a WFA.338 When confronted with large
risks of financial instability of a potentially systemic nature, na-
tional financial regulators are now expected to take concrete and
rapid measures aimed at strengthening the financial system. Until
a WFA becomes realistic, greater safety is achieved through institu-
tions that exist.339
Arguments in support of a WFA point to the globalization of
financial markets, the breakdown of sectoral distinctions world-
wide (among banks, investment dealers, insurance companies and
asset management firms), the growing integration and complexity
of international financial markets, and the need for efficient infor-
mation sharing by all relevant bodies. These are both comprehen-
sive and fundamentally international, and necessitate a strategy
fostering international stability.340 At the practical level, national
supervisory authorities must oversee and supervise the national
financial system in a very hands-on manner. This was one of the
arguments used in Europe when it was decided that banking su-
pervision would stay at the national financial level rather than go
to the European Central Bank. One could ask whether the magni-
tude of the task faced by a single worldwide agency might be so
great as to call for a similar strategy -supervision at the national
level.
Objections to a WFA are significant. As a matter of principle,
national regulators and legislators are not yet ready to give up
their powers to a single WFA with authority to set standards and
338 See, e.g., ANNA SCHWARTZ, TIME TO TERMINATE THE ESF AND THE IMF (Cato
Inst., Foreign Policy Brief No. 48, 1998) (stating that responses to the Asian finan-
cial crisis will come from the Asian countries themselves, not from the IMF), avail-
able at http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-048.pdf (last visited Oct. 14,
2004).
339 See Andre Icard, Strengthening Financial Stability: Institutional Approach
or Pragmatic Multitherapy?, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (Oct.
2, 1999) (arguing that countries should focus on strengthening the present frame-
work for dealing with financial instability rather than creating new institutions or
radically changing the structure of the existing ones), available at
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp991002.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
340 See Kiichi Miyazawa, Towards a New International Financial Architecture,
Speech at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan (Dec. 15, 1998) (discussing
realization of the need for reforming the international financial architecture),
available at http://www.geocities.com/Eureka/Concourse/8751/versib/jp121
501.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
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enforce them globally. Such a step would be widely perceived as a
loss of sovereignty. Local powers are ceded to existing interna-
tional organizations, not excluding the UN, but with Congress' an-
tipathy to the IMF and the World Bank it makes it difficult for
these institutions to obtain U.S. contributions. These attitudes will
not change soon. However, national legislators must see that, as
financial markets become more globalized, the more authority they
retain at home, the more difficult it will be to maintain any meas-
ure of authority over what occurs abroad.341
Strict applicability of corporate governance rules and creation
of market discipline in an international financial architecture
should be the center of attention of a WFA. However, the role of a
WFA in this respect should be consistent and complimentary.
There might be a risk that in the course of its mission, a WFA
might tend to operate more in its own interest than the market's.
This trend could lead a WFA to increase its rulemaking "domina-
tion" over national financial authorities.342
Immediately after the Asian crises of 1997-1998, there were
widespread calls for a fundamental reform of the international fi-
nancial architecture. Many argued that the traumas of South Ko-
rea, Indonesia, and Thailand pointed to fundamental weaknesses
in the international financial system. These were countries with
relatively sound fiscal positions, enjoying rapid economic growth.
However, when a crisis of confidence hit their financial systems,
they collapsed quickly. Such an experience, which caught the in-
ternational financial institutions by surprise, demonstrated not
only the inadequacy of financial institutions' surveillance, but also
their lack of crisis management tools. However, it is fair to say that
the financial markets also did not see the crisis coming. Experience
strongly suggests that the world is not ready for a WFA.
International financial liberalization plus geometric advances
in technology have caused financial markets to become closely in-
tegrated. These markets can no longer be controlled by policies
formulated purely at the national level with their international as-
pects left unregulated. In order for countries to enjoy the benefits
341 See S. GRIFFITH-JONES, GLOBAL CAPITAL FLOWS: SHOULD THEY BE
REGULATED? 157-88 (1998) (describing the current "mismatch" between global
markets and nationally based supervisors and suggesting structural changes).
342 William R. White, What Have We Learned From Recent Financial Crises And
Policy Responses? 18 (BIS, Working Paper No. 84, 2000) (discussing the theory of
bureaucracies, which states that a financial super-regulator might be tempted to
act in its own interest).
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of a flexible international financial system, capable of mobilizing
capital on a large scale for the promotion of growth and employ-
ment, a structure must be devised to protect both national econo-
mies and the wider world economy from the risks which financial
liberalization brings.343
The objectives of national financial authorities are to protect
consumers with the highest possible standards of integrity, to su-
pervise market conduct, to hone professional skills, and to mini-
mize systemic risk. These objectives should be the goal of an inter-
national financial regulation structure. As the Chairman of the
FRB, Alan Greenspan, has argued, "a global financial system ... is
not an end in itself. It is the institutional structure that has been
developed over the centuries to facilitate the production of goods
and services."344 A financial system is efficient if it achieves that
end.
There have been proposals, both within international financial
institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank and also from in-
dividual countries, to design a new kind of international financial
architecture. The fact is that no major new financial institution has
been set up yet. A development worth noting is the creation of the
Financial Stability Forum, which was established as an independ-
ent organization in 1999345 thanks to initiatives taken by govern-
ments of the most industrialized countries (the G-7). The Financial
Stability Forum brought together financial regulators and central
bankers to monitor financial stability worldwide and to exchange
information and establish common assessments of vulnerabilities
within the international financial system. Regardless of its impres-
sive mission, as Howard Davies points out, "it does not hold any
decisionmaking power even over its member governments (na-
tional financial regulators) or over any international financial au-
thorities. Therefore, it is difficult to consider it even as one step in
the direction of a WFA."346
343 See David Pearce, Making Globalization a Positive Force for Sustainable Devel-
opment (Commonwealth Consultative Group on Environment, Feb. 12, 2002) (dis-
cussing potential problems of not having sufficient protections to deal with the
increasing possibility of crises caused by globalization and proposing ways to
prevent or cushion the impact of those crises), available at
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared asp-files/uploadedfiles/{BE14D229
-3F8A-482D-84B2-72BA918D02E91CCGE_02_2.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
344 Alan Greenspan, The Globalization of Finance, 17 CATO J. 243, 244 (1998).
345 See generally, Financial Stability Forum, supra note 119 (describing formation
and functionality of the Financial Stability Forum).
346 Howard Davies, Is the Global Regulatory System Fit For Purpose in the
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There is a need for unified global regulation of the financial
sector. Meaningful and prudent regulation should enhance inter-
national trade and finance, moving the world to a higher state of
prosperity.347 The senior regulator should maximize financial sta-
bility between the developed and the emerging markets in such a
way as to maximize world productivity. None of the current in-
ternational institutions fits the proposed model as well as BIS. BIS
is very likely to increase its role as an important center for setting
standards in the field of international financial stability. Perhaps,
as BIS continues to run its own course of business, it may ulti-
mately take the role of a WFA.348 Eatwell and Taylor's message is
cogent:
[T]he WFA is needed because three decades of international
financial liberalization have removed almost all distinctions
between national and international capital markets. If lib-
eral finance is to thrive, the same regulatory tasks required
in national markets are now needed internationally. That is
why BIS pioneered international financial regulation with
the formation of the Committee on Bank Supervision and
Regulation in 1975. It was that Committee which formu-
lated the capital adequacy requirements for banks in the
1980's to which all 13 then BIS members agreed to observe,
and to keep out of their markets foreign banks not adhering
to the requirements. The result was that more countries
signed on to BIS standards in order to achieve market
credibility. 349
21st Century, Address at the Monetary Authority of Singapore Lecture (May 20,
2003) (describing the structure of international banking regulation).
347 Farhad F. Ghannadian, The Coming World Financial Crisis: More or Less
World Regulations?, 8 INT'L ADVANCES ECON. REs. 80, 80 (2002).
348 See Meltzer Report, supra note 126, at 12. The Meltzer Report recommends
that BIS (through the various committees) remain a financial standard setter. Im-
plementation of standards, and decisions to adopt them, should be left to domes-
tic regulators or legislatures. The Meltzer Report was published in March 2000 by
the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission established by the
Congress to consider the future roles of seven international financial institutions:
the IMF, the World Bank Group, the Inter-American Development Bank, the
Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, the World Trade Or-
ganization ("WTO"), and BIS.
349 John Eatwell & Lance Taylor, Why We Need a World Financial Authority, 2
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7. PROPER DEVELOPMENT OF A WFA
In 1997, Professor Raj Bhala of the William and Mary School of
Law wrote: "[the CBS] operates on a tenuous foundation. It is
highly unlikely that the G-10 countries will confer jurisdictional au-
thority upon the [CBS]. Allowing the [CBS] to write banking law
would threaten each country's sovereignty." 350 Professor Bhala's
conclusion in its application to the CBS is correct, and is equally
applicable to its affiliate, BIS. BIS was created in 1923 with no
thought of international bank regulation; the CBS was created in
1975 when the thought of increasing international regulation had
begun to achieve a measure of respectability. Neither is, however,
yet ready to assume the mantle of international bank regulator.
The banking systems of the world are highly diverse and the na-
tional regulatory systems reflect the diversity.351 One system of
regulation cannot today encompass all the realities of bank opera-
tion and, perhaps even more importantly, as Professor Bhala
rightly suggests, countries are not ready to abandon their sover-
eignty in favor of a group of experts who meet in Basel, Switzer-
land.
As previously noted, there is not a question of the desirability
of, perhaps even the need for, cohesive and uniform regulation of
the world's financial systems.3 2 Ideally, capital should be meas-
ured in the same way, and liquidity should be considered from the
same perspective in all countries that compete for the same curren-
cies. Level playing fields from a regulatory standpoint are desir-
able for all the world's banks. The inequities and the risks that re-
sult from today's bifurcated world of banks are apparent. The
international banking crises that resulted from the Asian problems
of 1997 exemplify massive systemic problems that are attributable
in large part to different banks reading from different regulatory
pages. The international system increasingly calls for a single
WIDER ANGLE (World Inst. For Dev. Econ. Research., U.N. Univ., Helsinki,
Finland), Dec. 1998, at 1, available at http://www.wider.unu.edu/newsletter/
ang19802.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
350 Raj Bhala, Equilibrium Theory, the FICAS Model, and International Banking
Law, 38 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 1, 15-16 (1997).
351 In the United States there are different regulatory structures for national
banks, state banks, national savings banks, and state savings banks, and for a host
of bank-related institutions, such as mortgage companies, trust companies, and
finance companies.
352 The interrelationship of international banks and the risks created by un-
equal standards are eloquently presented in Tarbert, supra note 295, at 1778-81.
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regulator. Eatwell and Taylor have written:
We proposed the establishment of a [WFA] to perform in
the domain of world financial markets what national regu-
lators do in domestic markets. A natural place to build the
WFA is on the foundations of global financial surveillance
and regulation that have already been laid at [BIS] in
Basel.353
Similarly, Mario Giovanoli, General Counsel for BIS, has writ-
ten that the "current process of consensus-building through com-
mittees of national experts" should be worked upon, and "might
benefit from some degree of harmonization and streamlining"
moving in the direction of a senior international regulator. 354
BIS and the CBS, and their formal and informal affiliates, are
not the only institutions that have assumed some measure of inter-
national regulatory control in banking and non-banking. There
are, of course, a number of international organizations without
formal government sanction in the financial and financially related
areas. Some of these have been mentioned in this Article. They in-
clude, in addition to the CBS, the International Organization of Se-
curities Commissions and the International Association of Insur-
ance Supervisors, one of the newer organizations which first met in
1994. Their area of activity has been called, "the world of financial
oversight."355 Essentially non-financial affairs have been interna-
tionally regulated by such organizations as the World Trade Or-
ganization ("WTO"), the International Atomic Energy Agency, the
Marine Fish Conservation Network, the World Health Organiza-
tion ("WHO"), the International Institute for Environment and De-
velopment, the International Council for the Conservation and Res-
toration of Monuments and Sites, and the developing regulation of
353 EATWELL & TAYLOR, supra note 5, at x.
354 Mario Giovanoli, A New Architecture for the Global Financial Market: Legal
Aspects of International Financial Standard Setting, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
LAW: ISSUES FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 3, 56 (Mario Giovanoli ed., 2000). Even
Giovanoli acknowledges, however, that "the emergence of a supranational bodywould appear in any case to be rather unrealistic in the near future." Id.
355 David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence ofInternational Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT'L. L.J. 281, 285 (1998)
(noting the influence of international financial regulatory organizations in formu-
lating international rules, and opining that these organizations should be recog-
nized by international law).
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pharmaceuticals. 356 All reflect the general awareness that the
world is smaller, that it is interrelated, and that international prob-
lems need international solutions.
A telling example of international financial cooperation oc-
curred during the so-called "debt crisis" of the 1980's. Mexico was
the first country to announce that it would be unable to pay its ob-
ligations to foreign banks. Cooperative action averted the crisis,
largely by means of financial infusions by the U.S. Federal Reserve
and central banks of western Europe and Japan. Each country rec-
ognized its own vulnerability and the risks posed by a Mexican de-
fault to its own banks. The international community saw an inter-
national problem and acted collectively.357
Movements towards international accord in various areas are
under way and we can learn from them. The UN sub-group that
deals with international private law, titled the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"), has, in
addition to its many other tasks, been working to harmonize inter-
national insolvency law since 1994. In 1997, it produced a Model
Law on International Insolvency only by dint of a general agree-
ment within UNCITRAL that it would attempt to address only
some four subjects out of the scores that constitute most local in-
solvency laws. In general, UNCITRAL abided by the principle that
the more complex a subject is, the less it is likely to be resolved on
an international basis. Since adoption of the Model Law,
UNCITRAL has attempted to move forward in harmonizing inter-
national insolvency law but has succeeded only in adopting a draft
set of general principles for drafting a single international bank-
ruptcy law.358 Any consideration of the CBS as a single interna-
tional bank regulator would certainly have a similar fate.
356 See generally Joseph G. Contrera, Comment, The Food and Drug Administra-
tion and the International Conference on Harmonization: How Harmonious Will Interna-
tional Pharmaceuticals Regulations Become?, 8 ADMIN L.J. AM. U. 927, 927-60 (1995)
(analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the International Conference on Har-
monization ("ICH"), and suggesting that, in light of the ongoing progress being
made by the conference, critics should suspend judgment on the ICH's success or
failure until its mandate expires).
357 See Brian Quinn, A Central Banker's View About The International Debt Crisis,
in INTERNATIONAL DEBT AND CENTRAL BANKING IN THE 1980s, at 35 (Zannis Res &
Sima Motamen eds., 1987). ("[A] crisis was averted only because all of the parties
involved were prepared to do things which went against instinct.").
358 Cf. Draft Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, U.N. Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law, 29th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.68 (2003) (suggesting
guidelines for the creation of insolvency law).
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The prestige that BIS has achieved in the international banking
arena is undeniable. Section 3 of this Article demonstrates the
range and significance of the issues on which it and its colleagues
in Basel - the most prestigious of which is the CBS - have opined,
and Section 4 shows that their opinions are not only taken seri-
ously but also generally adopted by the major banking countries of
the world.
The CBS has evolved through the years. It is clearly the senior
international voice in bank regulation and has been found accept-
able throughout the world for several reasons. First, the major cen-
tral banks are represented in the CBS and, as in England, where the
central bank does not have the power to regulate, 3 9 the institution
given that power also has a voice within the CBS.360 Each country
has the ability to modify the CBS statements to suit its own bank-
ing structure and finds the CBS acceptable as a central voice for
that reason. No country is required to accept the views of the CBS.
It produces, as has already been mentioned, "soft law." The CBS
has gradually become the voice of reason as a result of its own so-
phistication and insight. When a country accepts a CBS opinion, it
is not surrendering its sovereignty; it is exercising it.
Soft law promulgated by BIS or the CBS is widely adopted by
the international banking community. It represents movement in
the direction of a single international hard law. It is, however, still
far from single regulation of the sort that is widely desired and of-
fered by some as a requirement for a healthy international banking
system. Individual countries continue to have local authority as to
whether to adopt soft law. They may adopt it in different manners
as suits their local societies. They may adopt some and reject some.
At this time, there is no international uniformity.
Conflicts in banking are too great for there to be a single inter-
national regulator. We need name only a few:
1. What should a bank do, or, to rephrase, what is bank-
ing? Different countries define banking in different
ways (or don't bother to define it at all). In the United
States, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the
359 Bank regulatory power is held by the Securities and Investment Board,
created in 1997.
360 "Countries are represented by their central bank and also by the authority
with formal responsibility for the fundamental supervision of banking business
where this is not the central bank." Bank for International Settlements, The Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/index.htm
(last visited Sept. 3, 2004).
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definition of banking, or of what a bank may do, will
necessarily vary from time to time.361 At the same time,
the United States tends to have a more restrictive con-
cept of banking than other major countries where a
bank may own and operate industrial companies.
2. As a consequence of its narrow definition of banking,
the United States has a complex system of bank holding
company regulation. The concept is to prescribe a set of
activities that are financial in nature but still may not be
banking itself. These are included within a set of corpo-
rations that are affiliated with a bank but are not neces-
sarily given as powers to the bank itself. No other
country regulates its banking system in this manner. To
give regulatory power over the world of options to one
central regulator would probably grind the regulatory
gears to a halt.
3. Different countries regulate different types of institu-
tions within their banking structures. The United States
presents the most complex regulatory pattern of all with
commercial banks, savings banks, savings and loan as-
sociations, and credit unions as the prime banking -or
bank type -institutions, each with its own regulatory
structure multiplied by two because of the unique fed-
eral/ state dual banking system. Then there are numer-
ous institutions close to banks like finance companies,
industrial banks and trust companies to name just a
few. They too have regulatory structures.
4. Banking institutions offer different products, both fi-
nancial and non-financial, in different countries. For ex-
ample, while important compromises have been
reached, there is no general agreement within the
United States on the extent to which securities activities
and insurance should be deemed a part of banking and
should be offered by banks.362 The Gramm-Leach Bliley
361 See, e.g., Nationsbank of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S.
251, 258-59 (1995) (holding that the business of banking is not limited to certain
enumerated powers, but to those activities that are within the reasonable limits of
dealing in financial investment instruments).
362 Both securities activities and insurance have been found "closely related
to banking" under the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (2001) (list-
ing definitions) and certain aspects of insurance have been acknowledged to be
part of banking. Id.
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Act of 1999363 has authorized bank holding companies -
but not banks themselves -to offer a full range of secu-
rities and insurance products and services. At the same
time, banks themselves may offer a narrower range of
these same products and services.364 Intercompany
mergers and acquisitions have blurred distinctions
among banks, commercial banks, securities dealers, in-
surance companies, and insurance agencies. Harmoni-
zation on an international level through a single regula-
tory structure is hardly possible into the foreseeable
future.
Given the nature of legal scholarship, it is reasonable to expect
theories to arise around, explain, and predict the process of inter-
national bank regulation. One such theory is called "regime the-
ory." 365  This Article does little more than name it. It applies
mainly to international groupings based upon the agreement of
sovereign states. Another theory, based upon lesser groups, more
like the central banks that comprise the CBS, is called "neofunc-
tional theory." It was devised in response to the proliferation of
alphabet agencies that comprised the New Deal. 366 BIS and the
CBS have generally avoided the abstruse theoretical constructs that
attempt to explain their creation and predict their future. The Au-
thors believe that the work of these organizations can best proceed
without such explanations. The way has been set. New problems
363 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)
("providing a prudential framework for the affiliation of banks, securities firms,
insurance companies, and other financial services ... ").
364 For an instance of national banks in the securities business, see Sec. Indus.
Ass'n v. Comptroller of the Currency, 577 F. Supp. 252, 260 (1982) affd., 758 F.2d
739 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that the National Bank Act "does not limit bank af-filiates to securities transactions solely for pre-existing customers"); for national
banks in the insurance business, see 12 U.S.C. § 92 (2001), which establishes rules
for when national banking associations may solicit and sell insurance as agents of
insurance companies.
365 As articulated by one of its foremost proponents, Robert 0. Keohane, the
regime theory explains the prevalence of regimes as a function of the rational
choice of their members, who enter them to constrain their choices and reduce thetransaction costs of cooperation in an otherwise anarchic international society.
Robert 0. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER 101 (1989).
366 J.L. BRIERLY, THE COVENANT AND THE CHARTER 26 (1947) (comparing the
covenants of the League of Nations with the UN). Part of neofunctional theory isthat the development of some international agencies will stimulate the growth of
others, an evolution called the "spillover effect." Zaring, supra note 355, at 315.
The Authors find this point of view consistent with their position.
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will stimulate additional solutions. A theoretical superstructure
will more likely impede than advance creativity. In this way, the
future of international bank regulation will be a self-creating op-
eration.
The Authors recommend that we both observe and participate
in the process of international bank regulation. Internationaliza-
tion is in evolution. It is moving from a past condition where there
was essentially no international uniformity, to some time in the fu-
ture when, we may reasonably predict, there will be uniform inter-
national bank regulation. Meanwhile, the soft law issuing out of
Basel has moved us a long way. One example of the process of
evolution is the gradual acceptance of the Basel Capital Accord. In
1987, a little more than a year before the accord was issued by the
CBS, the United States and the United Kingdom entered into an
agreement to implement common risk-based capital standards for
banks in their respective countries. 367 A year later, after the CBS
adoption of the Basel Capital Accord in their first version, the full
G-10 countries adopted the standards.
This is the process of evolution which has gone from no law at
all 368 to soft law. It should naturally proceed to hard law and a
single law of international bank regulation. It need not be given
mandatory direction; it need not be subjected to theory. There will
continue to be new needs. They will be given new solutions. In-
ternational bank regulation will, in this manner, continue to ap-
proach and finally to reach the goal of a single mandatory supervi-
sory structure.
8. CONCLUSION
The pace of countries' exposure to world financial and com-
modity markets needs to be carefully managed. It is the time for
the development of international laws and regulatory institutions
to cope with globalization.
The role of an international financial institution is to fuel the
expansion of business globally, and to ensure confidence and li-
367 Duncan E. Alford, Basle Committee International Capital Adequacy Standards:
Analysis and Implications for the Banking Industry, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L. REV. 189, 195-
96 (1992).
368 Three of the major international regulatory organizations in the financial
area, dealing with banking, securities and insurance, "were created informally,"
and have evolved to highly structured, albeit soft law, institutions. Zaring, supra
note 355, at 301.
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quidity in the markets. According to its own course of activity
since its inception, BIS has established itself as a credible, inde-
pendent, and efficient financial institution. We have seen the bank
grow gradually, fulfilling its mission, when called to step in. These
are the fundamentals on which the bank stands tall today, while
gradually expanding its activities.
Expansion of the bank's activities will come by increasing its
authority. In the normal course, a course already set, it will natu-
rally increase its role in coordinating and setting standards for the
activities of central banks. One can see it acquiring certain powers
of intervention. BIS's goal should be to reconcile and integrate dif-
ferent legal and policy frameworks. In the process, it should sim-
plify existing procedures. However, it will need to offer clear
benefits to existing financial institutions, since increasing BIS's au-
thority will require major restructuring, investment, and certainly,
political endorsement. Its role will need to be clearly defined to
avoid overlap with other institutions and to indicate precisely how
its power will be exercised.
BIS should be both allowed and encouraged to evolve towards
a WFA. It should not now be transformed into a WFA. A two-tier
system of supervisory responsibilities has taken over the supervi-
sion of international financial institutions. National authorities
rule at the local level; supranational institutions are finding their
places globally. A division of competence between national and
supranational supervisory entities will be honed and pruned until
the supranational authority will be a formal, lawmaking body. BIS
seems the appropriate institution for this role.
Many prominent bankers, including former U.S. Secretary of
Treasury, Robert E. Rubin have made speeches 369 calling for steps
to strengthen the international financial architecture. Unfortu-
nately, this choice of words conjures up visions of an architect's
blueprint and a floor-to-ceiling renovation, when this is not in fact
how the international financial system evolves. It evolves incre-
mentally, changing marginally in response to pressures from mar-
kets and governments, not discontinuously in response to radical
visions. The existing system is made up of a dense network of so-
cial, economic and financial institutions. As with any network, its
369 See Robert E. Rubin, Speech before the House Committee on Banking and
Financial Institutions (May 20, 1999) (calling for involvement of the private sector
in crises prevention), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/
rr3161.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
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components are lent inertia by their interaction and evolve incre-
mentally in response to technological and other stimuli. So it is
with the international financial system. History supports this in-
terpretation and the associated prediction.
It is anybody's guess how far BIS will go. It is clear, however,
that the bank is heading towards new challenges. As a result, its
role in the international financial architecture will be closely
watched by bankers, regulators, politicians, and the public. At the
end, the last word in deciding whether the bank becomes a WFA
will belong to the financial markets' need for a supranational fi-
nancial supervisor and, assuming the existence of such a need, the
ability of nations to cede a measure of their sovereignty to BIS.
* * * * * *
